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OVERLOOKING TORT CLAIMANTS’ BEST
INTERESTS: NON-DEBTOR RELEASES IN ASBESTOS
BANKRUPTCIES
Joshua M. Silverstein*
The asbestos crisis has spawned the development of extraordinary new
remedies. One of the most dramatic and controversial is known as a “nondebtor release,” a bankruptcy order extinguishing claims against a party who
has not itself filed for bankruptcy. Also known as a “third-party release,” this
form of relief first found acceptance in early asbestos insolvencies. Since that
time, Congress has passed a statute—§ 524(g) of the Bankruptcy Code—that
expressly authorizes non-debtor releases in asbestos reorganizations. Powerful
remedies are subject to abuse, and third-party releases are no exception. In this
article, I argue that bankruptcy courts and litigants have overlooked critical
limits on non-debtor releases—limits contained in both § 524(g) and other
provisions of the Code. The most important restriction is this: Under the best
interest of creditors test set forth in § 1129(a)(7) of the Code, it is permissible to
extinguish the liabilities of a third party over the objection of claimants only
when the plan of reorganization promises payment in full on the released claims.
I.
II.
III.

IV.

*

INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................2
THE ASBESTOS TORT LITIGATION ......................................................7
THE JOHNS-MANVILLE BANKRUPTCY .............................................10
A. Pre-confirmation Proceedings ..............................................................10
B. The Plan of Reorganization..................................................................12
1. The Litigation Trusts .......................................................................12
2. The Channeling Injunction ..............................................................14
3. Plan Approval and Confirmation ....................................................15
C. The MacArthur Insurance Litigation ...................................................16
NON-DEBTOR RELEASES AFTER THE MANVILLE
BANKRUPTCY .........................................................................................19
A. Non-Debtor Releases in General ..........................................................20
1. Non-Debtor Releases Defined.........................................................20
2. The Circuit Split Regarding the Legal Validity of
Non-Debtor Releases ......................................................................22
3. Distinguishing Non-Debtor Releases from Other
Types of Relief ................................................................................28
B. Non-Debtor Releases Involving Insurance ..........................................31
1. The Non-Bankruptcy Rights of Co-Insureds and
Tort Claimants in a Debtor‟s Insurance Policy ...............................31
2. Insurance Policies and Proceeds in Bankruptcy ..............................46

Assistant Professor, William H. Bowen School of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock.
B.A. 1993, Hamilton College. J.D. 1996, New York University School of Law. I would like to
thank Phyllis Silverstein and Javitt Adili for their helpful comments on earlier drafts and Sarah
Elizabeth Pitman for her research assistance. I would also like to thank my colleagues at the
University of Arkansas at Little Rock for their encouragement during the process of writing this
article.

2

UMKC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78:1

V.

SECTION 524(g) OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE .................................55
A. The Purpose and General Structure of Section 524(g) .........................55
B. The Requirements for a Supplemental Injunction
Protecting the Debtor ...........................................................................57
C. Section 524(g)‟s Additional Requirements When
The Injunction Protects Non-Debtors ..................................................61
VI. LIMITATIONS ON ASBESTOS NON-DEBTOR RELEASES ...............66
A. The Varying Scope of Asbestos Non-Debtor Releases ........................66
B. Asbestos Non-Debtor Releases Issued Under §§ 105(a)
and 1123(b)(6)......................................................................................68
C. Asbestos Non-Debtor Releases Issued Under § 524(g) .......................71
1. The Relationship of § 524(g) to General Non-Debtor
Release Law ....................................................................................70
2. Counterarguments Regarding the Payment-In-Full
Requirement ....................................................................................83
3. Asbestos Non-Debtor Releases and the
Fair-and-Equitable Standard ...........................................................93
VII. CONCLUSION ...........................................................................................99
“A strong disease requyreth a stronge medicine.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
The asbestos crisis has bedeviled our legal system for over thirty years. It is
now the “longest-running mass tort litigation in U.S. history.”2 The “avalanche
of asbestos lawsuits” has overwhelmed the civil courts.3 More than seventy
firms have declared bankruptcy as a result of asbestos liability.4 Countless
plaintiffs have been denied full compensation on their claims.5 And courts and
legislatures have been unable to develop a comprehensive answer to the problem.

1

DESIDERIUS ERASMUS, PROVERBS OR ADAGIES WITH NEWE ADDICIONS GATHERED OUT OF THE
CHILIADES OF ERASMUS (photo. reprint 1969) (1539).
2
STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, ASBESTOS LITIGATION vii (2005),
available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG162/ [hereinafter RAND]. The RAND
report is a truly outstanding document. I recommend it to anyone interested in asbestos litigation,
specifically, and mass tort litigation, generally.
3
See In re Combustion Eng‟g, Inc., 391 F.3d 190, 200 (3d Cir. 2004) (“For decades, the state and
federal judicial systems have struggled with an avalanche of asbestos lawsuits.”).
4
See RAND, supra note 2, at 109-10 (estimating that seventy-three asbestos defendants have filed
for bankruptcy through the summer of 2004); id. at 152-53 (listing the seventy-three companies);
Martha Neil, Backing Away from the Abyss: Courts May Be Starting to Get a Grip on Asbestos
Litigation, 92 A.B.A. J., Sept. 2006, at 26, 29 (“To date, an estimated [eighty-five] companies have
filed for bankruptcy claiming asbestos liabilities as the cause.”).
5
See RAND, supra note 2, at 114-15 (noting that many bankrupt asbestos defendants have not been
able to pay asbestos plaintiffs in full through their reorganizations). For more on this point, see
infra notes 469-72 and accompanying text.
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Although a global resolution remains out of reach, experimentation with
piecemeal remedies has proceeded since the early stages of the litigation. Courts
have developed new procedures to deal with the size and complexity of asbestos
cases. Moreover, legislatures have enacted a range of statutes to address various
aspects of the asbestos quandary.
One of the most dramatic remedies to emerge from the crisis is known as a
“non-debtor release.”6 Similar in effect to the discharge granted to bankrupt
debtors,7 a non-debtor release is a bankruptcy order extinguishing the liabilities
of a party who has not itself filed for bankruptcy.8 Also known as a “third-party
release,” such a release is typically justified on the ground that the benefiting
non-debtor is making a financial contribution to the debtor‟s estate—a
contribution that is necessary for the success of the debtor‟s reorganization.9
Non-debtor releases first received judicial approval in the reorganization of
the Johns-Manville Corporation, one of the earliest asbestos insolvencies brought
under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.10 The Manville case lent considerable
legitimacy to third-party releases.11 Shortly thereafter, increasing numbers of
debtors began adding such provisions to their plans of reorganization, including
parties driven into bankruptcy as a result of non-asbestos liabilities.12 And many
courts granted the requested relief, generally finding the authority to issue thirdparty releases in § 105(a) of the Code,13 the primary source of the bankruptcy
courts‟ general equitable powers. However, other courts adopted a contrary
view, typically ruling that non-debtor releases are prohibited by § 524(e) of the
Code; that statute provides that discharging the debtor from a debt does not
impact any liability of a third party for the discharged debt.14
The legality of third-party releases remains controversial in non-asbestos
cases,15 but their legitimacy in the asbestos context is now well established. In
1994, Congress added § 524(g)16 to the Bankruptcy Code.17 This statute grants

6

See In re Transit Group, Inc., 286 B.R. 811, 820 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2002) (“Non-debtor releases
are extraordinary and should be reserved for unusual circumstances.”); Joshua M. Silverstein,
Hiding in Plain View: A Neglected Supreme Court Decision Resolves the Debate Over Non-Debtor
Releases in Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 23 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 13, 68 (2006) (explaining that
non-debtor releases “are a drastic form of relief”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
7
See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 523-24, 727, 944, 1141(d), 1328 (2006).
8
See infra Part IV.A.1.
9
See, e.g., In re Master Mortgage Inv. Fund, Inc., 168 B.R. 930, 938 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1994)
(finding that without a release, the non-debtors would not have made contributions that enabled the
debtor to formulate a workable plan and allowed creditors to recover in full).
10
See RAND, supra note 2, at 110-11.
11
The Manville bankruptcy is discussed in Part III, infra.
12
See, e.g., In re A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 88 B.R. 742, 754-55 (E.D. Va. 1988) (mass tort case
involving the Dalkon Shield holding that courts may grant non-debtor releases pursuant to their
“equitable and inherent” power under the Bankruptcy Code), aff‟d, 880 F.2d 694 (4th Cir. 1989).
13
11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2006).
14
Id. § 524(e).
15
See infra Part IV.A.2 (summarizing the split in the courts); Part IV.B (addressing some special
features of the split concerning insurance).
16
11 U.S.C. § 524(g) (2006).
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courts extensive additional powers in reorganizations initiated by debtors because
of asbestos liabilities.18 Included in the list of powers is the authority to grant a
non-debtor release to certain parties related to the debtor who are alleged to be
responsible for the debtor‟s asbestos obligations.19
Since the adoption of § 524(g), numerous courts have issued third-party
releases in asbestos cases.20 But many of these courts have cited both § 524(g)
and § 105(a) as authority for such releases, perhaps because the precise scope of
§ 524(g) is unclear, creating a danger that a given release falls beyond its scope.21
In this article, I contend that critical limitations on non-debtor releases,
whether the release is granted under § 524(g) or § 105(a), are not being addressed
by the courts in asbestos bankruptcies. The most important of these limitations is
that, under the best interests of creditors test,22 it is only permissible to extinguish
the liabilities of a third party over the objection of claimants when the plan of
reorganization promises payment in full on the released claims. Because so few
judicial opinions confirming reorganization plans in asbestos insolvencies have
considered this requirement, numerous tort plaintiffs have been deprived of an
alternative source of compensation without receiving the mandated assurance of
full payment.
One reason that courts are overlooking applicable safeguards may be that
asbestos claimants are not fully aware of such protections, and thus they are
waiving their rights, either by voting for the plan, or by failing to object to
confirmation. If so, this article is all the more necessary because it will serve to
educate both courts and litigants about the legal principles that govern asbestos
non-debtor releases.
The best research indicates that the asbestos crisis will not abate until the
middle of this century.23 Through 2002, 730,000 persons had brought claims for
asbestos injuries.24 But “[t]ens of millions of Americans” were exposed to the
substance.25 Thus, while the pace of filings has decreased from the highs of the
17

Section 524(g) was enacted as part of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394,
108 Stat. 4106 (1994).
18
See infra Part V.
19
See 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4).
20
See infra Part VI.
21
See infra Parts V.C., VI.B.
22
11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (requiring that dissenting creditors in a Chapter 11 reorganization receive
at least as much they would receive if the debtor liquidated under Chapter 7).
23
RAND, supra note 2, at 17-18 (citing studies that predict continued cancer deaths resulting from
asbestos up through 2049); see also Samuel Issacharoff, “Shocked”: Mass Torts and Aggregate
Asbestos Litigation After Amchem and Ortiz, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1925, 1925 (2002) (after setting forth
some sobering statistics, the author concludes that “it is readily apparent that the end of asbestos
litigation is decades away”).
24
RAND, supra note 2, at xxxiv, 2, 70-71; see also Lester Brickman, An Analysis of the Financial
Impact of S. 852: The Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act of 2005, 27 CARDOZO L. REV.
991, 992 (2005) (“Since each plaintiff sues approximately sixty to seventy different defendants and
bankruptcy trusts, the total number of claims probably exceeds 50,000,000.”).
25
RAND, supra note 2, at 2. Expert testimony at one hearing indicated that 25 million Americans
came into contact with asbestos-containing products and that 12 million of those people were still
alive in 1998. See In re Nat‟l Gypsum Co., 257 B.R. 184, 196 n.3 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2000).
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late 1990s and early 2000s,26 some experts estimate that more than half of the
total claims have yet to be asserted.27
The more recent waves of litigation have driven an increasing number of
defendants into bankruptcy.28 This trend is expected to persist.29 Section 524(g)
will thus continue to play a crucial role in addressing asbestos liabilities.30 And
non-debtor releases, issued under both that statute and § 105(a), are certain to be
a regular feature of asbestos bankruptcies.31 Accordingly, the need for careful
exploration of the powers granted by § 524(g) is pressing. Most of the
scholarship on the statute, however, has focused on other parts of the law.32 This

26

See RAND, supra note 2, at xxxiv, 72-73 (noting that the rate of filings increased significantly in
the late 1990s and early 2000s); Patrick M. Hanlon & Anne Smetak, Asbestos Changes, 62 N.Y.U.
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 525, 593-95 (2007) (documenting a decrease in claims filed in 2004 and 2005).
27
RAND, supra note 2, at 105-06; see also id. at xxvi (noting that, as of the end of 2002, while
“[e]stimates . . . vary, . . . at most, only about three-quarters of . . . claimants have come forward”);
Brickman, supra note 24, at 992 (“[T]he latest estimates are that 1,000,000 new claimants will
emerge over the next forty-five years.”). According to one well-respected estimate, over 120,000
cancer deaths resulting from asbestos had not yet occurred as of 2005. See RAND, supra note 2, at
15.
28
See RAND, supra note 2, at 109-10 (of the estimated seventy-three asbestos bankruptcies
through the summer of 2004, thirty-seven were commenced in 2000 or later).
29
See James L. Stengel, The Asbestos End-Game, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 223, 266 (2006)
(predicting “substantial additions” to the list of asbestos bankruptcies if Congress fails to pass
comprehensive reform legislation); Hanlon & Smetak, supra note 26, at 603 (predicting that
changes in asbestos litigation will motivate “more and more companies . . . to seek the resolution . .
. that bankruptcy provides”). For a recent asbestos bankruptcy filing, see Prepackaged Plan of
Reorganization of T H Agriculture & Nutrition, L.L.C. Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code,
In re T H Agric. & Nutrition, L.L.C., No. 08-14692 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 24, 2008).
30
Katherine Porter, Recent Issues in Asbestos Bankruptcies, NORTON ANN. S URV. B ANKR . L., Oct.
2004 Part I § H, at 224 (“The scope and security of the protection [offered by the statute] have
rendered § 524(g) the favored method for resolving asbestos liability.”).
31
Cf. Susan Power Johnston & Katherine Porter, Extension of Section 524(g) of the Bankruptcy
Code to Nondebtor Parents, Affiliates, and Transaction Parties, 59 BUS. LAW. 503, 512 (2004)
(“The most remarkable, and desirable, power of § 524(g) is the statute‟s authorization of a broad
channeling injunction that offers protection to a broad group of parties in interest, in addition to
protecting the debtor.”); see also In re Combustion Eng‟g, Inc., 391 F.3d 190, 204 (3d Cir. 2004)
(observing that ABB Limited, the ultimate parent of the debtor, moved the debtor into bankruptcy
to “cleanse” both the debtor and two non-bankrupt affiliates of asbestos liabilities).
32
See, e.g., S. Todd Brown, Section 524(g) Without Compromise: Voting Rights and the Asbestos
Bankruptcy Paradox, 2008 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 841 (2008) (offering various criticisms of the
operation of 524(g) with a particular focus on the deprivation of future claimants‟ rights); William
P. Shelley et al., The Need for Transparency Between the Tort System and Section 524(g) Asbestos
Trusts, 17 NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 2 Art. 3 257 (2008) (arguing that a lack of transparency in
the operating procedures of asbestos litigation trusts has enabled some plaintiffs to obtain double
recovery on their claims, unfairly burdening defendants); Mark D. Plevin et al., The Future Claims
Representative in Prepackaged Bankruptcies: Conflicts of Interest, Strange Alliances, and
Unfamiliar Duties for Burdened Bankruptcy Courts, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 271, 272 (2006)
[hereinafter Plevin et al., Future Claims Representative] (arguing that, by allowing debtors and
present claimants to appoint future claims representatives, courts have denied future claimants
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article begins the necessary exploration of § 524(g)‟s non-debtor release
provisions.33 It also addresses asbestos third-party releases granted under §
105(a).
Part II briefly reviews the asbestos-related tort litigation. Part III provides
an overview of the Manville bankruptcy, perhaps the most significant event in
the history of the asbestos litigation crisis. Part IV contains a detailed survey of
the law governing third-party releases in non-asbestos cases. Part V outlines §
524(g) and the case law implementing the act.
Part VI contains the main argument of this Article. In it, I identify and
explain the critical protections overlooked by courts and litigants alike,
protections that should be addressed before a non-debtor release is granted in an
asbestos case. The most crucial protection is that tort claimants have a legal right
to demand payment in full under the reorganization plan on any extinguished
claims against third parties. Finally, the Conclusion offers some closing remarks.
proper and independent representation in bankruptcy cases); Brickman, supra note 24, at 1000-01
n.34 (arguing that instead of structuring § 524(g) litigation trusts to “effectively distinguish” valid
and invalid tort claims, trusts are structured “to favor the interests of the lawyers controlling the
trusts‟ creation by, for example, paying their claims earlier and at higher levels than claims that
arise later in the process without regard to merit or causation”); Katherine M. Anand, Note,
Demanding Due Process: The Constitutionality of the § 524 Channeling Injunction and Trust
Mechanisms that Effectively Discharge Asbestos Claims in Chapter 11 Reorganization, 80 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1187, 1199-1211, 1222 (2005) (concluding that § 524(g) is unconstitutional because
it deprives future claimants of procedural due process by permitting a court to discharge future
claims without giving the claimants an adequate opportunity to participate in the case).
Much of the criticism applicable to courts‟ implementation of § 524(g), flows from the
non-judicial and expedited procedures used in pre-packaged bankruptcies. A “pre-packaged”
reorganization is one in which “plan negotiations, distribution of disclosure statements, and voting
all take place before the bankruptcy case is filed.” Mark D. Plevin et al., Pre-Packaged Asbestos
Bankruptcies: A Flawed Solution, 44 S. TEX. L. REV. 883, 888 (2003) [hereinafter Plevin et al.,
Pre-Packaged Asbestos Bankruptcies]. In such cases, the debtor usually files its disclosure
statement and plan of reorganization along with its Chapter 11 petition. Id. Asbestos debtors often
use the “pre-pack structure.” See id. at 889-907 (summarizing three asbestos pre-packs). Plevin
and his co-authors argue that because plan negotiations in such cases generally take place in secret,
the future claims representative is unable to effectively act on behalf of the future claimants, and
conflicts of interest infect the process. See id. at 907-08. As a result, various provisions of §
524(g) and other parts of the Code are violated. See, e.g., id. at 907-08 (explaining that because the
negotiations take place in secret, plaintiffs‟ lawyers who know about the negotiation are able to
obtain favorable treatment for their clients vis-à-vis other asbestos claimants); id. at 913-16
(explaining that, in pre-packs, similarly situated tort claimants “generally do not receive similar
treatment”); see also Ronald Barliant et al., From Free-Fall to Free-For-All: The Rise of PrePackaged Asbestos Bankruptcies, 12 AM . BANKR . INST. L. R EV. 441 (2004) (presenting numerous
criticisms of “pre-packaged” asbestos bankruptcies, including conflicts of interest, improper
conversion of present claims into future claims, improper classification of claims, and
discriminatory treatment of claims); id. at 446 (contending that “the rapid pace at which [asbestos]
bankruptcies are conducted” has lead to the sacrifice of “the procedural and substantive
requirements of the Bankruptcy Code”); RAND, supra note 2, at 119 (noting that pre-packs can
reduce the length of asbestos bankruptcies “to as little as three to six months”).
33
It should be noted that two essays have discussed the non-debtor release provisions of § 524(g).
See Porter, supra note 30, at 219-40; see Johnston & Porter, supra note 31, at 503-26.
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II. THE ASBESTOS TORT LITIGATION
Asbestos is a strong, durable, fireproof, heat-resistant material.34 It is also
“abundant and inexpensive to mine and process.”35 As a result, asbestos was
used in numerous commercial and residential settings up through the 1970s.36
Products that contained asbestos included building insulation,37 construction
materials, and automotive parts such as brake linings.38
Unfortunately, asbestos is extremely dangerous. It gives off fibers that can
permanently lodge in a person‟s lungs if inhaled.39 These particles can cause a
variety of lung ailments, such as lung cancer (including malignant
mesothelioma), asbestosis, and pleural plaque (which is a “harmful buildup that
lines the lungs”).40 While these illnesses vary in seriousness, all can be deadly.41
Asbestos is also linked to numerous diseases unrelated to the lungs.42
Asbestos has a very long latency period. A person usually does not become
ill until twenty to forty years after his or her first exposure.43 Moreover, while
persons who directly handled asbestos are the ones most often impacted, many
have been infected, and sometimes even killed, by inhaling fibers carried on the
clothing of family members.44
While the hazardous nature of asbestos has been known for thousands of
years,45 it was not until the publication of Dr. Irving Selikoff‟s breakthrough
medical research in the 1960s that litigation started to take off.46 The pace of
filings accelerated further after the 1973 Borel v. Fibreboard decision,47 in which
the Fifth Circuit ruled that asbestos manufacturers were strictly liable to persons
injured because of exposure to their product.48 These cases brought to light
evidence that manufacturers were aware of the dangers of asbestos as far back as
the 1930s but did not disclose the risks.49

34

RAND, supra note 2, at 11; Frank J. Macchiarola, The Manville Personal Injury Settlement
Trust: Lessons for the Future, 17 CARDOZO L. R EV. 583, 588 (1996).
35
RAND, supra note 2, at 11.
36
Id.
37
Macchiarola, supra note 34, at 588.
38
Stengel, supra note 29, at 226.
39
Macchiarola, supra note 34, at 588.
40
Id. at 588-89.
41
Findley v. Blinken (In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig.), 129 B.R. 710, 740 (Bankr. E. &
S.D.N.Y. 1991), vacated, 982 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1992).
42
RAND, supra note 2, at xix. For a good overview of the health impacts of asbestos, see id. at 1214.
43
Id. at 15 (“Typically, [twenty] to [forty] years elapse between the first exposure to asbestos and
disease manifestation.”).
44
Macchiarola, supra note 34, at 589.
45
Id.
46
Id. at 592.
47
RAND, supra note 2, at 1; Stengel, supra note 29, at 230 (explaining that asbestos litigation saw
a “virtual explosion” after Borel).
48
Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973).
49
RAND, supra note 2, at 22.
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Asbestos litigation soon began to overwhelm the legal system.50 First, the
total number of cases introduced complex aggregation and joinder issues.51
Second, asbestos litigation is “extremely complicated.”52 For example, the long
latency period and widespread use of asbestos raised difficult questions of
causation and proof, as well as challenging procedural issues regarding statute of
limitations and collateral estoppel.53
These challenges forced the courts to develop “unusual or imaginative
solutions”54 ranging from new docket practices and case management
techniques,55 to the increased usage of special masters and expert advisors to
juries.56 One commentator concludes that the judges presiding over asbestos
cases frequently transformed their role from “passive administrator of justice” to
“active participant in the litigation.”57 In addition to the courts, state legislatures
adopted new laws to address aspects of the litigation.58
While these legal developments brought about some positive results, the
asbestos crisis is far from over.59 And it has changed in shape over time. During
the first phase of the litigation, most claims flowed from industries where
working conditions exposed employees to high concentrations of asbestos
fibers—including asbestos mining and manufacturing, construction, the railroads,
and shipping.60
Ultimately, the crush of lawsuits compelled numerous
defendants operating in these fields to declare bankruptcy.61 The plaintiffs then
shifted their focus to more peripheral companies62 operating in other fields of

50

Id. at 28 (noting that courts “struggled to manage asbestos caseloads”).
See RAND, supra note 2, at 28, 43-44; Macchiarola, supra note 34, at 594 n.60.
52
Macchiarola, supra note 34, at 594.
53
Id. at 594-95 & n.60. It should also be noted that asbestos litigation is incredibly expensive. See
generally, RAND, supra note 2, at 92-106 (noting, inter alia, that the total costs of the asbestos
litigation was roughly seventy billion dollars through 2002, and that forty billion dollars went to
litigation costs; the amount actually paid to claimants was only thirty billion dollars). Some experts
predict that the total economic cost of asbestos personal injury claims will be $265 billion. See
RAND, supra note 2, at 105.
54
Macchiarola, supra note 34, at 590; accord RAND, supra note 2, at xx (“Trial judges developed
innovative procedures in the 1980s to manage large asbestos caseloads.”).
55
See, e.g., RAND, supra note 2, at 28-30 (summarizing “case aggregation” techniques
implemented by courts, such as global case management orders, multi-party settlement
negotiations, pre-trial and trial consolidations, and transferring all cases in a given jurisdiction to a
single court, among other techniques).
56
Macchiarola, supra note 34, at 590 n.33, 595.
57
Id. at 590-91.
58
See, e.g., RAND, supra note 2, at 25 (discussing changes to statutes of limitations to assist
plaintiffs who do not discover their injuries until years after exposure).
59
See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
60
RAND, supra note 2, at 76.
61
See RAND, supra note 2, at 48 (“As filings surged, many of the asbestos product manufacturers
that plaintiff attorneys had traditionally targeted as lead defendants filed for bankruptcy.”); see also
id. at 111 (listing the companies in the initial wave of asbestos bankruptcies, which includes key
players such as Johns-Manville, UNR, and Celotex).
62
Id. at xxiii.
51
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commerce.63 Many of these firms had only a tangential connection to asbestos.64
Through 2002, at least 8400 distinct parties had been named as defendants in
asbestos lawsuits,65 and the alleged tortfeasors come from a broad spectrum of
U.S. industries, though the litigation has been heaviest in a select few.66
Another change was the dramatic increase in the number of lawsuits filed
by parties who are “unimpaired”—i.e., their medical condition does not inhibit
their capacity to perform everyday activities, though they have suffered legally
cognizable injuries.67 Plaintiffs with claims of this type appear to be an
increasing portion of new actions.68
These changes have driven courts to develop further procedural innovations
such as deferred and expedited dockets.69 And state legislatures have once again
passed laws in an attempt to address the situation, including new venue rules to
restrict forum shopping and mass consolidations70 and “medical criteria
legislation” that “require plaintiffs to provide evidence at the outset of the case
that they have a physical impairment due to asbestos . . . exposure.”71
Throughout the history of the asbestos crisis, courts and legislators have
made several attempts to implement a global resolution. The courts focused on
the usage of settlement class actions. But these efforts were stymied by the

63

Id. at 76-77.
See, e.g., Kenneth S. Rivlin & Jamaica D. Potts, Not So Fast: The Sealed Air Asbestos Settlement
and Methods of Risk Management in the Acquisition of Companies with Asbestos Liabilities, 11
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 626, 626-28 (2003) (summarizing how Sealed Air Corporation, a company
that never manufactured or used asbestos-containing materials in its products, got drawn into the
asbestos litigation).
65
RAND, supra note 2, at 79.
66
Id. at 81-84.
67
Id. at xxv, 7-8.
68
Id. at xxv, 75-76; Barliant, supra note 32, at 443 (“Recent studies indicate that up to ninety
percent of current asbestos claims are filed by unimpaired claimants.”).
69
RAND, supra note 2, at xxi (discussing “deferred dockets,” a system under which plaintiffs who
are not “functionally impaired but who do have a legally cognizable injury,” can file an action to
avoid the statute of limitations bar, but the action is not actually litigated until the plaintiff develops
more serious symptoms); id. (discussing “expedited dockets,” which are dockets that permit
plaintiffs with more serious injuries to litigate their claims first).
70
Hanlon & Smetak, supra note 26, at 569-83.
71
Id. at 566-67.
64
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Supreme Court decisions in the Amchem and Ortiz cases.72 And Congress has
been unable to enact a comprehensive statutory solution.73
Given these failures, bankruptcy remains a critical forum for the resolution
of asbestos liability.74 And corporate debtors will continue using the bankruptcy
system to shield related non-debtors from asbestos lawsuits. The first case in
which an appellate court approved of such protection was the bankruptcy of
Johns-Manville. Part III reviews that case in detail.
III. THE JOHNS-MANVILLE BANKRUPTCY
A. Pre-confirmation Proceedings
The Johns-Manville Corporation was the world‟s largest producer of
asbestos and one of the leading manufacturers of asbestos products.75 As a result
of the scientific studies of asbestos published in the 1960s, an increasing number
of product liability lawsuits were filed against the company throughout that
decade and the 1970s.76 By the early 1980s, Manville was a defendant in

72

See Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997); Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815
(1999); RAND, supra note 2, at xx-xxi (summarizing the failed attempts to address asbestos
litigation via settlement class actions (“When the settlement was rejected by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Amchem Products v. Windsor, and when the Court subsequently rejected a similar class
settlement of asbestos claims against another major defendant in Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., efforts
to achieve a global resolution of asbestos litigation through class action litigation collapsed.”
(internal citations omitted))); see also id. at xx (“To date, notwithstanding extensive efforts over
time, neither the parties nor the courts have arrived at a comprehensive settlement of asbestos
claims.”).
73
See Stengel, supra note 29, at 241 & nn.83-86 (identifying various congressional proposals and
observing that “so far these efforts have not resulted in a solution”); Neil, supra note 4, at 28
(noting that many practitioners involved in asbestos litigation doubt that national legislation
resolving the crisis will ever be passed).
74
See Plevin et al., Future Claims Representative, supra note 32, at 272 (“Section 524(g) arguably
provides the only current mechanism by which a company free itself from” from the drag of
asbestos liability, “providing even healthy companies with unusual incentives to enter bankruptcy
to take advantage of this benefit.”); Fred S. Hodara & Robert J. Stark, Protecting Distributions for
Commercial Creditors in Asbestos-Related Chapter 11 Cases, 10 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 383, 388
(2001) (“Following Windsor and Ortiz, Chapter 11 appears to be the only viable legal procedure for
global resolution of a company‟s mass asbestos-related exposure.”); cf. RAND, supra note 2, at xx
(observing that one of “the most significant developments” in the first half of this decade was “the
increased use of bankruptcy reorganization to develop administrative processes for resolving
current and future claims.”).
75
Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 843 F.2d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 1988).
For a brief but excellent history of Manville and its litigation troubles, see generally Macchiarola,
supra note 34, at 591-96.
76
In re Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d at 639.
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approximately 12,500 lawsuits brought by over 16,000 plaintiffs.77 And parties
were filing new claims at a rate of 425 per month.78
Nonetheless, Manville had sufficient financial resources to meet its existing
obligations to current tort claimants and commercial creditors.79 The company‟s
primary concern was future liabilities.80 Manville‟s internal epidemiological
studies indicated that persons exposed to the company‟s asbestos would
ultimately file approximately 50,000 to 100,000 additional claims.81 All
together, Manville estimated it faced approximately two-billion dollars in
potential liability.82 In short, the company was a “financially besieged enterprise
in desperate need of reorganization of its crushing real debt, both present and
future.”83 Manville thus filed for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11 on
August 26, 1982.84
The Manville bankruptcy was one of the most complicated in history,85 due
largely to the scope and nature of the debtor‟s tort liability. The company hoped
to resolve all of its asbestos obligations through Chapter 11.86 This meant that
the bankruptcy process had to address “future asbestos health claimants.” 87
These claimants were persons “who had been exposed to Manville‟s asbestos
prior to the August 1982 petition date but had not yet shown any signs of
disease.”88 Because they were not ill during the pendency of the case, none of
these parties filed claims in the bankruptcy.89 Their identities were thus

77

Id.
Id.
79
See id. (“From the outset of the reorganization, all concerned recognized that the impetus for
Manville‟s action was not a present inability to meet debts.”).
80
See id.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. 618, 632 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) (internal quotation marks
omitted), aff‟d, 78 B.R. 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff‟d, 843 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1988).
84
3Kane v. Johns-Manville (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 843 F.2d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 1988).
Kane v. Johns-Manville (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 843 F.2d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 1988).
85
In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. at 624. As the Bankruptcy Court elaborated:
Indeed, this case is also one of the most hard fought in reorganization annals. It has
been estimated that there have been some 900 applications or motions, over 1000
orders, approximately 55 adversary proceedings, over 40 appeals (not including writs
addressed to the U.S. Supreme Court), 300 odd hearings and thousands of pages of
court transcripts.
Id.
86
In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 743, 745 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984) (“From the inception of
this case, it has been obvious to all concerned that the very purpose of the initiation of these
proceedings is to deal in some fashion with claimants exposed to the ravages of asbestos dust who
have not as of the filing date manifested symptoms of asbestos disease.”), aff‟d, 52 B.R. 940
(S.D.N.Y. 1985).
87
In re Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d at 639.
88
Id.
89
Id.
78
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unknown.90 Moreover, the Asbestos Health Committee appointed to represent
creditors suffering personal injury was only willing to represent present
claimants—persons who had already developed an asbestos-related disease.91
Finally, the case law was deeply divided over whether future claimants even
possessed “claims” cognizable in bankruptcy proceedings.92 Historically,
bankruptcy was not available to discharge “future obligations to unidentified
persons who cannot, even theoretically, appear in the case to protect their own
interest.”93
Judge Lifland (the presiding bankruptcy judge) resolved the procedural
problem of future claimant participation in the formulation of the debtor‟s plan of
reorganization by appointing a legal representative for those parties.94 The court
reasoned that even if the future claimants did not have bankruptcy “claims,” they
were at least “parties in interest” under § 1109(b) and thus were entitled to be
heard in the case.95 The substantive issue—how to address the future claimants‟
right to tort damages—was left for the plan of reorganization.
B. THE PLAN OF REORGANIZATION
1. The Litigation Trusts
Manville‟s plan of reorganization needed to provide relief for current
asbestos victims “without exhausting the resources necessary to care for
tomorrow‟s.”96 At the same time, it had to address the rights of the debtor‟s
general creditors and shareholders.97 The ultimate plan was the “product of more
than four years of effort to grapple with a social, economic and legal crisis of
national importance within the statutory framework of [C]hapter 11.”98 And it

90

Id.
See Manville Corp. v. The Equity Sec. Holders‟ Comm. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 60 B.R.
842, 845 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), rev‟d, 801 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1986).
92
See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. 618, 628-29 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) (reviewing case
law), aff‟d, 78 B.R. 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff‟d, 843 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1988). The Code defines
“claim” to mean, inter alia, a “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment,
liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal,
equitable, secured, or unsecured.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (2006). The courts remains split on
whether this definition encompasses future claims. Plevin et al., Future Claims Representative,
supra note 32, at 276 n.11 (summarizing the split).
93
Plevin et al., Future Claims Representative, supra note 32, at 277.
94
In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 743 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff‟d, 52 B.R. 940 (S.D.N.Y.
1985).
95
Id. at 748-49, aff‟d, 52 B.R. at 943. Section 1109(b) provides that a “party in interest . . . may
raise and may appear and be heard on any issue in a case under this chapter.” 11 U.S.C. § 1109(b).
96
See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 78 B.R. 407, 408 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff‟d, 843 F.2d 636 (2d Cir.
1988).
97
Id.
98
In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. 618, 621 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff‟d, 78 B.R. 407
(S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff‟d, 843 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1988).
91
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was marked by the usage of extraordinary remedies necessary to address the
mass tort at the heart of the proceeding.99
The centerpiece of Manville‟s reorganization plan was the creation of two
trusts—the “Asbestos Health Trust”100 and the “Property Damage Trust”101—
with the responsibility for liquidating and satisfying all asbestos-related claims
against the debtor, including future claims.102 The reorganization plan placed
those with asbestos property damage claims in Class Three.103 Present asbestos
health claims were put in Class Four.104 Future asbestos health claimants were
not included in any traditional plan class; instead, they were separately grouped
under the heading “other asbestos obligations.”105 The AH Trust was established
for parties suffering from asbestos-related diseases106—i.e., parties holding either
Class Four claims or other asbestos obligations. Under the terms of this Trust, a
claimant suffering personal injury caused by Manville‟s asbestos first had to
engage in settlement negotiations with representatives of the Trust.107 If the
parties failed to resolve the dispute, the claimant could elect mediation, binding
arbitration, or tort litigation in civil court.108 The claimant was permitted to
collect in full any compensatory damages awarded via these proceedings.109 The
PD Trust was similarly structured, but with the purpose of resolving asbestosrelated property claims110—i.e., Class Three claims.
Manville initially funded the AH Trust with $815 million in previously-held
cash, receivables, and insurance proceeds from settlements with its liability
insurance carriers.111 The plan also obligated Manville to pay the AH Trust $75
million per year for twenty-four years post-reorganization, commencing three
years after the Trust‟s creation.112 Together, these funding arrangements would
ultimately provide the AH Trust with over $2.5 billion.113

99

The bankruptcy court described the plan as “of necessity, both creative and pragmatic.” Id.
The “AH Trust.”
101
The “PD Trust.”
102
See Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 843 F.2d 636, 640 (2d Cir.
1988) (describing the AH Trust as the “cornerstone” of the plan); In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68
B.R. at 621-22 (outlining the key features of the two Trusts). The Trusts were “[o]ne of the most
innovative and unique features of the Manville Plan of Reorganization.” Id. at 621.
103
In re Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d at 640 n.1. Parties in this class included “schools,
colleges, hospitals, government bodies, and other persons and entities.” State Gov‟t Creditors
Comm. v. McKay (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 920 F.2d 121, 123 (2d Cir. 1990).
104
In re Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d at 640 n.1.
105
Id.
106
In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. at 621.
107
In re Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d at 640.
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. at 622.
111
Id. at 621.
112
Id.
113
Id.
100
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The reorganization plan also mandated that the AH Trust “own or have
access to up to eighty-percent of Manville‟s common stock.”114 And the Trust
possessed the right to receive up to twenty percent of the reorganized debtor‟s
profits, beginning four years after the Trust‟s inception, and continuing
indefinitely, until all asbestos health claims were satisfied.115
The PD Trust received $125 million and a portion of the insurance
settlement proceeds.116 In addition, the PD Trust was entitled to receive any
remaining assets of the AH Trust after all of the personal injury claims were
paid.117
2. The Channeling Injunction
Under the plan, Manville‟s post-bankruptcy operations were a critical
source of funding for the AH and PD Trusts. The success of the Trusts was
dependent upon maximizing and preserving the reorganized debtor‟s value as a
going concern.118 Accordingly, Manville needed protection from the prospect of
continued tort litigation after the company emerged from Chapter 11 so that it
would be free to earn the profits necessary to fund the Trusts.119
The discharge120 was not, by itself, sufficient to achieve that end because it
was unclear whether future asbestos claimants held “claims” that were
dischargeable in the bankruptcy.121 Accordingly, the plan provided that the
Bankruptcy Court would issue an injunction to “supplement” the effect of the

114

Id.
Id.
116
Id. at 622.
117
Id.
118
Id. (“The imperative rather, is to ensure . . . the continuing viability of the reorganized
corporation, which will fund the Trust, whatever the number and amount of claims happen to be.”);
Kane v. Johns-Manville (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 843 F.2d 636, 640 (2d Cir. 1988) (“The
purpose of the Trust is to provide a means of satisfying Manville‟s ongoing personal injury liability
while allowing Manville to maximize its value by continuing as an ongoing concern.”).
119
See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d at 640.
120
Under § 1141(d), the confirmation of a plan of reorganization discharges a corporate debtor
from all of its pre-confirmation debts (with limited exceptions). 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1), (3) & (6)
(2006). Section 524 sets forth the precise impact of a discharge. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2)
(the discharge serves as injunction barring all attempts to collect on any debt “as a personal liability
of the debtor”); id. at § 524(e) (the discharge “does not affect the liability of any other entity on, or
the property of any other entity for, such debt”).
121
As noted previously, the case law was divided on whether future claimants hold bankruptcy
“claims.” See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text. Confirmation of a reorganization plan
only “discharges the debtor from any debt.” 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1)(A) (2006). And a debt is
defined as “liability on a claim.” Id. § 101(12). Therefore, if the future claimants did not hold
“claims,” Manville‟s potential liability to them would not be discharged. See also id. §
1141(d)(1)(A) (“[C]onfirmation of a plan . . . discharges the debtor from any debt that arose before
the date of such confirmation” (emphasis added)).
115
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discharge.122 That injunction bars any person from asserting “Claims, Interests or
Other Asbestos Obligations . . . against the Debtor or its subsidiaries or any
settling insurance company.”123 Parties with future claims are covered via the
term “Other Asbestos Obligations.”124 Present and future asbestos claimants are
thus limited to recovery from the Trusts.125 As Judge Lifland explained, “the
injunction, effectively channels all asbestos related claims and obligations away
from the reorganized entity and targets [them] towards the AH and PD Trusts for
resolution.”126 The channeling injunction was designed to ensure that the future
claimants would be treated the same as present claimants under the plan even
though they were not allowed full creditor status.127 Both sets of parties were
entitled to a complete recovery from the Trusts,128 but were restricted from suing
Manville and the settling insurance carriers.
3. Plan Approval and Confirmation
The promise of recovery in full to asbestos claimants was not a guarantee.
As part of its ruling on “feasibility,”129 the bankruptcy court found that Manville
established “by convincing evidence” that it would be able to meet its obligations
under the plan.130 But, full recovery for asbestos claimants was ultimately

122

In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. 618, 624 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff‟d, 78 B.R. 407
(S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff‟d, 843 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1988).
123
Id. (quoting the plan) (internal quotation marks omitted).
124
See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d at 640.
.
125
See id. (“The Injunction provides that asbestos health claimants may proceed only against the
Trust to satisfy their claims and may not sue Manville, its other operating entities, and certain other
specified parties, including Manville‟s insurers.”).
126
In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. at 624.
127
In re Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d at 640. As with the bankruptcy court‟s conclusion that §
1109(b) permitted appointment of a future claims representative, see supra notes 94-95 and
accompanying text, channeling the future claims to the Trusts via the supplemental injunction
obviated the need to resolve whether the future claimants in fact held dischargeable bankruptcy
claims. See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. at 628 (explaining that other asbestos obligations
would not be discharged, simply “subject to the [i]njunction”).
128
Macchiarola, supra note 34, at 602 (“The Trust was bound by the Plan to . . . pay 100 percent of
the victims‟ claims.”).
129
A bankruptcy court must find by a preponderance of the evidence that a plan of reorganization is
“feasible,” Danny Thomas Props. II Ltd. P‟ship v. Beal Bank, S.S.B. (In re Danny Thomas Props.
II Ltd. P‟ship), 241 F.3d 959, 963 (8th Cir. 2001), that confirmation “is not likely to be followed by
the liquidation, or the need for further financial reorganization, of the debtor,” 11 U.S.C. §
1129(a)(11) (2006).
130
In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. at 634-35. Judge Lifland continued:
Furthermore, the Debtor‟s reasonable and credible projections of future earnings have
established that the reorganized corporation is unlikely to face future proceedings
under this title . . . . The evidence submitted by the Debtor as previously noted,
provides a reasonable estimation, based upon known present claimants and reasonable

16

UMKC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78:1

“subject to the Trust‟s being sufficiently funded.”131 Despite this contingency,
the plan was “overwhelmingly accepted” by the asbestos health and property
damage claimants.132
Certain objectors challenged the legality of the channeling injunction,133 but
they were overruled by Judge Lifland.134 He found a statutory basis for the
injunction in the general equitable powers granted by § 105(a),135 and the
channeling authority conferred by § 363.136 The court explained that the
injunction best protected the rights of the asbestos claimants by creating a body
of funds from which all could recover.137 Without the injunction, the parties
would engage in “piece-meal dismemberment” of the debtor‟s estate, which
would harm the beneficiaries of the injunction.138
C. The MacArthur Insurance Litigation
The channeling injunction enjoining the asbestos plaintiffs from suing
Manville and its liability insurance companies was not reviewed on appeal. The
Second Circuit held that the objectors lacked standing to challenge the
injunction.139 But the appellate court did assess a related ruling.
As explained in the previous section, both the AH and PD Trusts were
funded, in part, by the proceeds of Manville‟s settlement with its insurance
carriers.140 At the outset, Manville‟s insurers took the position that the
company‟s insurance policies did not cover asbestos liability.141 This forced the
debtor to engage in “incredibly complex” litigation with the carriers over the
scope of the policies.142 Given the prospects for recovery and the likely delays,
Manville attempted to settle the disputes with the hope of generating the proceeds
extrapolations from past experience and epidemiological data, of the number and
amount of asbestos-related claims that the AH Trust will be required to satisfy.
Id. at 635. The second circuit affirmed, concluding that these findings were “not clearly
erroneous.” In re Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d at 650; see also In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68
B.R. at 633-34 (where the bankruptcy court noted, as part of its best interests of creditors analysis,
that asbestos health and property damage claimants would receive payment in full on their tort
claims).
131
In re Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d at 642. Additionally, the promise of full recovery applied
only to compensatory damages. Punitive damages were disallowed under the plan. In re JohnsManville Corp., 68 B.R. at 627-28.
132
In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. at 621. Nearly nintey-six percent of the asbestos health
claimants voting approved the Plan. In re Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d at 641.
133
In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. at 624.
134
Id.
135
Id. at 625. For more on § 105(a), see infra note 191.
136
In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. at 625. For additional detail regarding § 363(f), see infra
notes 158-63, 334-45, and accompanying text.
137
In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. at 626.
138
Id.
139
Kane v. Johns-Manville (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 843 F.2d 636, 644-45 (2d Cir. 1988).
140
See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
141
Barry L. Zaretsky, Insurance Proceeds in Bankruptcy, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 373, 405 (1989).
142
Id. at 405-07.
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necessary to fund the reorganization.143 The parties eventually reached a
compromise.144
The settlements with the insurers were a “cornerstone” of Manville‟s plan
of reorganization.145 Under these agreements, the insurance companies paid the
debtor $770 million and, in exchange, were “relieved of all obligations related to
the disputed policies.”146 To effectuate the settlements, the bankruptcy court
“enjoined all suits against the insurers” concerning the policies.147 It also ordered
that any claims subject to the injunction would attach only to the proceeds of the
settlements.148 The insurers demanded this protection because certain tort
claimants and co-defendants in the asbestos litigation had brought direct actions
against them.149
A distributor of Manville‟s products, MacArthur, objected to the settlement
and the supporting injunction.150 MacArthur argued that it was a co-insured
under the settled policies pursuant to a vendor endorsement that entitled
Manville‟s distributors to “insurance coverage for liability resulting from their
sale of Manville‟s products.”151 Several plaintiffs had recently sued MacArthur
for such sales activity.152 Thus, the company contended, it was entitled to
indemnification from the settling insurers under the policies and the channeling
injunction was an illegal discharge that improperly extinguished its contractual
rights.153 The Bankruptcy Court overruled the objection154 and the Second
Circuit affirmed.
The appellate court explained that the injunction did “not offer the umbrella
protection of a discharge in bankruptcy.”155 Instead, it precluded “only those
suits against the settling insurers that arise out of or relate to Manville‟s
insurance policies.”156 Moreover, MacArthur‟s claims were “not extinguished;
they are simply channeled away from the insurers and redirected at the proceeds
of the settlement.”157
As authority for the channeling injunction, the Second Circuit pointed to §
363(f).158 That statute permits, in some circumstances, the sale of estate property

143

Id. at 407.
Id.
145
MacArthur Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 837 F.2d 89, 90 (2d Cir.
1988).
146
Id.
147
Id. at 91.
148
Id.
149
Zaretsky, supra note 141, at 407.
150
In re Johns-Manville Corp., 837 F.2d at 90.
151
Id.
152
Id. at 91.
153
Id.
154
Zaretsky, supra note 141, at 407.
155
MacArthur Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 837 F.2d 89, 91 (2d Cir.
1988).
156
Id.
157
Id.
158
Id.
144
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“free and clear” of a third party‟s interest, such as a lien.159 The third party‟s
rights are typically transferred—i.e., “channeled”—to the proceeds of the sale.160
The court reasoned that because Manville‟s policies belonged to the estate,161 §
363(f) allowed the bankruptcy court to dispose of the insurance policies through
the settlement and channel MacArthur‟s claims to the settlement payments.162
The injunction expressly barring MacArthur and others from suing the insurance
companies was “necessary to effectuate the Court‟s channeling authority . . . .
The authority to issue the injunction is thus a corollary to the power to dispose of
assets free and clear and to channel claims to the proceeds.”163
The Second Circuit found additional authority for the injunction in §
105(a).164 It observed that this statute “has been construed liberally to enjoin
suits that might impede the reorganization process.”165 And the bankruptcy court
found that direct actions against Manville‟s insurers “would adversely affect
property of the estate and would interfere with reorganization.”166
The Second Circuit admitted that the insurance settlement and the
accompanying injunction were “not precisely the same as the traditional sale of
real property free and clear of liens followed by a channeling of the liens to the
proceeds of the sale.”167 The insurance policies were not actually sold and
MacArthur‟s claim was distinct from a lien on property.168 But “the underlying
principle of preserving the debtor‟s estate for the creditors and funneling claims
to one proceeding in the bankruptcy court remains the same.”169 Because the

159

11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2006). See generally 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 363.06 (15th ed. rev.
2005).
160
The holder of the interest is entitled to adequate protection. 11 U.S.C. § 363(e). “The most
common form of adequate protection is to have the lien or other interest attach to the proceeds of
the sale.” 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 363.06[9]. And “[i]t has long been recognized that when a
debtor‟s assets are disposed of free and clear of third-party interests, the third party is adequately
protected if his interest is assertable against the proceeds of the disposition.” In re Johns-Manville
Corp., 837 F.2d at 94.
161
In re Johns-Manville Corp., 837 F.2d at 93 (citing, inter alia, 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2006)).
Section 541(a)(1) provides that a debtor‟s estate includes “all legal or equitable interests of the
debtor in property as of the commencement of the case,” with only minor exceptions. 11 U.S.C. §
541(a)(1).
162
In re Johns-Manville Corp., 837 F.2d at 93.
163
Id.
164
Id. Section 105(a) provides, inter alia, that courts sitting in bankruptcy “may issue any order,
process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.” 11
U.S.C. § 105(a) (2006).
165
In re Johns-Manville Corp., 837 F.2d at 93.
166
Id.
167
Id. at 94. When a debtor actually sells an asset under § 363(f), the bankruptcy court may issue
an injunction barring a creditor from attempting to enforce a preexisting lien on the property. Fogel
v. Zell, 221 F.3d 955, 965 (7th Cir. 2000).
168
In re Johns-Manville Corp., 837 F.2d at 94.
169
Id.
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settlement was “essential . . . to a workable reorganization, it falls well within the
bankruptcy court‟s equitable powers.”170
IV. NON-DEBTOR RELEASES AFTER THE MANVILLE
BANKRUPTCY
The Manville reorganization has had a dramatic impact on American tort
and bankruptcy law.171 As the first “mass tort bankruptcy,”172 Johns-Manville
signaled that Chapter 11 is an effective tool for addressing enterprise-threatening
liability. And in the aftermath of the case, bankruptcy became a critical avenue
for the resolution of mass torts.173
The case also significantly legitimized the extraordinary remedial devices
used in the reorganization—including the appointment of a future claims
representative, the establishment of a litigation trust to liquidate present and
future tort claims, and the issuance of a channeling injunction which bars future
claimants from suing the reorganized debtor and permits them to recover solely
from the trust. For example, debtors facing mass tort claims now typically
establish a litigation trust to manage these obligations.174 And future claims
representatives have become a common feature in such bankruptcies.175 In short,
Johns-Manville established a legal framework that numerous subsequent mass
tort reorganizations have followed.176

170

Id.
Cf. Macchiarola, supra note 34, at 597 (“Johns-Manville‟s Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding
was a threshold event in the disposition of mass tort cases.”).
172
Frederick Tung, The Future Claims Representative in Mass Tort Bankruptcy: A Preliminary
Inquiry, 3 CHAP. L. REV. 43, 72 (2000) (referring to Johns-Manville as “the first of the mass tort
bankruptcy cases”).
173
See id. at 44 & n.2 (explaining that bankruptcy and settlement class actions are the two legal
avenues for addressing mass tort liability); Ralph Brubaker, Bankruptcy Injunctions and Complex
Litigation: A Critical Reappraisal of Non-Debtor Releases in Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 1997 U.
ILL. L. REV. 959, 965 (1997) (noting that “the bankruptcy court is quickly becoming the forum for
resolution of many of the largest and most complex mass litigations.”). As noted in Part II, supra
note 72 and accompanying text, the utility of settlement class actions was substantially undercut by
the Supreme Court‟s decisions in Amchem Products v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997), and Ortiz v.
Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
174
JEFF FERRIEL & EDWARD J. JANGER, UNDERSTANDING BANKRUPTCY 854 (2nd ed. 2007) (“Since
its use in the Johns-Manville bankruptcy, cases involving mass tort claims have usually relied on a
trust for the settlement of present and future claims.”); see, e.g., Class Five Nev. Claimants v. Dow
Corning Corp. (In re Dow Corning Corp.), 280 F.3d 648, 654-55 (6th Cir. 2002) (discussing some
features of a “Settlement Facility” created to resolve the debtor‟s mass tort liability arising from the
production of silicone breast implants).
175
See Tung, supra note 172, at 44 (explaining that the future claims representative is “at the
center” of the bankruptcy approach to resolving mass torts).
176
See RAND, supra note 2, at 110-11 (observing that the Manville case “created the model for
resolving asbestos personal injury litigation under the protection of bankruptcy”); J. Maxwell
Tucker, The Clash of Successor Liability Principles, Reorganization Law, and the Just Demand
that Relief be Afforded Unknown and Unknowable Claimants, 12 BANKR. DEV. J. 1, 52 n.285
171
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In addition to these developments, the Manville bankruptcy “pave[d] the
way” for non-debtor releases.177 Recall that the channeling injunction in that
case did more than prohibit holders of future claims from suing the reorganized
debtor. It barred present and future tort claimants from suing independent third
parties—namely, Manville‟s liability insurers.178 Moreover, the bankruptcy court
also enjoined MacArthur, an additional insured under Manville‟s policies, from
asserting its contract rights against the carriers.179 Since Manville, bankruptcy
orders extinguishing the liability of non-bankrupt third parties have become
“increasingly common” in Chapter 11 reorganizations.180 In the following two
sub-parts, I review non-debtor releases generally and then address some special
issues that arise when a non-debtor release extinguishes rights relating to
insurance policies, as happened in Johns-Manville.
A. Non-Debtor Releases In General
1. Non-Debtor Releases Defined
In this Article, the terms “non-debtor release” and “third-party release”
refer to the extinguishing of a creditor‟s claims against a non-debtor over the
creditor‟s objection. Such releases come in three basic forms: (1) a section in a
Chapter 11 plan providing that certain claims against third parties are
“released”;181 (2) a permanent injunction in a Chapter 11 plan, or otherwise
(1995) (asserting that the Johns-Manville Trust pioneered the approach of establishing a trust to pay
future claimants); see, e.g., Unarco Bloomington Factory Workers v. UNR Indus., Inc., 124 B.R.
268, 271-72 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990) (summarizing a Chapter 11 plan that substantially mirrored
Manville‟s in its treatment of asbestos tort claims); H.R. REP. No. 103-835, at 40 (1994), reprinted
in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340, 3349 (explaining that UNR “has resolved its chapter 11 reorganization
with a similar trust/injunction arrangement”).
177
Brubaker, supra note 173, at 962 n.3; accord Silverstein, supra note 6, at 54.
178
See Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp., (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 843 F.2d 636, 640 (2d Cir.
1988).
179
See MacArthur Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 837 F.2d 89, 91 (2d
Cir. 1988).
180
Silverstein, supra note 6, at 18 (collecting authorities); accord In re Transit Group, Inc., 286
B.R. 811, 815 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2002) (“In the last few years, debtors more frequently are seeking
to expand the scope of the discharge to include the release of claims against non-debtor third parties
and insiders.”); Brubaker, supra note 173, at 961 (observing that non-debtor releases are receiving
“growing judicial acceptance” and that they “have regularly appeared in reorganization plans”);
Howard C. Buschman III & Sean P. Madden, The Power and Propriety of Bankruptcy Court
Intervention in Actions Between Nondebtors, 47 BUS. LAW. 913, 943 (1992) (noting “a trend among
debtors to provide releases for nondebtors in reorganization plans”); Peter E. Meltzer, Getting Out
of Jail Free: Can the Bankruptcy Plan Process Be Used to Release Nondebtor Parties?, 71 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 1, 1 (1997) (observing that “the custom of attempting to include releases of nondebtor
parties has become more and more prevalent”).
181
See, e.g., Republic Supply Co. v. Shoaf, 815 F.2d 1046, 1049 (5th Cir. 1987) (plan contained a
provision expressly releasing a creditor‟s claim against a guarantor of the debtor); In re Digital
Impact, Inc., 223 B.R. 1, 4 (N.D. Okla. 1998) (plan provided that the debtor‟s principal was
released from all claims relating to the debtor).
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issued by the court, forever prohibiting a creditor from prosecuting its claims
against a non-debtor;182 or (3) both a release and a permanent injunction barring
the creditor from attempting to collect from the released party on the
extinguished claim.183 The injunctions in the Johns-Manville case enjoining
MacArthur and the tort claimants from suing the debtor‟s insurance carriers fell
into the second category. But each type of release has the same basic impact.184
Non-debtor releases vary in scope. Some bar a single cause of action held
by an individual.185 Others purport to extinguish all of a non-debtor‟s
liabilities.186 However, third-party releases typically fall somewhere between
these two extremes, eliminating all claims against a non-debtor (1) concerning a
particular mass tort,187 or (2) relating to the debtor.188

182

See, e.g., Landsing Diversified Props.-II v. The First Nat‟l Bank and Trust Co. of Tulsa (In re
W. Real Estate Fund, Inc.), 922 F.2d 592, 600 (10th Cir. 1990) (prior to confirmation of the plan,
the bankruptcy court entered a permanent injunction enjoining a creditor of the debtor from
prosecuting its claim against a non-debtor), modified, Abel v. West, 932 F.2d 898 (10th Cir. 1991);
Am. Hardwoods, Inc. v. Deutsche Credit Corp. (In re Am. Hardwoods, Inc.), 885 F.2d 621, 622
(9th Cir. 1989) (prior to confirmation of the plan, the debtor sought a permanent injunction
enjoining a creditor from pursuing a state court lawsuit against guarantors of the debtor‟s obligation
to the creditor).
183
See, e.g., In re Dow Corning Corp., 255 B.R. 445, 475 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (plan both released
certain claims against Dow Corning‟s shareholders and enjoined holders of the released claims
from attempting to recover against the shareholders), rev‟d in part, 280 F.3d 648 (6th Cir. 2002); In
re Boston Harbor Marina Co., 157 B.R. 726, 729, 731 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1993) (plan contained both
a release of all claims against the debtor‟s co-venturers, a former part-owner of the debtor, and an
insurance company that was related to the debtor, and a permanent injunction barring prosecution
of the released claims).
184
Like a release, a permanent injunction effectively extinguishes the creditor‟s claim because the
creditor is forever barred from attempting to recover from the non-debtor. See In re W. Real Estate
Fund, Inc., 922 F.2d at 600 (“By permanently enjoining [the creditor‟s] action[s] against [the nondebtor], the bankruptcy court, in essence, discharged [the non-debtor‟s] liability. . . .”); Meltzer,
supra note 180, at 4 n.7 (explaining that permanent injunctions and releases have the same effect
and thus that the terms will be used interchangeably in the article); Kate Inman, Note, All Debts Are
Off?—Can the Bankruptcy Process Be Used to Release the Debts of Nondebtor Parties, 49 FLA. L.
REV. 631, 633 n.7 (1997) (“A permanent injunction preventing a creditor from suing a third party
is, in effect, a discharge of the third party‟s liability.”).
185
In re W. Real Estate Fund, Inc., 922 F.2d at 598 (bankruptcy court permanently enjoined the
debtor‟s attorney from executing upon a lien against the debtor‟s bank); In re Am. Hardwoods, Inc.,
885 F.2d at 622 (debtor sought a permanent injunction prohibiting a creditor from enforcing a state
court judgment against the debtor‟s shareholder-guarantors).
186
See, e.g., Resorts Int‟l, Inc. v. Lowenschuss (In re Lowenschuss), 67 F.3d 1394, 1401 (9th Cir.
1995) (provision in the debtor‟s plan granted a “global release” of all claims to, inter alia, the
debtor‟s children and a business he owned); In re Arrowmill Dev. Corp., 211 B.R. 497, 500 (Bankr.
D.N.J. 1997) (Chapter 11 plan stated that “[p]ursuant to § 1141 of the Code, confirmation of this
Plan shall also discharge all claims against Debtor‟s equity Interest holders or Affiliates”).
187
The release in In re Dow Corning Corp. prohibits all women injured by Dow Corning‟s silicone
breast implants from suing the company‟s shareholders for their injuries. 255 B.R. at 475; see also
In re Sybaris Clubs, Int‟l, Inc., 189 B.R. 152, 153 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995) (provision in the
proposed plan of reorganization contained a permanent injunction barring “all persons” from
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2. The Circuit Split Regarding the Legal Validity of Non-Debtor Releases
The federal courts have long been divided over the propriety of non-debtor
releases.189 Other than § 524(g), the Code does not expressly permit the issuance
of such releases.190 However, “pro-release” courts contend that the general
equitable powers granted by §§ 105(a)191 and 1123(b)(6)192 allow for this type of
relief.193 Disagreeing, most “anti-release” courts have concluded that non-debtor
releases violate § 524(e), which provides that the “discharge of a debt of the
debtor does not affect the liability of any other entity on, or the property of any
other entity for, such debt.”194 They read this language, and the bankruptcy
prosecuting any action against the debtor‟s insiders, a shareholder, and several affiliated entities
relating to the sale of notes and debentures issued by the debtor).
188
The release requested in In re Digital Impact, Inc. would have barred anyone from suing the
debtor‟s principal for any claims related to the debtor. 223 B.R. 1, 4 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1998); see
also Deutsche Bank AG v. Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc. (In re Metromedia Fiber Network,
Inc.), 416 F.3d 136, 141 (2d Cir. 2005) (release in the plan of reorganization purported to
extinguish all claims against various corporate insiders related to the debtor or its subsidiaries).
189
Compare Hat-Hanseatische Anlage v. Sago Palms Joint Venture (In re Sago Palms Joint
Venture), 39 B.R. 9, 9 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1984) (holding that § 524(e) bars non-debtor releases),
with In re A.H. Robins Co., 88 B.R. 742, 754-55 (E.D. Va. 1988) (holding that courts may grant
non-debtor releases pursuant to their “equitable and inherent” power under the Bankruptcy Code),
aff‟d, 880 F.2d 694 (4th Cir. 1989). For a full survey of the split in the courts, see generally
Silverstein, supra note 6, at 44-90.
190
Class Five Nev. Claimants v. Dow Corning Corp. (In re Dow Corning Corp.), 280 F.3d 648, 656
(6th Cir. 2002); Silverstein, supra note 6, at 17.
191
Section 105(a) is the primary source of the bankruptcy court‟s general equitable powers. See
Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 88 (1991) (“In addition, the bankruptcy court retains its
broad equitable power to „issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to
carry out the provisions of [the Code.]‟” (quoting § 105(a)); Omni Mfg., Inc. v. Smith (In re
Smith), 21 F.3d 660, 665 (5th Cir. 1994) (“From . . . section [105(a)] emanate the general equitable
powers of bankruptcy courts.”); In re G.S.F. Corp., 938 F.2d 1467, 1474 (1st Cir. 1991) (observing
that § 105(a) grants bankruptcy courts broad equitable powers); 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶
105.01, at 105-5 to 105-6 (15th ed. rev. 2004) (“Section 105 . . . is an omnibus provision phrased in
such general terms as to be the basis for a broad exercise of power in the administration of a
bankruptcy case.”). The statute provides that “[t]he court may issue any order, process, or
judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.” 11 U.S.C. §
105(a) (2006).
192
Section 1123(b)(6) permits a chapter 11 plan to “include any . . . appropriate provision not
inconsistent with the applicable provisions of this title.” 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(6).
193
See, e.g., In re Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3d at 656-58 (explaining that non-debtor releases are
permissible pursuant to §§ 105(a) and 1123(b)(6)); SEC v. Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc.
(In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc.), 960 F.2d 285, 293 (2d Cir. 1992) (citing MenardSanford v. Mabey (In re A.H. Robins Co.), 880 F.2d 694, 701 (4th Cir. 1989), for the proposition
that bankruptcy courts may enjoin litigation against a non-debtor); In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d
at 701 (holding that bankruptcy courts may grant a non-debtor release under § 105(a)); see also
Silverstein, supra note 6, at 60-61 nn.275 & 276 (containing an extensive list of federal courts and
commentators adopting this view); id. at 59-61 (more fully outlining the pro-release authorities‟ §§
105(a) and 1123(b)(6) reasoning).
194
11 U.S.C. § 524(e) (2006).
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policies underlying it, to prohibit third-party releases.195 Pro-release courts have
responded by arguing that § 524(e) does not expressly address releases; therefore,
the statute is no bar to such relief.196 A second group of anti-release authorities

195

See, e.g., Resorts Int‟l, Inc. v. Lowenschuss (In re Lowenschuss), 67 F.3d 1394, 1401-02 (9th
Cir. 1995) (§ 524(e) prohibits non-debtor releases); Feld v. Zale Corp. (In re Zale Corp.), 62 F.3d
746, 760 (5th Cir. 1995) (“Section 524[(e)] prohibits the discharge of debts of non-debtors,” and
thus § 105(a) may not be used to grant non-debtor releases); Landsing Diversified Props.-II v. First
Nat‟l Bank and Trust Co. of Tulsa (In re W. Real Estate Fund, Inc.), 922 F.2d 592, 601-02 (10th
Cir. 1990) (holding that § 524(e) prohibits any permanent injunction “extended post-confirmation .
. . that effectively relieves the nondebtor from its own liability to the creditor” and thus § 105(a)
may not be used to provide such relief); Am. Hardwoods, Inc. v. Deutsche Credit Corp. (In re Am.
Hardwoods, Inc.), 885 F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Section 524(e) . . . limits the court‟s
equitable power under section 105 to order the discharge of the liabilities of nondebtors.”); see also
Silverstein, supra note 6, at 47-49 n.194 (containing an extensive list of federal courts and
commentators adopting this view); id. at 44-50 (describing in greater detail the anti-release
authorities‟ § 524(e) argument). It is well-established that § 105(a) may not be used in a manner
that is inconsistent with another section of the Bankruptcy Code. Noonan v. Sec‟y of Health and
Human Servs. (In re Ludlow Hosp. Soc., Inc.), 124 F.3d 22, 28 (1st Cir. 1997) (“The bankruptcy
court may not utilize section 105(a) if another, more particularized Code provision . . . impedes the
requested exercise of equitable power.”); 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 105.01[2], at 105-7 (15th
ed. rev. 2004) (“Section 105 does not allow the bankruptcy court to override explicit mandates of
other sections of the Bankruptcy Code . . . .”).
196
See, e.g., In re Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3d at 657 (“[Section 524(e)] explains the effect of a
debtor‟s discharge. It does not prohibit the release of a non-debtor.”); In re Dow Corning Corp.,
255 B.R. 445, 477-78 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (“On its face, § 524(e) does not set forth a per se rule
prohibiting permanent injunctions as to non-debtors. . . . [The statute] does not expressly prohibit
third-party injunctions . . . .”), rev‟d in part, aff‟d in pertinent part, 280 F.3d 648 (6th Cir. 2002); In
re Master Mortgage Inv. Fund, Inc., 168 B.R. 930, 936 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1994) (“To the extent
that § 524(e) does not explicitly prohibit the court from issuing a permanent injunction, the
language is clear . . . .”); see also Silverstein, supra note 6, at 61-62 n.278 (collecting judicial and
secondary authorities); id. at 61-63 (explaining more fully the pro-release courts‟ position regarding
524(e)); id. at 122-28 (siding with the pro-release authorities and concluding that § 524(e) does not
prohibit non-debtor releases).
A few anti-release authorities have argued that §§ 524(a) and (g) (as opposed to 524(e))
bar non-debtor releases. Regarding § 524(a), compare In re Am. Hardwoods, Inc., 885 F.2d at 622,
626 (ruling that the discharge injunction of § 524(a) “displaces” any authority bankruptcy courts
possess under § 105(a) to enjoin the assertion of claims against third parties), and Peter M. Boyle,
Note, Non-Debtor Liability in Chapter 11: Validity of Third-Party Discharge in Bankruptcy, 61
FORDHAM L. REV. 421, 428-29, 437 (1992) (generally adopting the Ninth Circuit‟s argument), with
Silverstein, supra note 6, at 128-31 (presenting this argument more fully, and then explaining why
it is invalid). Regarding § 524(g), compare In re Lowenschuss, 67 F.3d at 1402 n.6 (“A recent
amendment to the Bankruptcy Code buttresses our conclusion that § 524(e) does not permit
bankruptcy courts to release claims against non-debtors.”), and In re Salem Suede, Inc., 219 B.R.
922, 937 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1998) (§ 524(g) “suggests that § 524(e) precludes the issuance” of
channeling non-debtor releases), with Silverstein, supra note 6, at 50-51 n.204 (rejecting this
argument because, inter alia, Congress expressly stated that the enactment of § 524(g) was to have
no impact on the authority of bankruptcy courts to issue third-party releases), and Ralph Brubaker,
Unwrapping Prepackaged Asbestos Bankruptcies (Part I): Non-Debtor “Releases” and Permanent
Injunctions, 25 No. 1 BANKR. LAW LETTER 1, 7 (2005) [hereinafter Brubaker, BANKR. LAW LETTER]
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contend that even if § 524(e) is not an obstacle, §§ 105(a) and 1123(b)(6) simply
do not grant sufficient equitable power to permit the release of claims against
non-debtors.197 In a recent article, I sided with the pro-release courts on these
issues.198
While the pro-release authorities agree that non-debtor releases are
permissible, they have used a number of different tests to determine whether a
given release is authorized.199 The now-dominant standard was set forth in In re
Master Mortgage Investment Fund, Inc.200 It has five elements. First, there must
be “an identity of interest between the debtor and the third party, usually an
indemnity relationship, such that a suit against the non-debtor is, in essence, a
suit against the debtor or will deplete assets of the estate.”201 Second, the third
(same), Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 111(b), 108 Stat. 4106, 4117
(uncodified) (“Nothing in [524(g)] . . . shall be construed to modify, impair, or supersede any other
authority the court has to issue injunctions in connection with an order confirming a plan of
reorganization.”), and 140 CONG. REC. H10765 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1994) (remarks of Rep. Brooks)
(explaining that § 111(b) “make[s] clear that the special rule being devised for the asbestos claim
trust/injunction mechanism is not intended to alter any authority bankruptcy courts may already
have to issue injunctions in connection with a plan [of] reorganization.”).
197
The bulk of these authorities have adopted the position that § 105(a) may only be used to
enforce other provisions in the Bankruptcy Code; it does not permit orders implementing general
bankruptcy policies such as the policy favoring reorganization over liquidation. Accordingly, since
no Code section permits non-debtor releases, § 105(a) cannot be used to grant that form of relief.
See, e.g., In re Digital Impact, Inc., 223 B.R. 1, 4-5, 14 (N.D. Okla. 1998) (adopting this
reasoning); In re Dow Corning Corp., 244 B.R. 721, 742 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1999) (holding that
because § 105(a) must be used in conjunction with other Code provisions, the statute does not give
bankruptcy courts the power to issue non-debtor releases) rev‟d, 255 B.R. 445, 480 (E.D. Mich.
2000), rev‟d in part, aff‟d in pertinent part, 280 F.3d 648, 658 (6th Cir. 2002); In re Sybaris Clubs,
Int‟l, Inc., 189 B.R. 152, 155-56, 159 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995) (same); see also Silverstein, supra
note 6, at 51-52 (setting forth in more detail the anti-release courts‟ argument with respect to §§
105(a) and 1123(b)(6)); id. at 106-119 (explaining why the anti-release courts‟ argument is
invalid).
Other authorities have suggested that §§ 105(a) and 1123(b)(6) may not be used to
contravene substantive non-bankruptcy law, something non-debtor releases clearly do. Brubaker,
supra note 173, at 1017 n.209 (“[S]upplementary implementation sections such as § 1123(b)(6)
merely beg the question whether non-debtor releases are in fact „appropriate‟ provisions of a plan.
That question inevitably requires consideration of the fact that non-debtor releases directly
contravene nonbankruptcy law that would impose liability on the released non-debtors.”); see also
Silverstein, supra note 6, at 131 (“[T]hird-party releases . . . eliminate liability that non-debtors
would otherwise face under federal and state law.”); id. at 131-136 (setting forth this argument in
significant detail, and then contending that it is invalid).
For a final anti-release argument based on §§ 105(a) and 1123(b)(6), see infra note 229.
198
See Silverstein, supra note 6, at 19-20, 106-36.
199
Id. at 71 (“[P]ro-release courts have used various standards to assess the legitimacy of nondebtor releases.”); id. at 64-71 (describing the various tests proposed by courts and commentators).
200
In re Master Mortgage Inv. Fund, Inc., 168 B.R. 930 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1994); Silverstein,
supra note 6, at 64 (explaining that the Master Mortgage test is used by a “majority of pro-release
courts use in assessing whether to grant a non-debtor release”).
201
In re Master Mortgage Inv. Fund, Inc., 168 B.R. at 935 (emphasis added).
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party must contribute substantial assets to the reorganization.202 Third, the
release must be “essential to reorganization. Without the [release], there is little
likelihood of success.”203 For example, in the absence of a release, non-debtors
may refuse to contribute assets that are “necessary” for the debtor‟s
reorganization.204 Fourth, a “substantial majority of the creditors agree to [the
release], specifically, the impacted class, or classes has „overwhelmingly‟ voted
to accept the proposed plan treatment.”205 Fifth, the plan provides for “payment
of all, or substantially all, of the claims of the class or classes affected by the
[non-debtor release].”206 In In re Dow Corning Corp., the Sixth Circuit added a
sixth factor: all dissenting creditors whose claims are extinguished by the release
must be paid in full under the plan.207 Pro-release authorities have generally
approved of this addition.208
In my prior article, I argued for a modified version of the Master Mortgage
test involving four elements.209 First, an “identity of interest” is necessary to
establish subject matter jurisdiction over the claims eliminated by the release. 210
Second, the release must be “essential to the reorganization” to justify invoking
§§ 105(a) and 1123(b)(6).211 This standard will usually be satisfied by
demonstrating that contributions from third parties are necessary to the debtor‟s
reorganization and are contingent upon the third parties receiving a release.212
But it can be met in other ways.213 Thus, the second Master Mortgage element—
“substantial contribution”—is not required.214 In addition, the second element of

202

Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
204
Id. at 938 (without a release, the non-debtors would not have made contributions that enabled
the debtor to formulate a workable plan and allowed creditors to recover in full).
205
Id. at 935 (emphasis added). In Master Mortgage, 94.8% and 93.4% of the two classes affected
by the release voted for the plan. Id. at 938.
206
Id. at 935 (emphasis added).
207
Class Five Nev. Claimants v. Dow Corning Corp. (In re Dow Corning Corp.), 280 F.3d 648, 658
(6th Cir. 2002).
208
See, e.g., In re Friedman‟s, Inc., 356 B.R. 758, 761 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2005) (“Dow Corning has
perhaps the clearest articulation of some of the circumstances in which such a provision can be
approved.”) (adopting the Master Mortgage test with the Dow Corning addition); In re Transit
Group, Inc., 286 B.R. 811, 817-18 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2002) (also adopting the Master Mortgage
test with the Dow Corning addition).
209
See Silverstein, supra note 6, at 72-78. I shall refer to this as the “Modified Master Mortgage”
test or elements.
210
Silverstein, supra note 6, at 72; see also id. at 20-21 n.38 & 78-79 n.357 (explaining some
jurisdictional issues regarding non-debtor releases); Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3d
Cir. 1984) (holding that bankruptcy courts have jurisdiction over claims that “could conceivably
have any effect on the estate being administered in bankruptcy” (emphasis omitted)).
211
Silverstein, supra note 6, at 72.
212
Id. at 72-73.
213
Id. at 73 (“Alternatively, critical employees of the debtor might refuse to continue working in
the absence of a release, making it impossible for the debtor to emerge from bankruptcy and
resume its operations.”).
214
Id.
203
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my test mandates that the debtor in fact be reorganizing rather than liquidating.215
Third, because it is not “fair and equitable” to “cram down” a plan containing a
non-debtor release, the class of creditors impacted by the release must have
“accepted” the plan under § 1126(c).216 This is another change from Master
Mortgage because § 1126(c) provides a different standard (among voting
creditors, at least two-thirds in dollar amount and more than one-half in number
must approve of the plan) from the fourth element discussed above
(“overwhelming” acceptance).217
Fourth and last, payment-in-full for dissenting creditors whose claims are
extinguished by the non-debtor release is required by the best interests of
creditors test.218 Under that test, a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization may only be
confirmed if it provides each dissenting, impaired creditor at least as much as the
claimant would receive if the debtor liquidated under Chapter 7.219 Non-debtor
releases are impermissible in Chapter 7 cases.220 In such a proceeding, a creditor
may thus recover any deficiency from a solvent co-obligor if the liquidation
distribution does not completely satisfy the creditor‟s claim.221 Accordingly,
since the dissenting creditor would receive payment in full on its claim in a
Chapter 7 bankruptcy from the debtor, the co-obligor, or a combination of the
two, the dissenting creditor must receive full payment under the debtor‟s Chapter
11 plan if the codebtor receives a release.222 The same analysis applies if the

215

Id. at 73-74.
Silverstein, supra note 6, at 74-75; 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c) (2006) (defining class “acceptance”); id.
§ 1129(b) (establishing that a plan of reorganization may be confirmed over the objection of a
dissenting class—i.e., “crammed down”—if the plan is “fair and equitable” and “does not
discriminate unfairly”). Claimants impacted by a non-debtor release must be placed in a distinct
class (or classes, if the release extinguishes different types of claims). Including them in a class
with other claimants “undermines the Bankruptcy Code‟s classification and treatment scheme” set
forth in 11 U.S.C. §§ 1122(a), 1123(a)(4) (2006). Brubaker, supra note 173, at 983; see also id. at
981-986 (arguing that third-party releases frequently corrupt the integrity of class formation and
treatment because courts do not take the extinguished non-debtor claims into account in analyzing
whether the plan of reorganization satisfies §§ 1122(a) and 1123(a)(4)); id. at 990-91 (third-party
releases weaken the “cram down” protections set forth in § 1129(b) by “infect[ing] the soundness
of the classification system”).
217
Compare 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c) (2006) (“A class of claims has accepted a plan if such plan has
been accepted by creditors . . . that hold at least two-thirds in amount and more than one-half in
number of the allowed claims of such class held by creditors . . . that have accepted or rejected such
plan.”), with In re Master Mortgage Inv. Fund, Inc., 168 B.R. 930, 935 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1994)
(“[A] substantial majority of the creditors agree to [the release], specifically, the impacted class, or
classes, has „overwhelmingly‟ voted to accept the proposed plan treatment.” (emphasis added)).
218
Silverstein, supra note 6, at 76-78.
219
11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (2006); 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1129.03[7], at 1129-45 (15th ed.
rev. 2004); id. ¶ 1129.03[7][e], at 1129-56 (describing § 1129(a)(7) as restating “the „best interests
of creditors‟ test”).
220
Silverstein, supra note 6, at 73-74 & 76 n.350. But cf. id. at 74 n.338 (collecting authorities
granting releases in Chapter 11 liquidations).
221
Id. at 76 & n.350.
222
Id. at 77 & n.351.
216
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debtor and the third party are not co-debtors—i.e., where the debtor has no
personal liability for the claim against the third party. Clearly, the creditor would
receive compensation in full on such a claim from the non-debtor if the debtor
liquidated. Thus, when a debtor‟s Chapter 11 plan purports to extinguish an
independent claim against a third party, the best interests test mandates payment
in full for the claimholder.223
The best interests of creditors test does not apply to creditors voting to
accept the plan.224 Moreover, a release of claims held by such creditors is
voluntary and thus legitimate, whether the creditors receive full satisfaction on
their claim or not.225 That is why a plan need not provide payment in full to “all,
or substantially all” creditors impacted by a non-debtor release, as mandated by
the Master Mortgage test.226 Instead, only dissenting creditors must be paid in
full. As a practical matter, however, it is likely that creditors subject to a thirdparty release would demand equal treatment and object to any plan of
reorganization that paid only some of them in full, dooming the release under
Element Three—creditor consent. Therefore, plans with non-debtor releases
satisfying this fourth element will generally provide payment in full on all
extinguished claims.227
Critically, full payment need not be guaranteed to satisfy the best interests
test. A plan of reorganization is confirmable as long as the plan is “feasible”—
confirmation “is not likely to be followed by the liquidation, or the need for
further financial reorganization, of the debtor.” 228 If the plan obligates the debtor
to satisfy the creditor‟s claim, and the court finds that the plan is feasible, the
court may confirm it with the non-debtor release. And upon any default, the
creditor must bear the loss because its claim against the third party is gone.229

223

Id. at 77 n.351.
11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7).
225
See infra notes 232-233 and accompanying text.
226
See In re Master Mortgage Inv. Fund, Inc., 168 B.R. 930, 935 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1994).
227
Silverstein, supra note 6, at 78.
228
11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11). This subparagraph of § 1129(a) is known as the “feasibility
requirement.” Fin. Sec. Assurance, Inc. v. T-H New Orleans Ltd. P‟ship (In re T-H New Orleans
Ltd. P‟ship), 116 F.3d 790, 801 (5th Cir. 1997).
229
This point has lead some anti-release authorities to conclude that even if a non-debtor release is
part of a Chapter 11 plan that promises payment in full on the extinguished claim, the release is
inequitable and thus beyond the power conferred by §§ 105(a) and 1123(b)(6) because it places the
risk of plan failure on the creditor rather than the non-debtor. Again, if the debtor defaults on its
plan obligations—a significant risk—and there is a third-party release, the creditor cannot recover
any remaining shortage from the released non-debtor. However, if the plan merely contains a
“provisional injunction”—a temporary, post-confirmation injunction that expires if the debtor does
not satisfy its duty to pay the creditor in full—then the risk of plan failure is allocated to the nondebtor. In such a case, the creditor retains its right to sue the previously-shielded third party for
any deficiency. The anti-release authorities thus conclude that §§ 105(a) and 1123(b)(6) grant, at
most, the power to issue provisional injunctions. See, e.g., In re Dow Corning Corp., 244 B.R. 721,
743 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1999), rev‟d, 255 B.R. 445 (E.D. Mich. 2000), aff‟d in pertinent part, 280
F.3d 648 (6th Cir. 2002). See generally Silverstein, supra note 6, at 80-86 (presenting this
argument more fully); id. at 119-22 (explaining why the argument is invalid).
224
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Third-party releases that are part of reorganization plans promising payment
in full on the barred claims are often referred to as “channeling releases.”230
Under both the Master Mortgage test, as amended by the Sixth Circuit, and my
modified version of the test, channeling releases are the only permissible type of
non-debtor release. Releases in plans that do not provide for payment in full—
known as “actual releases”231—are prohibited.
It is crucial to emphasize that, although the authorities are split on the
propriety of channeling releases, they share a mutual condemnation of actual
releases. The non-debtor release jurisprudence, bolstered by the arguments of
commentators, firmly establishes that third-party releases are either (1)
sanctioned only if a feasible plan of reorganization promises full payment on the
extinguished claims, or (2) entirely invalid.
3. Distinguishing Non-Debtor Releases From Other Types of Relief
Because a “non-debtor release” extinguishes a creditor‟s claims against a
non-debtor over the creditor‟s objection, the term does not refer to: (1)
temporary limits on lawsuits against non-debtors (either pre- or postconfirmation); (2) releases of claims that are property of the debtor‟s estate; or
(3) releases granted consensually by a creditor. Each of these types of relief is
distinct from a third-party release.
Going in reverse order, the legitimacy of voluntary releases—e.g.,
reorganization provisions stating that creditors can obtain additional payment
from a non-debtor if they agree to release their claims against the third party232—
is uncontroversial.233 Similarly, the Code expressly permits the compromise of

230

Silverstein, supra note 6, at 24.
Id.
232
See, e.g., In re Resorts, Int‟l, Inc., 145 B.R. 412, 460 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1990) (plan contained
provisions enabling creditors to release all claims against several non-debtors in exchange for
additional compensation); In re Monroe Well Serv., Inc., 80 B.R. 324, 329 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987)
(same).
233
See In re Specialty Equip. Cos., 3 F.3d 1043, 1046-47 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that consensual
non-debtor releases do not violate § 524(e) and are permissible under the Code); In re Cent. Jersey
Airport Servs., Inc., 282 B.R. 176, 182-83 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2002) (holding that a voluntary release
does not implicate § 524(e)); In re Digital Impact, Inc., 223 B.R. 1, 14-15 (N.D. Okla. 1998)
(holding that bankruptcy courts do not have the power to grant involuntary non-debtor releases, but
may issue voluntary third-party releases where such provisions comply with general principles of
contract law); In re Resorts, Int‟l, Inc., 145 B.R. at 467-68 (permitting voluntary non-debtor
releases to be included in the debtor‟s plan because such releases are “purely contractual between
the parties to the release” and thus do not run afoul of § 524(e)); see also Silverstein, supra note 6,
25-26, 26 n.58 (collecting authorities). The courts are split on how consent to a non-debtor release
must be shown. According to some, voting in favor of a plan is insufficient to manifest assent; the
creditor must expressly sign off on the release. See, e.g., In re Arrowmill Dev. Corp., 211 B.R.
497, 507 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1997). Other courts think a mere vote in favor of a reorganization plan is
sufficient. See, e.g., In re Specialty Equip. Cos., 3 F.3d at 1045-47 (holding that a vote for
confirmation of the plan is sufficient to indicate acceptance of a voluntary non-debtor release); In
re After Six, Inc., No. 93-11150DAS, 1994 WL 45471, at *1 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Feb. 9, 1994)
231
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claims belonging to the estate.234 It is thus well-established that bankruptcy
courts may override creditor and shareholder rights to assert estate causes of
action after the debtor has settled the claims.235 Pre-confirmation, temporary
restrictions on lawsuits against non-debtors—known as “non-debtor stays”—are
also generally permissible, if a showing of necessity is made.236
Post-confirmation temporary restrictions, while more controversial than
voluntary releases, settlements of estate claims, and non-debtor stays,237 are also
distinguishable from third-party releases because they do not eliminate the
creditor‟s rights. Known as “provisional injunctions,”238 these post-confirmation
limitations merely (i) suspend the creditor‟s claim for a specific period of time, 239
or (ii) condition the creditor‟s right to sue the third party on the debtor‟s failure to
pay the creditor in full through the plan of reorganization.240 Accordingly, unlike
(approving of provisions releasing a large number of non-debtors from all claims held by those
voting for the plan). For a thorough discussion of consensual non-debtor releases, see generally
Meltzer, supra note 180, at 33-39.
234
See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(3)(A) (2006) (“[A] plan may . . . provide for . . . the settlement or
adjustment of any claim or interest belonging to the debtor or to the estate . . . .”).
235
A good example is shareholder derivative lawsuits. Shareholder derivative claims are actually
property of the debtor‟s estate rather than property of the debtor‟s shareholders. Sobchack v. Am.
Nat‟l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago (In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc.), 17 F.3d 600, 604 (2d Cir. 1994);
In re Texaco, Inc., 84 B.R. 893, 900 (Bankr S.D.N.Y. 1988), appeal dismissed by 92 B.R. 38
(S.D.N.Y. 1988). Accordingly, bankruptcy courts may extinguish shareholders‟ rights to assert
such claims. In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 17 F.3d at 602-04 (affirming an order of the bankruptcy
court enjoining the debtor‟s preferred stockholders from suing certain managers of the debtor for
breach of fiduciary duty and tortious interference because the claims were derivative, belonged to
the estate, and thus were extinguished as part of a settlement between the debtor and the managers);
In re Pac. Gas and Elec. Co., 304 B.R. 395, 418 n.26 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2004) (distinguishing
authorities holding that § 524(e) proscribes the involuntary release of a creditor‟s claims against a
non-debtor because the release in the debtor‟s plan of reorganization only extinguished claims
belonging to the estate); see also In re Energy Coop., Inc., 886 F.2d 921, 929 (7th Cir. 1989) (“The
power of the court under [§ 105(a)] . . . includes the power to issue an injunction enjoining third
parties from pursuing actions which are the exclusive property of the debtor estate and are
dismissed pursuant to a settlement agreement.”); In re General Homes Corp., 134 B.R. 853, 861
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1991) (implying that § 524(e) does not bar releases of derivative claims because
§ 1123(b)(3)(A) expressly allows for the extinguishing of such claims).
236
Silverstein, supra note 6, at 32-33. Non-debtor stays are typically granted when a creditor‟s
lawsuit against a third party would interfere with the debtor‟s reorganization. Id.
237
See id. at 85-86 n.387 (collecting authorities that are split over the power of bankruptcy courts to
issue “provisional injunctions”).
238
Id. at 29; see also In re Dow Corning Corp., 244 B.R. 721, 743 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1999) (using
the term “provisional injunction” in reference to a hypothetical post-confirmation temporary
injunction that would restrain a creditor from pursuing a non-debtor only until the assets available
under the plan are exhausted), rev‟d, 255 B.R. 445, 480 (E.D. Mich. 2000), rev‟d in part, 280 F.3d
648, 658 (6th Cir. 2002).
239
See, e.g., In re Rohnert Park Auto Parts, Inc., 113 B.R. 610, 612, 615 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1990) (the
plan of reorganization restrained creditors from taking legal action against any co-obligors of the
debtor for five years).
240
See, e.g., In re MAC Panel Co., No. 98-10952C-11G, 2000 WL 33673757, at *8 (Bankr.
M.D.N.C. Feb. 24, 2000) (the debtor‟s plan of reorganization included an injunction and a release
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channeling releases, provisional injunctions do not place the risk of plan failure
on the creditor; the creditor‟s claims are preserved (though suspended) until
payment in full is received. If the debtor defaults, the creditor may pursue the
previously shielded third party.241
Non-debtor releases must also be distinguished from “exculpation” clauses
and injunctions. Non-debtor releases enjoin contract, tort, and statutory claims
based on pre-petition conduct of the debtor and/or the benefitting non-debtors.242
Exculpation provisions extinguish causes of action flowing from post-petition
activities involving the administration of the bankruptcy case—e.g., the filing,
negotiation, and confirmation of the reorganization plan.243 Non-debtor releases
and exculpation clauses raise different issues.244 Indeed, many of the parties
protected by exculpations already have qualified immunity from the claims that
are barred.245
barring a creditor from prosecuting the debtor‟s shareholders as long as the debtor complied with
the plan, under which the creditor was to be paid in full; any deviation from the plan terminated the
injunction and voided the release to the extent a deficiency remained).
241
See Silverstein, supra note 6, at 30. For a summary of an argument against non-debtor releases
based on a comparison with provisional injunctions, see supra note 229.
242
See, e.g., In re Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3d at 653-55 (release extinguished rights of tort
claimants against debtor and its shareholders for their pre-petition involvement with silicone breast
implants).
243
See, e.g., In re Adelphia Commc‟ns Corp., 368 B.R. 140, 263 & n.290 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007)
(plan included a section entitled “Exculpation” (1) providing that the debtor, its management, the
creditors‟ committees, and numerous other parties “shall not be liable . . . for any Cause of Action
arising . . . from actions or omissions in connection with . . . these Chapter 11 Cases, this Plan, the
Disclosure Statement,” and multiple other pieces of the bankruptcy case, and (2) enjoining “all
parties in interest from asserting” such cause of action); In re Friedman‟s, Inc., 356 B.R. 758, 762
(Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2005) (plan contained a provision stating that the debtor, creditors‟ committee,
lenders, and these parties‟ directors, officers and other advisors “would be exculpated” from claims
by any party of interest in the bankruptcy flowing from an act or omission “„arising out of the
Debtors‟ Chapter 11 Cases, negotiation and filing of this Plan, filing the Chapter 11 Cases, the
pursuit of confirmation of this Plan, . . . except for their willful misconduct and gross negligence.‟”
(quoting the plan of reorganization)).
244
See In re Adelphia Commc‟ns Corp., 368 B.R. at 267 (noting that “without question it has long
been the custom in the bankruptcy community to make distinctions between releases involving preand post-petition conduct”); In re Friedman‟s, Inc., 356 B.R. at 760-64 (separately addressing and
applying different legal standards to the non-debtor releases and exculpation clauses in the debtor‟s
plan of reorganization). But see Airadigm Communications, Inc. v. FCC (In re Airadigm
Commc‟ns, Inc.), 519 F.3d 640, 647-48, 655-58 (7th Cir. 2008) (analyzing an exculpation clause as
though it were a non-debtor release). I think the Airadigm court was wrong to proceed as it did.
245
Section 1103, which sets forth the duties of official creditor committees in bankruptcy and their
members, see 11 U.S.C. § 1103(a), (c) (2006), “has been interpreted to imply both a fiduciary duty
to committee constituents and a limited grant of immunity to committee members.” In re PWS
Holding Corp., 228 F.3d 224, 246 (3d Cir. 2000) (collecting authorities). “This immunity covers
committee members for actions within the scope of their duties.” Id; accord 7 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1103.05[4][a] (15th ed. rev. 2006) (“A member of an official committee has a
qualified immunity from legal action for matters relating to the performance of the committee‟s
duties.”). But it does not extend to “willful misconduct or ultra vires acts.” In re PWS Holding
Corp., 228 F.3d at 246; see also Murphy v. Weathers, No. 7:07-CV-00027-HL, 2008 WL 4426080,
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B. Non-Debtor Releases Involving Insurance
The channeling injunctions in the Johns-Manville case extinguished any
rights held by the tort claimants and MacArthur against Manville‟s insurance
carriers. Non-debtor releases of this type, which are not uncommon,246 raise
unique issues because of complexities in the treatment of insurance under both
state law and the Bankruptcy Code. This sub-part reviews those issues.247
1. The Non-Bankruptcy Rights of Co-Insureds and Tort Claimants in a
Debtor’s Insurance Policy
An insurance policy is a contract between the insurer and the primary
insured.248 “Additional insureds” are persons, other than the primary insured,
listed in the policy by name or category as covered insureds.249 Corporations
bankrupted by mass torts frequently own liability policies that provide coverage
to multiple additional insureds, including non-debtor affiliates, directors, officers,
and shareholders.250 Additional insureds are third-party beneficiaries of the
at *5 (M.D. Ga. Sept. 25, 2008) (explaining that exculpation clauses limited to negligent conduct
by the protected parties merely restate the appropriate standard of liability under the bankruptcy
code) (collecting authorities).
246
See, e.g., Homsy v. Floyd (In re Vitek, Inc.), 51 F.3d 530, 531-32 (5th Cir. 1995) (after debtor
settled with its liability insurance carriers and the bankruptcy court approved the settlement, the
bankruptcy court issued an injunction barring all third parties from suing the insurers for claims
seeking additional coverage under the settled policies); In re Allied Prods. Corp., 288 B.R. 533,
535-36, 538 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2003) (approving in principle of third-party release of debtor‟s
insurers, which barred claims of debtor‟s tort creditors against the carriers, but denying the relief
because the release was requested as part of a broader motion that was otherwise invalid), aff‟d,
No. 03 C 1361, 2004 WL 635212 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2004); In re Dow Corning Corp., 198 B.R.
214, 243-47 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (holding that the court possessed the power to grant the debtor‟s
liability carriers a third-party release, extinguishing the rights of debtor‟s tort claimants against the
insurers); Unarco Bloomington Factory Workers v. UNR Indus., Inc., 124 B.R. 268, 272, 276-79
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990) (same); infra notes 329, 332, 335 (discussing additional cases involving
insurance non-debtor releases); see also Brubaker, supra note 173, at 961 (noting that “many” nondebtor releases “are approved in the context of an insurer‟s settlement of a coverage dispute with
the debtor‟s estate”).
247
In my prior article on non-debtor releases, I presumed that insurance releases were always
distinguishable from other types of releases. See Silverstein, supra note 6, at 27-28. Additional
research has altered my view, as will be apparent below.
248
Estate of Sustache v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 751 N.W.2d 845, 850 (Wis. 2008) (“An
insurance policy functions as a contract between the insured and the insurer.”); 45 C.J.S. Insurance
§ 584 (2007) (“The general rule is that an insurance policy is a personal contract between the
insurer and the named insured.”).
249
House v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 540 N.E.2d 738, 741 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) (explaining that
an additional insured is “any person who is an insured under the policy in addition to the named
insured” and that “this includes not only persons who may be indicated by name to be an insured,
but also any person who is a member of a class which is specifically indicated to be an insured
under the policy.”); 45 C.J.S. Insurance § 597 (2007) (same).
250
See 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 541.10[3] at 541-63 (15th ed. rev. 2005) (“The insurance
carriers typically have written policies of insurance covering the debtors, nondebtor affiliates and
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insurance agreement.251 As such, they possess contract rights under the insurance
policy that are enforceable directly against the carrier.252
Once an insurer pays an amount equivalent to the limits set forth in an
insurance policy, its obligations under the policy are discharged.253 If a carrier
turns over less than the full policy limit, however, it is only released to the extent
of the payment made.254 Accordingly, absent language in the policy to the
divested predecessor entities, among others.”); 1 ROWLAND H. LONG, THE LAW OF LIABILITY
INSURANCE § 3.06[3][a] (2007) (“In addition to the named insured, the standard CGL [Commercial
General Liability] policy also extends coverage to other individuals.”).
251
Douglas R. Richmond, Insurance Agent and Broker Liability, 40 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J.
1, 55-56 (2004) (“Additional insureds are intended third-party beneficiaries of the policies to which
they are added.”); Douglas R. Richmond, The Additional Problems of Additional Insureds, 33 TORT
& INS. L.J. 945, 947 (1998) (“Because only the insurer and named insured are parties to the
insurance contract, additional insureds necessarily are third-party beneficiaries.”); see, e.g., Herd v.
Am. Sec. Ins. Co., 556 F. Supp. 2d 992, 997 (W.D. Mo. 2008) (holding that where two individuals
were listed as additional insureds, the insurance policy “clearly and directly expressed . . . intent”
that they benefit from the policy, and thus the individuals were third-party beneficiaries).
252
See In re Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 133 B.R. 973, 978 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991) (explaining
that MacArthur in Johns-Manville and the debtor‟s co-insured parent company in this case held
legal or equitable interests in the insurance policies at issue “with the right to make direct claims on
the insurers if the conditions of the policies are satisfied”), aff‟d, 149 B.R. 860 (N.D. Ill. 1992);
Cmty. Bank of Homestead v. Am. States Ins. Co., 524 So. 2d 1154, 1154 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988)
(“[C]overage to the bank as an „additional insured‟ . . . afforded the bank the right to maintain an
independent action as an intended third-party beneficiary.”). Loss payees on insurance contracts,
another type of third-party beneficiary, have similar rights. See Master Mortgage Inv. Fund, Inc. v.
Am. Nat. Fire Ins. Co. (In re Master Mortgage Inv. Fund, Inc.), 165 B.R. 453, 455 (Bankr. W.D.
Mo. 1993) (“Certainly, a loss payee may bring action against an insurer on the contract of insurance
as a third party beneficiary.”); GMAC v. The Windsor Group, Inc., 2 S.W.3d 836, 839-40 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1999) (because insurance policy loss payees are third-party beneficiaries, they are entitled to
enforce the policy against the insurer; if a party has the right to enforce a contract—either as a party
to the agreement or a third-party beneficiary—the party “has a legally protectable interest”). See
generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 304 (1981) (a third-party beneficiary “may
enforce the duty” owed to it by the promisor under an agreement).
253
Carolina Cas. Ins. Co. v. Studer, 555 F. Supp. 2d 972, 978-79 (S.D. Ind. 2008) (depositing
policy limits with court via interpleader action extinguished carriers indemnification and defense
obligations under the policy to the primary and additional insureds) (applying Illinois and Indiana
law); Hosp. for Joint Diseases v. Hertz Corp., 803 N.Y.S.2d 670, 670 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005)
(“[W]here . . . an insurer has paid the full monetary limits set forth in the policy, its duties under the
contract of insurance cease.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); 4 LEE R. RUSS & THOMAS F.
SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE 3d § 61:9 (1996) (“When the insurer makes payment of the
proceeds of insurance to the person who by the policy is the proper recipient, such payment is a
discharge of the liability of the insurer.”) (collecting authorities). It should be noted, however, that
a majority of courts hold that the duty to defend is not always discharged merely by paying the
policy limit of a commercial general liability policy. See ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING
INSURANCE LAW 876-80 (2002).
254
See supra note 253 (the authorities cited therein implicitly support this conclusion); see also
46A C.J.S. Insurance § 1986 (2007) (“As a general rule, when the insurer makes payment of the
proceeds of insurance to the person who by the policy is the proper recipient, such a payment is a
discharge of the liability of the insurer, where the entire amount due is paid. In the case of a partial
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contrary, a compromise between one insured and the insurer cannot extinguish
the rights of other insureds to pursue the carrier for any difference between the
policy limits and the settlement amount.255 This conclusion reflects the general
principle that a promisor and promisee may not alter a third-party beneficiary‟s
rights without the latter‟s consent once those rights have vested.256 A similar rule
regarding settlements applies to loss payees,257 who are also third-party
beneficiaries of an insurance agreement.258
payment to the person designated by the policy, the insurer is discharged from liability to the extent
of the amount paid.” (emphasis added)).
255
See In re Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc. 133 B.R. 973, 979-80 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991) (holding
that because the debtor and its carriers reached a settlement for less than the policy limits, FWC, a
non-debtor co-insured, still held rights under the policies, and non-bankruptcy law did not permit
the court to extinguish those rights) (“When FWC purchased the policies it assumed the risk that
the policies might be exhausted by claims made by the additional insureds, not that its rights would
be extinguished by a separate agreement between one of the additional insureds and the insurer.”),
aff‟d, 149 B.R. 860 (N.D. Ill. 1992); Michael Sean Quinn & Brian S. Martin, Insurance and
Bankruptcy, 36 TORT & INS. L.J. 1025, 1079-80 (2001) (“[A] subsidiary that has gone into
bankruptcy may not compromise the rights under the policy of a co-insured parent[.]”); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 311 cmt. e (1981) (“In general the power of promisor
and promisee to vary the duty to a beneficiary under other types of insurance policies is understood
to be subject to a similar limitation: when an insured loss occurs, the power to vary the terms of the
policy with respect to that loss is terminated.”); id. § 311 cmt. e, illus. 5 (“A contracts with B for
liability insurance covering any person operating A‟s automobile with A‟s permission. C incurs
liability covered by the policy. Thereafter A and B agree to rescind the policy. The attempted
rescission does not affect the rights of C or the person to whom he is liable.”); 46A C.J.S.
Insurance § 1882 (2007) (“A settlement with respect to one item of loss does not preclude recovery
on the policy with respect to other items. Similarly, a settlement and release with respect to one
claim does not preclude recovery on the policy with respect to other claims.”).
256
See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 10.8, at 673 (4th ed. 2004) (noting that “[a]ll courts
agree” with this proposition). The authorities differ on the moment of vesting, and have adopted
three distinct views: vesting occurs (1) when the contract is formed, (2) when the beneficiary
assents to the contract, or (3) when the beneficiary relies upon the contract. Id. § 10.8, at 673. But
the promisor and promisee are free to override these default rules by expressly identifying the
moment of vesting in their agreement. Id. § 10.8, at 675.
257
See Perfect Invs., Inc. v. Underwriters at Lloyd‟s, London, 782 P.2d 932, 934 (Okla. 1989)
(holding that a settlement between an insurer and insured cannot defeat a loss payee‟s rights against
the insurer, unless the loss payee consents); 46A C.J.S. Insurance § 1884 (2007) (“A loss payee‟s
right to proceed against the insurance company may not be defeated by a settlement between the
insured and the insurance company made without the knowledge and consent of the loss payee.”).
258
See supra note 252. Additional insureds and loss payees are often (though not always) subject
to the carrier‟s defenses against the insured. See, e.g., Master Mortgage Inv. Fund, Inc. v. Am.
Nat‟l Fire Ins. Co. (In re Master Mortgage Inv. Fund, Inc.), 165 B.R. 453, 455 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.
1993) (“[T]hird party beneficiaries are . . . subject to the same defenses as the promisor could assert
if the promisee were suing on the contract.” (citations omitted)) (applying the rule to an insurance
contract and the loss payee thereunder). This principle is frequently articulated by describing the
third-party beneficiary‟s rights as “derivative.” See, e.g., 45 C.J.S. Insurance § 597 (2007) (“The
rights of any third party to an insurance contract are derivative rights, however, and can rise to no
greater dignity than the rights of the insured under the contract.”). But the principle has no bearing
here. The authority of a promisor and promisee to modify a contract involving a third-party
beneficiary (such as a settlement for less than the policy limits between an insurer and the named
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In Johns-Manville, MacArthur was an additional insured.259 Like other
such insureds, it possessed “a right directly against the insurers to seek
indemnification for product liability based on Manville products,”260 as long as
the policy limits were not exhausted. However, there was some suggestion that
Manville‟s insurers had already paid the full policy limits pursuant to their
settlements with the debtor.261 If that was the case, then MacArthur owned no
rights against Manville‟s carriers,262 and the channeling injunction barring
MacArthur from suing the insurers did not extinguish anything.263 If the policy
limits were not consumed, however, then the injunction did constitute a nondebtor release of MacArthur‟s state law contract claims against the carriers for
the remaining coverage.264
insured that purports to eliminate the rights of additional insureds) is governed by a different set of
rules from those that address which defenses are assertable by a promisor against a third-party
beneficiary. Compare FARNSWORTH § 10.8 (“Vulnerability of Beneficiary to Discharge or
Modification”), and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 311 (1981) (“Variation of a Duty to
a Beneficiary”), with FARNSWORTH § 10.9 (“Vulnerability of Beneficiary to Defenses and Claims”),
and RESTATEMENT § 309 (“Defenses Against the Beneficiary.”).
259
MacArthur was added to the policy via a vendor endorsement, MacArthur Co. v. JohnsManville Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 837 F.2d 89, 90 (2d Cir. 1988), making it an
additional insured, Merced County Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. State, 284 Cal. Rptr. 680, 686 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1991) (“An additional insured added by endorsement is a third-party beneficiary of the
insurance contract[. . . .]”). See also Zaretsky, supra note 141, at 408 (“MacArthur was, in effect, a
co-insured under Manville policies, entitled to indemnification for liability resulting from the sale
of Manville products.”).
260
Zaretsky, supra note 141, at 408; see also In re Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc. 133 B.R. 973, 978
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991) (explaining that MacArthur had a legal or equitable interest in Manville‟s
policies), aff‟d, 149 B.R. 860 (N.D. Ill. 1992).
261
See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 837 F.2d at 90-91 (“It is disputed whether Manville‟s policy
limits have been exhausted.”); id. at 93 (“In the present case, such a dispute exists because
Manville claims that the product liability limits on the policies to which the vendor endorsements
attach have been exhausted. The Bankruptcy Judge appears to have substantially accepted
Manville‟s contention, as he found that MacArthur‟s interest in the settled policies was „highly
speculative.‟”).
262
Id. at 90 (“The endorsements are subject to the payment limits and other restrictions of the
underlying policies; thus, if the product liability aggregate limits in the underlying Manville
policies have been exhausted, the insurer has no independent obligation to pay distributors on
product liability claims.”); Zaretsky, supra note 141, at 412 (explaining that if Manville used all of
the available insurance proceeds, MacArthur would have nothing to pursue); see also In re FortyEight Insulations, Inc., 133 B.R. at 980 (observing that if the debtor had already exhausted the
insurance, the co-insured non-debtor “may have no further rights under the policies”); Carter v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 33 S.W.3d 369, 373 (Tex. App. 2000) (“[S]ettlements that result in
the exhaustion of policy limits excuse further performance by the insurer on behalf of the other
insureds.”).
263
Actually, MacArthur potentially still held “bad faith” claims against the carriers. See State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 348 N.E.2d 491, 494 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976) (noting that an insurer
may be liable for bad faith in some circumstances even though the policy limits have been
exhausted).
264
In its discussion of the bankruptcy court‟s jurisdiction over MacArthur‟s claims against the
carriers, the Second Circuit concluded that MacArthur‟s contractual rights were “no different” from
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The situation with respect to a debtor‟s tort claimants is more complex.
Tort claimants are unsecured creditors.265 Such creditors hold no interest in any
specific piece of the debtor‟s property prior to obtaining a judgment and
attaching a lien via post-judgment process.266 This principle is applicable to
liability insurance. The general rule is that, absent policy language or a statutory
provision to the contrary, injured parties hold no interest in their tortfeasor‟s
insurance and thus may not sue the insurance company directly to recover under
the policies.267
the tort rights “of the asbestos victims who have already been barred from asserting direct actions
against the insurers.” In re Johns-Manville Corp., 837 F.2d at 92. For jurisdictional purposes, the
court was correct. Bankruptcy courts possess jurisdiction over all claims that “could conceivably
have any effect on the estate being administered in bankruptcy.” Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d
984, 994 (3d Cir. 1984); see also 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 3.01[4][c][ii][B], at 3-22 to 3-23 &
n.85 (15th ed. rev. 2004) (noting that the Pacor Test “has been adopted by most circuit courts”).
And, as the Second Circuit correctly explained, both MacArthur and the tort creditors sought “to
collect out of the proceeds of Manville‟s insurance policies on the basis of Manville‟s conduct.” In
re Johns-Manville Corp., 837 F.2d at 92-93 (emphasis added). MacArthur‟s and the asbestos
plaintiffs‟ claims would thus “effect” the estate, providing the bankruptcy court with jurisdiction
over them. See id. at 93 (“In both cases, plaintiffs‟ claims are inseparable from Manville‟s own
insurance coverage and are consequently well within the Bankruptcy Court‟s jurisdiction over
Manville‟s assets.”). But this jurisdictional analysis does not establish any parallel between
MacArthur‟s and the asbestos claimants‟ rights under state substantive law. Nor is it relevant to
whether MacArthur‟s or the tort plaintiffs‟ claims constituted or flowed from interests in estate
property, an issue discussed infra at Part IV.B.2.
265
See In re Elec. Mach. Enters., Inc., 371 B.R. 549, 552 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2007); Edward J.
Janger, The Death of Secured Lending, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1759, 1760 (2004).
266
Volvo White Truck Corp. v. Chambersburg Beverage, Inc. (In re White Motor Credit Corp.), 75
B.R. 944, 948 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987) (“General unsecured claimants including tort claimants,
have no specific interest in a debtor‟s property.”); Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Normative Theory of
Bankruptcy Law: Bankruptcy as (is) Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 931, 1023 (2004)
(“Under nonbankruptcy law, unsecured creditors have no property interest in their debtor‟s assets
until such time as they receive a judicial lien, normally following judgment and, as to personal
property, the exercise of judicial remedies against the debtor‟s assets.”).
267
1 LONG, supra note 250, § 1.06[3][a], at 1-34.2 (“The modern rule is that, in the absence of a
contractual or statutory provision allowing a direct action, the claimant has no right to a direct
action against the insurer.”); 46A C.J.S. Insurance § 1942 (2007) (“As a general rule, in the
absence of policy or statutory provisions to the contrary, one who suffers an injury which comes
within the provisions of a liability insurance policy is not in privity of contract with the insurance
company, and cannot reach the proceeds of the policy for the payment of his or her claim by an
action directly against the insurance company.”); 22 ERIC MILLS HOLMES, HOLMES‟ APPLEMAN ON
INSURANCE 2d § 142.1[B][1], at 480 (2003) (explaining that tort claimants are “remitted” to
standard post-judgment remedies, such as garnishment, if there is no direct action statute and the
claimant is not a third-party beneficiary under the insurance policy); see, e.g., Trancik v. USAA
Ins. Co., 581 S.E.2d 858, 861 (S.C. Ct. App. 2003) (explaining that an injured third party is an
“incidental beneficiary” and thus “does not have a contractual relationship with the insurer and
cannot maintain an action against the insurer for breach of the insurance contract”); All Around
Transp., Inc. v. Cont‟l W. Ins. Co., 931 P.2d 552, 556-57 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996) ((1) explaining the
general rule, (2) noting that Colorado has no general direct action statute and that the injured party
was not a third-party beneficiary under the insurance policy, (3) holding that the injured party thus
had no direct action rights against the carrier even though it had obtained a judgment against the
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If a liability insurance policy provides that persons injured by the insured
are third-party beneficiaries, the situation is different. In that circumstance, the
harmed parties are in privity of contract with the carrier and may sue the insurer
directly,268 as long as they comply with any conditions set forth in the policy.269
Additionally, many jurisdictions have enacted “direct-action” statutes that
permit tort claimants to sue the tortfeasor‟s carrier directly.270 “Usually these
statutes require the injured party to obtain a final judgment against the insured
before proceeding directly against the insurer.”271 Some of these laws permit a
direct suit as soon as the final judgment is entered.272 Others require either that
the judgment remain unpaid for a certain period of time 273 or the existence of a
writ of execution that was returned unsatisfied.274 I shall refer to all such laws
insured, and (4) observing that the injured judgment creditor could use the general garnishment
laws to enforce the judgment against the insurer).
There are a number of exceptions to this general rule. Perhaps the most important
involves compulsory insurance. See In re Dow Corning Corp., 198 B.R. 214, 239 n.18 (E.D. Mich.
1996) (explaining that Michigan regards injured persons to be third-party beneficiaries of
compulsory liability insurance, such as automobile insurance); Crisp Reg‟l Hosp., Inc. v. Oliver,
621 S.E.2d 554, 583 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) (“[W]ith the exception of certain instances where liability
insurance coverage is legislatively mandated,” tort claimants are generally not third-party
beneficiaries of liability insurance policies. (emphasis added)); 7A LEE R. RUSS & THOMAS F.
SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE 3d § 104:45 (1997) (noting that a person injured in a car accident
is a “legal beneficiary” of the tortfeasor‟s “[c]ompulsory motor vehicle insurance.”).
268
7A COUCH ON INSURANCE 3d, supra note 267, § 104:7 (“The absence of privity is no bar to a
direct action against a liability insurer where there is a statute or contract clause giving the injured
person a direct action right.” (emphasis added)); 46A C.J.S. Insurance § 1942 (2007) (“Where the
insurance contract, by reason of policy provisions for the benefit of the injured person, is construed
as a third-party beneficiary contract, the injured person has the usual rights of a third-party
beneficiary to maintain an action against the insurance company.”) (collecting authorities); see,
e.g., Underwriters at Lloyds v. Shimer (In re Ide Jewelry Co.), 75 B.R. 969, 975-76 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1987) (consignor, injured as a result of consignee-insured‟s conduct, possessed a direct
right of action against the consignee‟s carrier under the consignee‟s insurance policy); Desmond v.
Am. Ins. Co. 786 S.W.2d 144, 146-47 (Mo. Ct App. 1989) (noting that some liability insurance
policies contain provisions that grant injured persons third-party beneficiary status and finding that
the policy in this case included such a provision).
269
46A C.J.S. Insurance § 1943 (2007) (“The injured person can recover only under the terms and
conditions of the contract, and must comply with the policy provisions conferring the right.”); see,
e.g., St. Paul Ins. Co. v. Rahn, 641 S.W.2d 276, 278 (Tex. App. 1982) (explaining that an injured
person was required to comply with the conditions of its tortfeasor‟s insurance policy before
bringing a direct action against the carrier).
270
22 APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE 2d, supra note 267, § 142.3[A][1], at 504; 46A C.J.S. Insurance §
1944 (2007). For a good overview of direct action statutes, see generally 22 APPLEMAN ON
INSURANCE 2d, supra note 267, § 142.3, at 502-520.
271
APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE 2d, supra note 267, § 142.3[A][1], at 504. See generally id. §§
142.1[D], at 484-85, 142.3[A][1], at 504-506 (identifying numerous examples of such statutes).
272
E.g., CAL. INS. CODE § 11580(b)(2) (West 2005); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-7-2 (2008).
273
E.g., N.Y. INS. LAW § 3420(a)(2) (McKinney 2007); ALA. CODE § 27-32-2 (LexisNexis 2007).
274
E.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 500.3006 (West 2002); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/388
(West 2008).
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that condition a direct suit on the existence of a judgment as “post-judgment
statutes.”
Some direct action laws permit suit against the insurer prior to the entry of a
judgment against the tortfeasor.275 A few even permit a direct action without the
filing of a lawsuit against the insured.276 I shall refer to all such laws as “prejudgment statutes.”
Direct actions laws, whether of the post-judgment or pre-judgment variety,
also typically state that the insolvency or bankruptcy of the insured does not
release or alter the liability of the carrier.277
While some features of direct action statutes are relatively straight-forward,
courts in pre-judgment and post-judgment states are divided over (1) whether
such laws confer a property interest in liability insurance, (2) the nature of any
interest conferred, and (3) when the interest arises.278 Moreover, it is difficult to
ascertain the precise contours of these disagreements because of ambiguities in
the case law.279

275

22 APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE 2d, supra note 267, § 142.3[A][1], at 505 (“Note that some states
permit the injured party to maintain an action against the tortfeasor‟s insurer at an earlier stage of
the proceedings against the tortfeasor.”).
276
E.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 632.24 (West 2006) (“Any bond or policy of insurance covering
liability to others for negligence makes the insurer liable, up to the amounts stated in the bond or
policy, to the persons entitled to recover against the insured for the death of any person or for injury
to persons or property, irrespective of whether the liability is presently established or is contingent
and to become fixed or certain by final judgment against the insured.”); Estate of Otto v. Physicians
Ins. Co. of Wisconsin, Inc., 751 N.W.2d 805, 812 (Wis. 2008) (“[T]he insured is not a necessary
party to the action brought against its insurer.”); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1269(B)(1) (2009); see
also 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 541.10[3], at 541-63 (15th ed. rev. 2005) (“In addition, some
allegedly injured persons may have direct action rights against the insurance carrier, even, in some
cases, bypassing the debtor-insured.”).
277
For examples of post-judgment provisions containing such language, see CAL. INS. CODE §
11580(b)(1) (West 2005); N.Y. INS. LAW § 3420(a)(1) (McKinney 2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS §
500.3006 (West 2002); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/388 (West 2008); IND. CODE ANN. § 27-1-137(a) (West 1999). For examples of pre-judgment laws containing such language, see WIS. STAT. §
632.22 (West 2006) and LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1269(A) (2009). Virtually every state would
have adopted legislation like this “had not insurers revised the standard policy forms used for
liability insurance to provide coverage without regard to an insured‟s solvency.” ROBERT E.
KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW 378 (1988).
278
See generally 7A COUCH ON INSURANCE 3d, supra note 267, § 104:31 (“The right of a claimant
under a direct action statute has been variously described. In some instances, the designation of the
nature of the right is not particularly significant while, in others, the implications which could be
drawn from the particular classification of the claimant‟s right are of the utmost significance.”).
279
See id. § 104:2, at 104-12 to 104-13 (“In the absence of a clear authorizing statute, readers are
warned that the analysis of what rights the third party may have against the insurer tends to become
tangled in the interwoven strands of various collateral theories, the language and underpinnings of
which are themselves often arcane.”). Some of the divergences in the authorities likely flow from
variations in statutory language. See generally id. § 104:13 (“The statutory schemes of various
jurisdictions differ, and practitioners must be certain to review the particular statute of the
jurisdiction at issue in order draw definitive conclusions.”).
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Authorities in states with pre-judgment statutes generally understand such
laws to grant tort claimants a property interest in their tortfeasor‟s liability
insurance well before any judgment is obtained against the insured. In Louisiana,
for example, the entire public is considered a third-party beneficiary of liability
insurance policies280 with rights that vest “at the time of the tort.”281 And the
direct action provision contains language that expressly supports this
understanding.282 In Wisconsin, while tort claimants are apparently not thirdparty beneficiaries,283 they do obtain a vested interest in the tortfeasor‟s insurance
once a covered injury occurs.284 Consistent with these principles, decisions
applying both Louisiana and Wisconsin law have stated that liability insurance
proceeds are reserved for tort claimants—including pre-judgment claimants; they
are not available to general unsecured creditors.285

280

See Litton v. Ford Motor Co., 554 So. 2d 99, 103 (La. Ct. App. 1989) (“Under the wellestablished jurisprudence, the general public as a class is also a third party beneficiary of liability
insurance coverage.”).
281
See Hayes v. New Orleans Archdiocesan Cemeteries, 805 So. 2d 320, 323 (La. Ct. App. 2001)
(“The Direct Action Statute vests the injured party with rights at the time of the tort to institute an
action directly against the insurer within the terms and limits of the policy.”).
282
See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1269(D) (2009) (“It is also the intent of this Section that all
liability policies within their terms and limits are executed for the benefit of all injured persons and
their survivors or heirs to whom the insured is liable[.]”) (emphasis added). But cf. Descant v.
Adm‟rs of Tulane Educ. Fund, 639 So. 2d 246, 249 (La. 1994) (describing the Louisiana direct
action statute as granting “merely . . . a procedural right of action against the insurer”).
283
See Mercado v. Mitchell, 264 N.W.2d 532, 538 (Wis. 1978) (“In the absence of express
provisions in the policy or statutory provisions which can be read into the policy, a standard
liability policy does not make the injured party a third-party beneficiary.”); Hammock v. Koderl,
No. 98-0956-FT, 1998 WL 596401, at ***1 (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 10 1998) (same). But see
Kranzush v. Badger State Mut. Cas. Co., 307 N.W.2d 256, 273 (Wis. 1981) (Abrahamson, J.,
concurring) (explaining that direct action statutes, among other laws, are “predicated on the theory
that the third-party victim is a third-party beneficiary of the insurance contract”).
284
See Society Ins. v. Capitol Indem. Corp., 659 N.W.2d 875, 879 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003) (“Our
supreme court clearly indicated that the rights of the parties become fixed when the loss occurs.”).
285
See Nat‟l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Titan Energy, Inc. (In re Titan Energy, Inc.), 837 F.2d 325, 327,
329 (8th Cir. 1988) (explaining that the insurance proceeds will be paid to the pre-judgment tort
claimant if the policy is valid, but if coverage is lacking then the tort claimant “will join the general
creditor queue”) (tort claimant filed action against the carrier under Louisiana‟s direct action
statute, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1269(B)(1) (2009)); Hometown Bank v. Acuity Ins., 748 N.W.2d
203, 206-07 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008) (explaining that even if an injured person sued the insured in the
future and the loss was covered by the carrier, a non-tort judgment creditor of the insured could not
garnish the proceeds of the insurance policy because the insurer “would not owe any money to [the
insured], but to the injured party”). Some Louisiana authorities consider insurers to be co-liable
with the insured to the tort claimant. See, e.g., Wimberly v. Brown, 973 So. 2d 75, 78 (La. Ct. App.
2007) (“Further, an insurer is solidarily liable with its insured.”); Yarbrough v. Fed. Land Bank
Ass‟n of Jackson, 616 So. 2d 1327, 1335 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (“An obligation is solidary when each
obligor is liable for the whole performance of the obligation.”). This also strongly suggests that
insurance proceeds are preserved for injured persons with claims covered by the policies because
only the beneficiaries of a guaranty may recover against the guarantor.
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Courts in post-judgment jurisdictions are more deeply divided. Some have
interpreted their direct action laws as providing injured persons with third-party
beneficiary status under the insurance policy once a judgment is obtained against
the insured.286 Tort claimants without a final judgment are distinguished and
apparently have no property interest in the tortfeasor‟s liability insurance.287
Decisions in other states—states that have not fully articulated the status of postjudgment tort creditors—have concurred with this assessment of the rights of
pre-judgment claimants.288

286

See, e.g., Harper v. Wausau Ins. Co., 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 64, 68 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (“[O]nce a
party has a final judgment against the insured, the claimant becomes a third party beneficiary of the
insurance policy and may enforce the terms which flow to its benefit pursuant to” Cal. Ins. Code
section 11580 (West 2005), California‟s direct action statute.) (collecting California authorities);
Hand v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 258, 266 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (“[J]udgment creditors
granted a right of action by the [direct action] statute have been repeatedly and definitely held to be
third party beneficiaries of the policy.”); see also 22 APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE 2d, supra note
267, § 142.1[F], at 491-92 (“Thus, in those states, once a injured party has a final judgment against
an insured, the injured party becomes a third party beneficiary of the portions of the policy that
flow to his or her benefit.”). Florida also has a post-judgment direct action statute and it implies
that injured persons become third-party beneficiaries upon obtaining a judgment against the
insured. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.4136(2) (West 2005) (“No person who is not an insured . . .
shall have any interest in such policy, either as a third-party beneficiary or otherwise, prior to first
obtaining a settlement or verdict against a person who is an insured.”); see also Canadian Home
Ins. Co. v. Norris, 471 So. 2d 217, 218 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (explaining that upon obtaining a
final judgment, the plaintiff vests a “third-party interest” in the insurance policy and may then file a
direct action against the carrier under section 627.4136(4)).
287
See Hand, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 265 (“[B]y virtue of section 11580, a judgment creditor of an
insured enjoys third party beneficiary status and rights under the policy, and in this respect stands
distinct from those „third party claimants‟ who have not achieved that status.”); Fortman v. Safeco
Ins. Co., 271 Cal. Rptr. 117, 119 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (“The judgment requirement prevents
claimants' actions unless they first perfect their third-party beneficiary status by securing a
judgment against the insured tortfeasor.”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.4136(2) (West 2005) (“No
person who is not an insured . . . shall have any interest in such policy, either as a third-party
beneficiary or otherwise, prior to first obtaining a settlement or verdict against a person who is an
insured.” (emphasis added)).
288
See, e.g., In re Dow Corning Corp., 198 B.R. 214, 240 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1996) (applying
Michigan law) (“In short, prior to obtaining and enforcing a judgment, an injured person merely
has an expectation of recovery that is contingent upon the occurrence of future events, and such
expectation does not rise to the level of a vested property right.”) (holding that tort claimants
without a judgment against the debtor did not have a property interest in the debtor‟s liability
insurance); see also La. World Exposition, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co. (In re La. World Exposition, Inc.),
832 F.2d 1391, 1399 (5th Cir. 1987) (“One having a pending, unadjudicated tort claim against
another does not—whether or not the claimant is bankrupt—thereby have a property interest in
liability insurance proceeds payable to the defendant. . . .” (offering the quoted language as a
general principle, rather than interpreting any particular direct action statute)); 7A COUCH ON
INSURANCE 3d, supra note 267, § 104:32 (contending that direct action statutes do not transform a
tort claimant from “a mere general creditor” into a secured creditor, but only citing cases from the
1930s).
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If an injured person lacks a property interest in its tortfeasor‟s policy, then
his rights are probably the same as those of any other unsecured creditor. Under
this conclusion, liability insurance proceeds should not be segregated for tort
claimants. Rather, they should be distributed to the full body of unsecured
creditors via the bankruptcy priority scheme.289
Other post-judgment states take a different view. Courts applying Alabama
law, for example, have interpreted the local direct action statute290 to provide tort
claimants with the equivalent of a lien on the tortfeasor‟s insurance once they
suffer harm.291 Similarly, the Second Circuit read New York‟s direct action law

289

See Charles A. Beckham, Jr., It‟s All an Unsecured Claim to Me: The Tortious Interference of
Bankruptcy Law with Liability Insurance Proceeds, 22 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 779, 798 (1991) (“The
Bankruptcy Code does not contain a separate priority scheme for the distribution of insurance
proceeds. Any distribution of insurance proceeds directly to a tort claimant would be repugnant to
the stated intentions of the Bankruptcy Code.”); see also WILLIAM L. NORTON, III & ROGER G.
JONES, NORTON CREDITORS‟ RIGHTS HANDBOOK § 20:4 (West 2008) (suggesting that whether tort
claimants have priority over other unsecured creditors in insurance proceeds is an open question);
Zaretsky, supra note 141, at 398 (“[I]f the insurance proceeds are viewed as property of the estate,
then arguably the proceeds should be distributed among creditors in the same manner as other
property of the estate.”). Two commentators have cited Soliz v. S. Farm Bureau Cas. Co. (In re
Soliz), 77 B.R. 93 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987) (decided under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Pub. L.
No. 696, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978), rather than the Code), as supporting this conclusion. See
Beckham, supra, at 796-97; Edward F. Donohue, Impact of Bankruptcy on Insured Malpractice
Claims, 3 NO. 2 LEG. MALPRACTICE REP. 11, 12 (1992). In that case, the trustee settled with the
debtor‟s alleged liability insurer. In re Soliz, 77 B.R. at 94. The court ultimately held that the
money paid by the carrier pursuant to the settlement was property of the estate, “distributable to all
creditors in accordance with the applicable Bankruptcy Act provisions,” rather than to the tort
claimants injured by the debtor. Id. at 94-95, 97. However, the payment from the insurer settled,
inter alia, a number of contract causes of action “unrelated to the claims of the Tort Claimants.”
Id. at 95, 97. And the court distinguished a case cited by the tort claimants on the ground that it
concerned “a liability policy, not a contract right dispute as in the instant case.” Id. at 97. The
court appears to have treated the settlement payment not as liability insurance proceeds, but as
breach of contract damages. Thus, Soliz is questionable authority for the proposition that tort
claimants have no priority in liability insurance over unsecured creditors.
290
ALA. CODE §§ 27-32-1, 27-32-2 (LexisNexis 2007).
291
See, e.g., Maness v. Ala. Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 416 So. 2d 979, 981 (Ala. 1982)
(“Under Alabama Law, the injured party acquires a vested interest (secondary) in the nature of a
hypothecation of the insured‟s rights under the policy.”), not followed on other grounds, Woodall v.
Alfa Mut. Ins. Co., 658 So. 2d 369 (Ala. 1995); Nat‟l Surety Corp. v. Sanders, 301 So. 2d 93, 95
(Ala. Civ. App. 1974) (same); BLACK‟S LAW DICTIONARY 759 (8th ed. 2004) (“Hypothecate. To
pledge (property) as security or collateral for a debt, without delivery of title or possession.”).
While injured persons may not actually sue insurance companies until after they have obtained a
judgment against the insured, Maness, 416 So. 2d at 981-82, “the right of the judgment creditor
relates back to the time when his right action arose,” Fleming v. Pan Am. Fire and Cas. Co., 495
F.2d 535, 538, 541 (5th Cir. 1974) (emphasis added) (holding that a settlement between insurer and
insured taking place after the plaintiff‟s injury, but prior to a final judgment in the underlying
action, did not defeat the plaintiff‟s vested interest in the insurance policy); see also ALA. CODE §
27-32-1 (providing that “whenever a loss occurs on account of a casualty covered by such contract
of insurance, the liability of the insurer shall become absolute” (emphasis added)).
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to grant a pre-judgment tort claimant an interest in the liability insurance of its
tortfeasor superior to that of the tortfeasor‟s bankruptcy estate.292 The court
explained that the statute created “in effect a trust fund of the insurance proceeds
for the benefit of the injured person”293 and “was designed by the New York
legislature to ensure that injured persons with unsatisfied claims against a
bankrupt receive the proceeds of insurance before they enrich the bankrupt‟s
general creditors.”294
A number of other courts and commentators have reached conclusions
consistent with the Alabama and New York authorities without citing any
particular direct action statute. Some have determined that only injured parties
may be paid with insurance proceeds; general unsecured creditors are not entitled
to receive such funds.295 This suggests that the proceeds of liability insurance are
held in the equivalent of a constructive trust for the benefit of tort claimants.296

292

See Am. Bank & Trust Co. v. Davis (In re F.O. Baroff Co.), 555 F.2d 38, 41-42 (2d Cir. 1977)
(construing the predecessor to N.Y. INS. LAW § 3420(a)(1) (West 2007)); see also Baez v. Medical
Liab. Mut. Ins. Co., 136 B.R. 65, 68 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (explaining that, under § 3420(a)(1), “upon
filing of a bankruptcy petition, the insured is divested of his interest in the proceeds of the policy to
the extent that those proceeds are needed to compensate the injured party, which proceeds at that
point vest in the injured party”) (holding that a pre-judgment tort claimant, unlike “other unsecured
creditors,” was entitled to post-petition interest paid out of the debtor‟s liability insurance
proceeds).
293
In re F.O. Baroff Co., 555 F.2d at 42.
294
Id. at 44. A few subsequent decisions have criticized Baroff. See, e.g., Galecor v. Inst. of
London Underwriters, 729 F. Supp. 1101, 1104 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (contending that the “Second
Circuit ignored plain statutory language”).
295
See, e.g., In re Mahoney Hawkes, LLP, 289 B.R. 285, 295 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2002) (in reference
to the proceeds of the debtor‟s liability insurance policies, the court explained that the tort
claimants “have the right to receive some property of the estate that general unsecured creditors
cannot receive”); Landry v. Exxon Pipeline Co., 260 B.R. 769, 786 (Bankr. M.D. La. 2001) (noting
that liability insurance proceeds “could not be made available for distribution to the creditors other
than those who have claims under the policies”); id. at 786 n.62 (contending that if insurance
proceeds are property of the estate, they should not be distributed pursuant to the bankruptcy
priority scheme because unsecured creditors are “without claims covered by the particular
insurance”); 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 362.03, at 362-25 (15th ed. rev. 2006) (stating that
“policy proceeds are not available to all creditors, and in that sense are different from other
property of the estate”); id. ¶ 362.07, at 362-85 (15th ed. rev. 2002) (noting that policy proceeds are
“available only to creditors with the type of claims covered by the policy”); Robert K. Rasmussen,
Resolving Transnational Insolvencies Through Private Ordering, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2252, 2269
(2000) (“When a firm files for bankruptcy, the proceeds of insurance policies go directly to the
injured claimants, despite their nominal status as unsecured creditors.”); see also Houston v.
Edgeworth (In re Edgeworth), 993 F.2d 51, 56 (5th Cir. 1993) (“But under the typical liability
policy, the debtor will not have a cognizable interest in the proceed of the policy. Those proceeds
will normally by payable only for the benefit of those harmed by the debtor under the terms of the
insurance contract.”); Beckham, supra note 289, at 787 (“Most courts and practitioners assume that
insurance proceeds are exclusively for the benefit of the tort claimant.”).
296
See Zaretsky, supra note 141, at 398 (“The [insurance] proceeds may be viewed as property that
is held in a type of constructive trust that can be reached only by a particular class of creditors, not
by creditors generally.”). Professor Zaretsky also contends that the insurer is comparable to a
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Alternatively, even if general unsecured creditors may be paid with liability
insurance, tort claimants hold priority rights in the proceeds akin to those of
secured creditors.297 Under either understanding—tort claimants as constructive
trust beneficiaries or as secured parties—pre-judgment tort claimants possess a
property interest in the debtor‟s insurance.298
As with additional insureds,299 it is well-established that if the insurer has
already paid the policy limits to the insured, the injured party may not recover
from the carrier.300 When the insurer and insured settle for less than the coverage
guarantor who guaranteed debts only to tort claimants. Id. at 388 (“The insurer is similar to a
guarantor in that it undertakes the obligation to satisfy a claim against the principle debtor who, in
this case, is the insured.”); id. at 390 (“As with the guaranty, which is available only to the creditor
who is the beneficiary of the guaranty, a claim against an insurer is available only to the
beneficiaries of the insurance.”).
297
See, e.g., In re Mahoney Hawkes, 289 B.R. at 288-89, 296 (explaining that the debtor‟s
unsecured tort claimants “are, in effect, multiple secured creditors having claims against a single
fund,” namely, the proceeds of the liability insurance policy); Zaretsky, supra note 141, at 388 n.46
(“To the extent that insurance proceeds are available to satisfy their claims, the position of the
beneficiary-claimants may be analogized to that of a secured party. There is particular property
that is earmarked for the satisfaction of their claims. Moreover, their claims may be fully satisfied
notwithstanding that mere general creditors may receive little or nothing.”); David Gray Carlson,
Indemnity, Liability, Insolvency, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1951, 1959 (2004) (explaining that the
interest of an injured party in its tortfeasor‟s insurance is best understood as a statutory lien).
298
See UCC § 1-201(35) (2001) (“„Security interest‟ means an interest in personal property.”); In
re White, 297 B.R. 626, 635 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2003) (“The constructive trust is a legal fiction that
adopts the analogy of a trust and declares that a beneficiary owns an equitable interest in
property.”). Further support for the conclusion that tort claimants have some type of property
interest can be drawn from the cases that permit lifting of the automatic stay so that an injured party
may prosecute the debtor in name only in order to recover against the debtor‟s carrier. See 3
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 362.07, at 362-85 (15th ed. rev. 2002) (briefly discussing this line of
authority). Lifting the stay for quicker recovery is generally something reserved to secured parties
or those who otherwise have an interest in the debtor‟s property. See generally id. ¶ 362.07 (15th
ed. rev. 2002, 2005, 2006) (surveying the bases for lifting the stay, virtually all of which require
that the party seeking relief hold an interest in the debtor‟s property). Moreover, lifting the stay
permits tort claimants to recover from liability insurance free from competition with other creditors.
If a tort claimant‟s rights are no greater than those of other unsecured creditors, there is little basis
for permitting such an extraordinary remedy. See also In re Allied Prods. Corp., 288 B.R. 533,
537-38 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2003) (holding that, under Illinois‟s post-judgment direct action statute,
215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/388 (West 2008), pre-judgment tort claimants hold an interest in a
bankrupt-insured‟s liability insurance requiring adequate protection before the debtor may
compromise the policy by selling it back to the carrier free and clear of the tort claimants‟ interest),
aff‟d, No. 03 C 1361, 2004 WL 635212 (“In the court‟s view, the weight of authority in Illinois
favors the proposition that injured parties do generally have rights in insurance policies, and that
such rights vest at the moment of injury.”).
299
For the rule applicable to additional insureds, see supra note 253 and accompanying text.
300
See Altadis USA, Inc. v. NPR, Inc., 162 F. App‟x 926, 929 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding that
because the insurer had already paid the insurance proceeds to the insured, the injured party could
not recover against the insurer); 7A COUCH ON INSURANCE 3d, supra note 267, § 106:12 (“The
claimant bringing the direct action is subject to the maximum amount limitation of coverage
declared in the policy. That is, the claimant cannot recover more from the insurer than the insured
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limits, however, the rights of tort claimants appear to depend on whether they
hold a property interest in the insurance. Courts frequently hold that a
compromise under the policy limits bars injured persons without a property
interest from suing the carrier for any remaining coverage, as long as the
settlement is not a fraudulent transfer to the insurer subject to avoidance by
general creditors.301 But if the tort claimants possess a property interest,302 then a
sub-policy limits compromise generally does not extinguish their rights against
the insurer; the injured persons remain free to pursue the carrier for the difference
between the coverage limits and the settlement amount, whether they obtained
their property interest by contract303 or under a direct action statute, such as New
York‟s304 or Alabama‟s.305
might have recovered if the action had been brought by him or her.”) (collecting authorities); 46A
C.J.S. Insurance § 1943 (2007) (the injured party is “limited to the amount of the policy”).
301
See, e.g., Michel v. Am. Fire & Cas. Co., 82 F.2d 583, 587-88 (5th Cir. 1936) (reversing trial
court‟s directed verdict and holding that the jury should have addressed whether insured‟s release
of insurer for less than one-sixth of the value of its claim constituted fraudulent transfer as to
insured‟s judgment creditor despite fact that judgment creditor held no interest in policy at time of
settlement) (applying Florida law); In re Dow Corning Corp., 198 B.R. 214, 233-42 (Bankr. E.D.
Mich. 1996) (carefully reviewing Michigan law and reaching the conclusion that injured parties
with unliquidated tort claims have no property interest in the tortfeasor‟s insurance policies, despite
Michigan‟s post-judgment direct action statute, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 500.3006 (West 2002), but
may challenge a settlement between the insured and its carriers under fraudulent transfer law, the
same as any other unsecured creditor); Hartman v. United Heritage Prop. & Cas. Co., 108 P.3d 340,
342-43, 346 (Idaho 2005) (upholding a settlement for substantially less than the policy limits that
resolved a coverage dispute between the carrier and its insured, and was executed prior to the tort
claimant obtaining a judgment against the insured, because tort claimants have no rights in liability
policies); Stonewall Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho, 971 P.2d 1142, 1146
(Idaho 1998) (noting that Idaho has no direct action statute); see also In re Forty-Eight Insulations,
Inc., 133 B.R. 973, 978 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991) (“It might be clearer to say simply that tort
claimants have no „legal or equitable‟ interest in the insurance policy in the first place, any more
than they do in other property of the estate, so that their property rights are not impaired by a
settlement of the debtor‟s claim to coverage.”). Some states also have enacted statutes that prohibit
the insurer and insured from agreeing to retroactively void an insurance policy after an injury to a
person that may be covered by the policy. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.18.320 (West
1999).
302
To recap, tort claimants possess an interest in their tortfeasor‟s insurance when they (1) are
contractual third-party beneficiaries, see supra notes 268-69 and accompanying text, (2) were
injured in a pre-judgment state, see supra notes 280-85 and accompanying text, (3) were injured in
a post-judgment state where the direct action statute is construed to grant an interest pre-judgment,
see supra notes 290-98 and accompanying text, or (4) were injured in a post-judgment state and
have obtained a judgment against the insured and complied with any additional conditions of the
local direct action statute, see supra note 286 and accompanying text.
303
See Phila. Forrest Hills Corp. v. Bituminous Cas. Corp., 222 A.2d 493, 494-95 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1966) (holding that a settlement between a tortfeasor and its carrier for less than the policy limits
did not bar the plaintiff, who was a third-party beneficiary of the insurance policy, from suing the
carrier; the settlement apparently took place before the plaintiff obtained a judgment against the
insured).
304
See Smith & Wesson v. Birmingham Fire Ins. Co., 510 N.Y.S.2d 606, 607-10 (N.Y. App. Div.
1987) (holding that a settlement for less than the policy limits between two insured‟s and their
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carrier, executed before the tort claimant injured by the insureds even sued them, was not binding
on the tort claimant, and thus the tort claimant was entitled to summary judgment against the carrier
for the full amount of its claim, because recognizing the settlement as binding “would defeat the
beneficial purpose of” New York‟s post-judgment, direct action law, N.Y. Ins. Law section 3420
(West 2007)) (“A settlement agreement between insurer and insured, made without the
participation of the injured third party, should not be given the broad effect of barring the thirdparty judgment creditor‟s rights. Such agreement might readily be collusively entered into between
the insurer and its insured.”); Rushing v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 167 N.E. 450, 450 (N.Y. 1929)
(Cardozo, C.J.) (direct action filed under the precursor to section 3420) (explaining that tort
claimant was not “affected by the compromise” between carrier and insured for less than the policy
limits executed while tort claimants action against insured was still pending); Arida v. Essex Ins.
Co., 750 N.Y.S.2d 725, 726 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002) (holding that settlement of declaratory
judgment action between carrier and insured for less than the policy limits, executed while tort
claimant‟s lawsuit against the insured was pending, did not bar tort claimant from suing the carrier
post-judgment under section 3420).
305
See Fleming v. Pan Am. Fire & Cas. Co., 495 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1974). In that case, Fleming‟s
cattle were damaged by the insured. Id. at 537. While Fleming‟s suit was pending, the insured and
its carrier settled for less than the policy limits. Id. at 538. Fleming subsequently obtained a
judgment against the insured for well above the settlement amount and then sued the insurer under
Alabama‟s direct action statute, which is now codified at Ala. Code sections 27-32-1, 27-32-2
(LexisNexis 2007). Fleming, 495 F.2d at 535. The Fifth Circuit explained that the statute provides
the injured person with the equivalent of a lien on the tortfeasor‟s liability insurance, id. at 539-40,
and that this interest “relates back” to the moment the injury is suffered, id. at 541. Thus, “Fleming
having acquired such a lien or vested interest, the insurer could not defeat his right of action by its
settlement with the named insured.” Id. at 540. And Fleming was free to pursue the carrier for any
remaining coverage. Id. at 541.
Decisions from other jurisdictions, while not expressly addressing the question, contain
language suggesting that a settlement for under the policy limits is not binding on the tort claimant
once the claimant obtains a property interest. See, e.g., In re Allied Prods. Corp., 288 B.R. 533,
537 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2003) (observing that under Illinois‟s post-judgment direct action statute, 215
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/388 (West 2008), “a claim covered by a liability insurance policy in
Illinois, once pursued to judgment against the insured, must be satisfied up to the policy limits”
(emphasis added)), aff‟d, No. 03 C 1361, 2004 WL 635212 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2004); Kranzush v.
Badger State Mut. Cas. Co., 307 N.W.2d 256, 266 (Wis. 1981) (explaining that Wisconsin‟s prejudgment direct action statute, WIS. STAT. ANN § 632.24 (West 2006), makes an insurer “liable up
to the policy limits” (emphasis added)); Reliance Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 807,
809 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (California‟s post-judgment direct action statute, CAL. INS. CODE §
11580(b) (West 2005), “provides that a judgment creditor may proceed directly against any liability
insurance covering the defendant, and obtain satisfaction of the judgment up to the amount of the
policy limits.” (emphasis added)). But cf. Unarco Bloomington Factory Workers v. UNR Indus.,
Inc., 124 B.R. 268, 277 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (holding that even if tort claimants possessed direct action
rights against debtor‟s carriers, good faith settlement between debtor and the insurers discharged
any such rights) (apparently applying Illinois law, but failing to specify whether the hypothetical
direct action rights reflected the existence of a property interest or not).
As with additional insureds, see supra note 258, tort claimants are generally subject to the
carrier‟s defenses against the insured. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 218
S.W.3d 42, 55 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006) (“The rights of any third-party to the insurance contract are
derivative rights and can rise to no greater dignity than the rights of the insured under the
contract.”); 46A C.J.S. Insurance § 1943 (2007) (“The injured person‟s rights are no better than
those of the insured, however, and the insurance company may assert any defense against the
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Enhanced protection for tort claimants with a property interest is consistent
with the treatment of other parties in analogous positions. For example, as
discussed above, compromises for less than the policy limits do not preclude
additional insureds and loss payees from suing the insurer for the remaining
coverage because of their status as third-party beneficiaries.306 Similarly, a
number of authorities have concluded that a debtor and a third party who owes
the debtor money may not settle the debtor‟s claim without the consent of a
creditor who has already attached a security interest to the third party‟s obligation
and notified the third party of the interest.307
Returning now to the Johns-Manville case, if the settlement between the
debtor and its carriers did not fully exhaust the available proceeds,308 the
channeling injunction probably eliminated the state law rights of some tort
claimants—those with a property interest in the policies—to sue Manville‟s
injured person which it could assert in a suit by the insured.”). But, also as with additional
insureds, see supra note 258, the availability of defenses under an insurance contract and the
binding effect of a modification of that same contract (such as a settlement) are separate questions
governed by different legal principles. See Rushing v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 167 N.E. 450,
450 (N.Y. 1929) (Cardozo, C.J.) (distinguishing the impact of policy defenses from the impact of a
settlement between the insured and insured); Smith & Wesson v. Birmingham Fire Ins. Co., 510
N.Y.S.2d 606, 608 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (same); see also Fleming, 495 F.2d at 541 & n.10
(applying Alabama law) (noting that while tort claimants are subject to a carrier‟s defenses against
the insured arising before any injury, “grounds of defense sought to be created by the insurer
subsequent to the accident,” such as a settlement between the carrier and the insured, “would not be
available” in a proceeding under Alabama‟s direct action statute, Ala. Code §§ 27-32-1, 27-32-2
(LexisNexis 2007)).
306
See supra notes 254-58 and accompanying text.
307
See 4447 Assocs. v. First Sec. Fin., 889 P.2d 467, 468-70, 475 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (holding
that a settlement between the debtor and a third-party obligor, entered into after the debtor had
assigned its rights to a creditor as security and after the creditor had notified the third party of the
assignment, was not binding on the creditor), appeal after remand, 973 P.2d 992 (Utah Ct. App.
1999); Progressive Design, Inc. v. Olson Bros. Mfg. Co., 206 N.W.2d 832, 833-34 (Neb. 1973)
(same) (“As assignee [sic] of the contract, any settlement made by plaintiff [the debtor] is
necessarily ineffective unless the assignee [the secured creditor] is a party to it.”); 9 RONALD A.
ANDERSON & LARRY LAWRENCE, ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-318:8 (1999)
(“Similarly, after an assignment has been made, the assignor [the debtor] cannot settle the claim
against the account debtor [the third party] without the consent of the assignee [the secured
party].”). See generally Okla. Natural Gas v. Apache Corp., 124 F. App‟x 604, 608 (10th Cir.
2005) (applying Oklahoma law) (holding that settlement agreement between assignor and buyer of
gas well did not alter rights of assignee of gas well who was not party to agreement and where
agreement listed gas well as “previously transferred”); Cent. Ohio Receivables Co. v. Huston, No.
87AP-1185, 1988 WL 99356, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 20, 1988) (“Similarly, an assignor
generally lacks the power to discharge the obligor, whether by affirmative action or by default,
after the obligor has received notice of the assignment.”). It should be noted that modification of
an account post-assignment or post-notification is permitted in some circumstances. See generally
U.C.C. § 9-405(a) & (b) (1999); 4447 Assocs., 889 P.2d at 475 n.11 (“The account debtor and the
assignor are free to make changes as provided by the original account contract or which may be
commercially reasonable within the context of the transaction.”).
308
See supra notes 261-64 and accompanying text.
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insurers for any remaining coverage. Thus, the injunction operated as a nondebtor release.
Third-party releases extinguish a creditor‟s independent rights against the
shielded non-debtor.309 The analysis in this subpart indicates that additional
insureds and some tort claimants hold independent property interests in the
debtor‟s insurance, thereby providing them with such rights against the carrier.
Thus, any bankruptcy order barring these additional insureds and tort claimants
from suing the carriers—when the coverage has not been exhausted—constitutes
a third-party release.310 However, whether insurance non-debtor releases should
be governed by the same legal principles as such releases generally turns on the
relationship of the debtor‟s insurance to the bankruptcy estate. It is to that issue I
now turn.
2. Insurance Policies and Proceeds in Bankruptcy
A debtor‟s insurance policies are generally considered estate property. 311
The most persuasive reason for this conclusion is that the debtor holds title to the
insurance policies it purchased.312 “Since the debtor is the owner of the policy,
the policy becomes property of the estate.”313 The debtor‟s insurance policies are
thus shielded by the automatic stay, prohibiting the insurers from cancelling them
after the debtor files for bankruptcy.314
Critically, ownership of an insurance policy is not the same as ownership of
or entitlement to the proceeds of that policy. “The interest in the policy does not

309

See supra Parts IV.A.1. & IV.A.3.
Cf. Homsy v. Floyd (In re Vitek, Inc.), 51 F.3d 530, 531-32 (5th Cir. 1995) (bankruptcy court
granted debtor‟s carriers a non-debtor release barring all third parties (including additional insureds
and tort claimants) from suing them; as part of their settlements with the debtor, the insurers paid
the full policy limits into the estate).
311
3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 362.03, at 362-24 (15th ed. rev. 2005) (“The prevailing view is
that an insurance policy is property of the estate, protected by the automatic stay.”) (collecting
authorities); see also 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2006) (providing that a debtor‟s estate includes “all
legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case,” with
minor exceptions).
312
See Landry v. Exxon Pipeline Co., 260 B.R. 769, 793 n.74 (Bankr. M.D. La. 2001) (liability
insurance policies are property of the estate because “of the debtor‟s contractual rights and
ownership interests under and in the policies”); Zaretsky, supra note 141, at 385 (“The debtor
certainly has a legal interest, title, in the insurance policy itself.”).
313
Zaretsky, supra note 141, at 385; see also 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 541.10[1], at 541-67
(15th ed. rev. 2005) (explaining that insurance policies “as a whole” belong to the estate “because
the corporation owns and pays for the policies”).
314
3 COLLIER ¶ 362.03, at 362-24. Any rights the debtor holds under its policies are estate property
as well. Houston v. Edgeworth (In re Edgeworth), 993 F.2d 51, 55 (5th Cir. 1993) (“Any rights the
debtor has against the insurer, whether contractual or otherwise, become property of the estate.”); 5
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 541.10[1], at 541-60 & n.1 (15th ed. rev. 2006) (“Insurance policies
and debtors‟ rights under insurance policies have been generally held to be property of the estate.”)
(collecting authorities).
310
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by itself give the debtor any direct right to the proceeds.”315 Therefore, whether
insurance proceeds are property of the estate is a distinct issue from whether the
underlying policy belongs to the estate.316 And the status of policy proceeds can
vary with the facts of each case.317
When the debtor is both the insured and the loss payee, as in the case of
fire, life, and much automobile coverage, there is little question that both the
insurance policy and the related proceeds are estate property.318 But the courts
are split over whether the proceeds of liability insurance are property of the
estate.319
Some decisions have held that liability insurance proceeds are not estate
property because the debtor has no right to keep the proceeds when the insurer
pays on a claim.320 “The proceeds are paid to the victim of the insured‟s
wrongful act.”321 The debtor thus has no “cognizable interest” in the
proceeds.”322
Other cases have found that liability insurance proceeds are generally
property of the estate.323 Some have justified this conclusion on the ground that

315

Zaretsky, supra note 141, at 386; accord 5 COLLIER ¶ 541.10[1], at 541-60 & n.1 (“[O]wnership
of an insurance policy does not necessarily entail entitlement to receive proceeds of that policy.”
(emphasis in original)).
316
See La. World Exposition, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co. (In re La. World Exposition, Inc.), 832 F.2d
1391, 1399 (5th Cir. 1987) (“The question is not who owns the policies, but who owns the liability
proceeds.”); Landry, 260 B.R. at 785 (“While the rights held by a debtor under insurance policies
are property of the estate, whether the funds paid by the Insurers on account of the insurance
policies are property of the estate is an entirely different question.”). But see Homsy v. Floyd (In re
Vitek, Inc.), 51 F.3d 530, 534 n.17 (5th Cir. 1995) (explaining that “the vast majority of courts do
not bother to distinguish ownership of insurance policies from ownership of the proceeds of those
policies, but treat that the two go hand-in-hand”).
317
In re Sfuzzi, Inc., 191 B.R. 664, 668 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1996) (“[I]nsurance policies are property
of the estate . . . , but the question of whether the proceeds are property of the estate must be
analyzed in light of the facts of each case.” (emphasis in original)); accord In re Scott Wetzel
Servs., Inc., 243 B.R. 802, 804 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1999).
318
In re Sfuzzi, Inc., 191 B.R. at 668 (“Unquestionably, proceeds from collision, life, and fire
insurance policies are property of the estate when the proceeds are made payable to the debtor
rather than to a third party, such as a creditor.”); accord Landry, 260 B.R. at 789.
319
See Landry, 260 B.R. at 784-94 (containing an extensive discussion of the split).
320
See Houston v. Edgeworth (In re Edgeworth), 993 F.2d 51, 55-56 (5th Cir. 1993) (“The
overriding question when determining whether insurance proceeds are property of the estate is
whether the debtor would have a right to receive and keep those proceeds when the insurer paid on
a claim.”); Landry, 260 B.R. at 786-87 (adopting the Edgeworth analysis); In re Scott Wetzel Serv.,
Inc., 243 B.R. at 804 (same); see also Landry, 260 B.R. at 800 (“There is no statutory basis for
concluding that the proceeds of liability insurance policies are property of the estate.”).
321
Landry, 260 B.R. at 786.
322
In re Edgeworth, 993 F.2d at 56; accord Landry, 260 B.R. at 786 (“In the liability insurance
context the debtor has no cognizable claim to the proceeds paid by an insurer on account of a
covered claim.”); Zaretsky, supra note 141, at 387 (“[T]he debtor does not have any direct interest
in the policy proceeds, nor does the debtor have any control over the allocation of the proceeds.”).
323
See, e.g., Tringali v. Hathaway Mach. Co., Inc., 796 F.2d 553, 560 (1st Cir. 1986) (holding that
the proceeds of liability insurance policies are property of the estate).
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the debtor‟s “estate is worth more with [the insurance proceeds] than without
them.”324
Still other decisions have ruled that the status of liability insurance proceeds
depends on the type of coverage provided by the policy—namely, whether the
policy covers the debtor. If the debtor purchases a liability insurance policy that
indemnifies only its directors and officers (i.e., the company is not itself an
insured under the policy) the proceeds are not part of the estate, according to this
line of authority.325 If the policy provides coverage solely to the debtor, however,
then the proceeds are estate property.326 Finally, when the policy covers the
debtor and third parties, the courts in this line are divided. Some conclude that
all of the proceeds are part of the estate.327 Others have ruled that only the
debtor‟s interest in the proceeds are estate property; neither the rights of coinsureds nor the property from which they seek payment are part of the estate.328
The bankruptcy status of insurance proceeds is critical to assessing the
validity of insurance non-debtor releases. Recall the primary factual scenario
involving this type of release. The carrier and the debtor enter into a settlement
in which the insurance policy and all related rights are transferred back to the
carrier in exchange for a payment to the debtor that is less than the policy limits
(and less than the value of the claims held by any tort plaintiffs and/or additional

324

Nat‟l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Titan Energy, Inc. (In re Titan Energy, Inc.), 837 F.2d 325, 329 (8th
Cir. 1988).
325
See, e.g., La. World Exposition, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co. (In re La. World Exposition, Inc.), 832
F.2d 1391, 1399-1401 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that officer and director liability policies were
property of the estate, but that the proceeds were not because the officers and directors were the
only insureds and the proceeds were payable only to them); Homsy v. Floyd (In re Vitek, Inc.), 51
F.3d 530, 535 (5th Cir. 1995) (following In re La. World Exposition).
326
In re Vitek, Inc., 51 F.3d at 535.
327
See, e.g., In re CyberMedica, Inc., 280 B.R. 12, 14, 17 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2002) (holding that all
proceeds of the insurance policy were part of debtor‟s estate even though the policy provided
primary coverage to both the debtor and its directors and officers); In re Sacred Heart Hosp., 182
B.R. 413, 420 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995) (reaching the same conclusion under similar facts as
CyberMedica because the “Proceeds available for the Debtor‟s liability exposure are not segregated
from the Proceeds available to the directors and officers” and thus the Debtor “has a sufficient
interest in the Proceeds as a whole to bring them into the estate.”).
328
For example, in In re Adelphia Communications Corp., 364 B.R. 518 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007),
the court found that the co-insured directors and officers “have no interest, disputed or otherwise, in
the Estate‟s Policies, nor to the Estate‟s entitlement to policy proceeds.” Id. at 527. It
conceptualized the relationship between the carriers, the debtor, and the additional insureds as
follows: the estate has claims against the insurers and the co-insured managers have claims against
the insurers. Id. Thus, the directors and officers “right to any cash would be from the Insurers, as a
contractual entitlement, not from the property [of the estate] being sold, as a kind of in rem right,
and would be independent of anything the Estate sought or received.” Id.; see also In re FortyEight Insulations, Inc. 133 B.R. 973, 977 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991) (holding that only the debtor‟s
interests in policy proceeds were property of the estate; the co-insured‟s “claims against the
insurers or its interests in the insurance policies are not property” of the debtor‟s estate), aff‟d, 149
B.R. 860, 863 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (“The bankruptcy court correctly distinguished, however, the rights
of the debtor from the rights of FWC [the co-insured]. Only Forty-Eight‟s interests are part of the
estate. FWC‟s interest in insurance policies is not part of the estate.”).
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insureds). Subsequently, the bankruptcy court enters an order releasing all
claims against the insurer relating to the compromised policy, an order which
purports to extinguish the rights of co-insureds and tort plaintiffs to pursue the
insurer for the remaining coverage.329
Consider first the propriety of an insurance non-debtor release like this
when only the debtor‟s rights in the proceeds are part of the estate; the proceeds
rights of additional insureds and tort claimants neither constitute, nor flow from,
interests in estate property. Under this legal conclusion, additional insureds and
tort plaintiffs hold contractual or statutory claims against the insurer that are
distinct from the estate. A release discharging these causes of action is
indistinguishable from the standard non-debtor release. Therefore, an insurance
release is permissible only if it comports with the law generally applicable to
third-party releases. In pro-release jurisdictions, the release must satisfy the
Master Mortgage test330 (or, I would argue, my modified version of the test331).332
If it does, the court may enter the release under §§ 105(a) and/or 1123(b)(6). In
anti-release jurisdictions, an insurance release is void;333 lawsuits by co-insureds

329

This is substantially the structure proposed in In re Adelphia Communications Corp., 364 B.R.
at 520-21, 523, and In re Dow Corning Corp., 198 B.R. 214, 219-20, 223-24 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
1996).
330
See supra notes 200-08 and accompanying text (discussing the Master Mortgage elements).
331
See supra notes 209-29 and accompanying text (discussing the Modified Master Mortgage
elements).
332
The bankruptcy of Adelphia is an excellent example. As noted previously, that case mirrors the
primary factual scenario involving insurance non-debtor releases. See supra note 329. Adelphia
was pending in the Southern District of New York, see 364 B.R. 518, which is part of the Second
Circuit, a pro-release jurisdiction, see SEC v. Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc. (In re Drexel
Burnham Lambert Group, Inc.), 960 F.2d 285, 293 (2d Cir. 1992). The bankruptcy court concluded
that the directors‟ and officers‟ rights to the liability insurance proceeds were not interests in estate
property, but rather were independent claims against the carriers. In re Adelphia Commc‟ns Corp.,
364 B.R. at 527. The court then proceeded to apply the Master Mortgage test to the proposed
release. Id. at 528-30 (concluding that, since the Test was not satisfied, the court lacked the power
to release the directors‟ and officers‟ claims against the insurer for the remaining coverage).
In re Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 133 B.R. 973, aff‟d, 149 B.R. 860 (N.D. Ill. 1992), is
also instructive. Like Adelphia, the facts were consistent with the primary factual scenario. See id.
at 975-76 (outlining the settlement between the debtor and its carriers and the impact of the release
on the debtor‟s parent company, FWC, a co-insured under the insurance policies subject to the
compromise); id. at 980 (“[T]he amount of the settlement here is less than the face amount of the
policies, so that it is impossible to say that this settlement would exhaust the policies.”). The
bankruptcy court held that only the debtor‟s interest in the insurance policies were estate property.
Id. at 977, aff‟d, 149 B.R. at 863 (expressly approving of this finding). It subsequently concluded
that releasing FWC‟s rights against the carriers was impermissible. Id. at 978. In reaching this
determination, the court distinguished several early pro-release cases by noting that (1) Forty-Eight
Insulations was liquidating rather than reorganizing, (2) FWC‟s claims would not lead to
contribution or indemnity claims against the debtor, and (3) FWC was not guaranteed full payment
on its claims. Id. at 978. Each of these bases would eventually become an aspect of the Master
Mortgage test. See supra notes 200-08 and accompanying text.
333
See supra notes 194-97 and accompanying text (discussing the anti-release line of authority).
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and tort creditors against the carrier may not be enjoined in these territories when
the insurer and the debtor settle for less than the policy limits.
Now consider the legitimacy of an insurance release when all of the
proceeds payable under the policy are property of the estate. Pursuant to this
legal conclusion, the additional insureds‟ and tort claimants‟ rights to proceeds—
the rights enabling them to bring suit against the debtor‟s carrier—are essentially
interests in estate property. This changes the analysis. First, if all insurance
proceeds are property of estate, there are statutes beyond §§ 105(a) and
1123(b)(6) that may authorize insurance non-debtor releases. Sections 363(f),
1123(a)(5)(D) and 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) expressly allow for the disposition of estate
property free of third-party interests.334 These statutes might authorize a debtor
to transfer its insurance policy (and any related rights) back to the carrier free of
the interests of co-insureds and tort claimants.335 After such a transaction, the

334

See 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2006) (“The trustee may sell property . . . free and clear of any interest
in such property of an entity other than the estate, only if . . . .” (emphasis added)); id. §
1123(a)(5)(D) (permitting “sale of all or any part of the property of the estate, either subject to or
free of any lien” (emphasis added)); id. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) (providing that secured claims receive
fair and equitable treatment when the plan provides “for the sale . . . of any property that is subject
to the liens securing such claims, free and clear of such liens, with such liens to attach to the
proceeds of such sale” (emphasis added)). The fact that the transfer of the insurance policies is a
“settlement” rather than a “sale” is irrelevant. See In re Adelphia Commc‟ns Corp., 364 B.R. at 526
(“A sale incident to a settlement is still a sale even if the Insurers are in a unique position to make
the purchase, and even if there are no other bidders with the ability or motivation to do so.”); In re
Dow Corning Corp., 198 B.R. at 245 (holding that “[e]quating compromises/settlements of lawsuits
to sales of a debtor‟s property is appropriate because there is so little to distinguish them”); id. at
245-47 (offering multiple, persuasive arguments for the conclusion that sales and settlements are
essentially the same for purposes of § 363, including § 363(f)). But see 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
¶ 363.02, at 363-11 (15th ed. rev. 2005) (noting that “the cases are mixed . . . on whether the
settlement of a claim that the estate owns is a sale (that is, disposition) of property of the estate”).
335
In re Allied Prods. Corp., 288 B.R. 533 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2003), aff‟d, No. 03 C 1361, 2004 WL
635212 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2004), supports this conclusion with respect to § 363(f). That case also
appears to follow the primary factual scenario: The debtor wanted to sells its insurance policies
back to the carriers and have the court enjoin the debtor‟s pre-judgment tort claimants from suing
the insurers. Id. at 535; see also id. at 538 n.2 (implying that the sales price was below the
coverage limits of the various policies). The court noted that the insurance policies were property
of the estate and thus the debtor possessed the power to sell them. Id. at 535-36. The court also
explained that the policies could be sold under § 363(f) free and clear of any third-party property
interests as long as the interest-holders received adequate protection. Id. at 536. The debtor
intended to use the proceeds of the sale for the general benefit of the estate, not to pay claims
covered by the policies. Id. at 535. And the debtor proposed no other form of adequate protection
for the tort claimants. Id. at 536; see infra note 336 for more on adequate protection. Thus, the
“buy-back arrangement”—which included the sale of the policies, the injunction shielding the
carriers, and the debtor‟s use of the proceeds for general purposes—was permissible only if the tort
claimants held no property interests in the policies. In re Allied Prods. Corp., 288 B.R. at 536.
However, the court ruled that, under Illinois‟s post-judgment direct action statute, 215 Ill. Comp.
Stat. Ann. 5/388 (West 2008), the pre-judgment tort claimants did possess property interests in the
debtor‟s liability insurance. In re Allied Prods. Corp., 288 B.R. at 537-38. The court thus refused
to approve of the buy-back arrangement.
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additional insureds‟ and tort plaintiffs‟ claims would probably attach to the funds
the insurer paid in exchange for the return of the policy.336 But the additional
insureds‟ and tort claimants‟ interests in the insurance policy itself would be
gone, and thus so would their contractual and statutory rights against the insurer
for the difference between the settlement amount and the policy limits. Since the
co-insureds and tort claimants would now only hold rights in the settlement
payment, the bankruptcy court would possess ample authority to enjoin them
from suing the insurer.337
Second, if all liability insurance proceeds are estate property, then insurance
third-party releases are probably not subject to the limits on general non-debtor
releases contained in the Master Mortgage test or my modified version of the
test. For example, § 363(f) is one possible basis for insurance releases when all
of the insurance proceeds are part of the estate. Bankruptcy trustees may use that
statute in Chapter 7 cases.338 Insurance releases might therefore be permissible
in Chapter 7 actions,339 unlike general non-debtor releases.340 This would
The crucial point here is that Allied Products supports the proposition that, because
insurance policies are property of the estate, the policies may be sold pursuant to § 363(f) free and
clear of the property interests of tort claimants. The problem with the debtor‟s scheme in Allied
Products was merely the lack of adequate protection for the tort claimants, not any absolute
prohibition on selling insurance policies free and clear of tort claimant property interests.
It should be noted that there is authority that implicitly contradicts Allied Products. See
In re Mahoney Hawkes, LLP, 289 B.R. 285, 290, 295, 300-01 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2002) (concluding
that all of the proceeds of the debtor‟s liability insurance policies were property of the estate, but
assessing the insurance non-debtor release in the plan of reorganization under § 105(a) and the
Master Mortgage test, rather than under § 363(f) or the provisions of Chapter 11 identified supra
note 334).
336
See 11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (“[O]n request of an entity that has an interest in property . . . sold . . . by
the trustee, the court . . . shall prohibit or condition such . . . sale . . . as is necessary to provide
adequate protection of such interest.”); 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 363.06[9] (15th ed. rev. 2005)
(“The most common form of adequate protection is to have the lien or other interest attach to the
proceeds of the sale.”); 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) (providing that secured claims receive fair
and equitable treatment when the plan provides “for the sale . . . of any property that is subject to
the liens securing such claims, free and clear of such liens, with such liens to attach to the proceeds
of such sale” (emphasis added)).
337
See Fogel v. Zell, 221 F.3d 955, 965 (7th Cir. 2000) (“And thus when an asset of the estate is
sold by the trustee in bankruptcy free and clear of any liens, the court can enjoin a creditor from
suing to enforce a preexisting lien in the asset.”); In re Dow Corning Corp., 198 B.R. 214, 245
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1996) (explaining that bankruptcy courts may use § 105(a) to issue an
injunction barring a creditor from seeking to enforce an interest in property purchased from the
debtor under § 363(f) where the injunction is “necessary and appropriate to give the „free and clear‟
aspect of § 363(f) meaning”) (collecting authorities); P.K.R. Convalescent Ctrs., Inc. v. Va. (In re
P.K.R. Convalescent Ctrs., Inc.), 189 B.R. 90, 96 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1995) (“Accordingly, § 105[(a)]
authorizes this court to enjoin any act to collect an interest in the bankruptcy estate in contravention
of a court order to sell the property free and clear of all interests under § 363(f)(5).”).
338
11 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006) (“Except as provided in section 1161 of this title, chapters 1, 3 and 5
of this title apply in cases under chapter 7, 11, 12, or 13 of this title . . . .”).
339
Cf. Homsy v. Floyd (In re Vitek, Inc.), 51 F.3d 530, 531-32 (5th Cir. 1995) (in a Chapter 7
liquidation, after the debtor settled with its liability insurance carriers and the bankruptcy court
approved the settlement, the bankruptcy court issued an injunction barring all third parties
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eliminate the need to pay dissenting creditors in full on the claims extinguished
by an insurance third-party release. To elaborate, remember that the payment-infull requirement applies to general third-party releases because of the best
interests test. Since that type of release is prohibited in Chapter 7 cases, if the
debtor were to liquidate, the creditor would receive complete satisfaction on its
claim from the debtor, the co-obligor, or a combination of the two. The best
interests test mandates that the creditor receive as much in the debtor‟s Chapter
11 case as it would receive in a Chapter 7. Accordingly, a Chapter 11 plan must
promise the creditor full payment on any claims extinguished by a general thirdparty release. However, if insurance non-debtor releases are permissible in
Chapter 7, the crucial first premise of this argument is not true with respect to
insurance releases.341 Hence, insurance third-party releases would be exempt
from the payment-in-full element contained in both versions of the Master
Mortgage test.
Similar arguments exist that the remaining elements of the two Master
Mortgage tests are either moot or inapplicable to insurance releases,342 if such
releases are in fact authorized under § 363(f).343 But these arguments are not
(including additional insureds and tort claimants) from suing the insurers for claims seeking
additional coverage under the settled policies; however, as part of their settlements with the debtor,
the insurers paid the full policy limits into the estate, distinguishing this case from the primary
factual scenario involving insurance non-debtor releases; moreover, the Fifth Circuit did not
mention § 363(f) or otherwise identify the statutory basis for the sale and injunction).
340
See supra notes 215, 220 and accompanying text.
341
In addition to § 363(f), two provisions of Chapter 11—§§ 1123(a)(5)(D) and
1129(b)(2)(A)(ii)—might also authorize insurance non-debtor releases. If insurance releases are
permissible only under one or both of the Chapter 11 sections, and not under § 363(f), then the
analysis offered in the body changes. Unlike § 363(f), the two Chapter 11 statutes do not apply in
Chapter 7 bankruptcies. 11 U.S.C. § 103(g). Insurance third-party releases would thus be
prohibited in Chapter 7 cases, just like general non-debtor releases. And therefore, the argument
that the best interests test mandates payment in full on claims extinguished by general releases
would have equal force when applied to insurance releases.
342
For example, both tests require an “identity-of-interest” between the released third party and the
debtor. This element concerns subject matter jurisdiction. Such jurisdiction will always exist in
the context of a § 363(f) sale and a supporting injunction because bankruptcy courts have
jurisdiction over all property of the estate. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e)(1) (2006). Both versions of the
Master Mortgage test also mandate that a non-debtor release be “essential to the reorganization.”
See supra notes 203, 211 and accompanying text. But the standard for approving a sale under §
363 is “essentially a business judgment test,” 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 363.02[1][f] (15th ed.
rev. 2005), a much lower standard. Finally, both versions of the Master Mortgage test require a
substantial level of creditor consent to any third-party release. However, there is no similar
requirement that a trustee obtain consent from creditors before conducting a § 363 sale. See, e.g.,
11 U.S.C. § 363(b), (c), (f). Creditors may object, 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 363.02[1][2], but
their dissent alone cannot block a sale under § 363.
343
The authorities adopting the first position—that only the debtor‟s interest in liability insurance
proceeds is part of the estate—have expressly rejected § 363(f) as a basis for granting insurance
non-debtor releases; and they have done so precisely on the ground that only the debtor‟s interest in
the proceeds is estate property. For example, in In re Adelphia Communications Corp., 364 B.R.
518 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007), the court concluded that § 363(f) was inapplicable because it found
that the proceeds rights of the director and officer additional insureds were not derived from any
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interest in property of the estate, but rather flowed from “contractual entitlement[s]” against the
carriers that were independent of the estate. Id. at 527; accord In re Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc.,
133 B.R. 973, 978 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991) (holding that a debtor may not use § 363(f) to sell a
liability insurance policy back to the insurer free of the interests of a co-insured because the coinsured‟s interest in the policy does “not become property of the estate”), aff‟d, 149 B.R. 860, 864
(N.D. Ill. 1992) (“The [bankruptcy] court correctly held that another party‟s interests do not
become property of the estate and therefore cannot be sold under § 363 which deals with the sale of
property of the estate.”).
There are also arguments that § 363(f) does not permit insurance non-debtor releases
even if the second position is correct—even if all liability insurance proceeds are indeed estate
property. The power to authorize a sale of property free and clear of third-party interests under §
363(f) is contingent upon meeting one of five conditions. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(f)(1)-(5) (2006).
Only two of these conditions could possibly be satisfied in the context of an insurance settlement
for less than the policy proceeds that contains a non-debtor release of the carrier. First, § 363(f)(4)
permits a free-and-clear sale where the third-party‟s property “interest is in bona fide dispute.” Id.
§ 363(f)(4). This provision might be satisfied with respect to tort plaintiffs if their claims against
the debtor are legitimately contested. See In re Dow Corning Corp., 198 B.R. 214, 245 (E.D. Mich.
1996) (holding that the tort claimants‟ interest, if any, in the debtor‟s insurance policies were
subject to bond fide dispute, satisfying § 363(f)(4), because “the Debtor vehemently denies liability
to the tort claimants”). The standard might also be met against tort claimants and additional
insureds if the carrier has legitimate bases for challenging the debtor‟s or the additional insured‟s
entitlement to coverage. But if there is no valid argument available to place the interests of tort
plaintiffs or additional insureds in bona fide dispute, then § 363(f)(4) is inapplicable. Second, §
363(f)(5) allows for a sale free and clear where the third party “could be compelled, in a legal or
equitable proceeding, to accept a money satisfaction of such interest.” 11 U.S.C. § 363(f)(5).
Since tort claimants merely possess a right to payment out of insurance proceeds, it seems likely
that § 363(f)(5) could be used to transfer insurance policies free of their property interests.
Additional insureds, however, beyond their right to the payment of proceeds, are typically owed a
duty to defend by the carrier. This might mean that § 363(f)(5) may only be used to extinguish the
claims of tort plaintiffs against the carrier. On this reading, the claims of additional insureds are
beyond the scope of the statute.
The power to sell property free and clear in a Chapter 11 plan is not limited to the five
conditions in § 363(f). 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1129.05[2][b][iv] (15th ed. rev. 2004). Thus,
including an insurance non-debtor release in the debtor‟s plan of reorganization may avoid the
limitations set forth in that statute. However, the two provisions of Chapter 11 that provide the
power to sell estate property free and clear use the more specific term “lien” in describing such
sales. See 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(5)(D) (permitting “sale of all or any part of the property of the
estate, either subject to or free of any lien” (emphasis added)); id. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) (providing
for sales “free and clear of such liens” (emphasis added)). Now, another Chapter 11 provision, §
1141(c), provides that “the property dealt with by the plan is free and clear of all claims and
interests of creditors, equity security holders, and of general partners in the debtor.” Id. § 1141(c)
(emphasis added). But, while § 1141(c) uses the broader term “interest,” the “free and clear”
impact of that statute is limited by the terms of the plan of reorganization: Property dealt with by
the plan is free and clear “except as otherwise provided in the plan.” Id. Thus, if there is no statute
in Chapter 11 that permits a plan to include a sale free and clear of interests that are not liens, the
plan would either (1) have to preserve the property interests of tort claimants and additional
insureds, mooting any “free and clear” impact of § 1141(c), or (2) satisfy the requirements of §
363(f). In sum, a sale free and clear of the type of “interests” in the debtor‟s insurance held by tort
claimants and additional insureds might go beyond the power granted by the specific language of
§§ 1123(a)(5)(D) and 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii). That would leave § 363(f) as the only statutory basis for
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sufficiently pertinent to the issues raised by asbestos non-debtor releases to
warrant significant attention here.
To recap: If only the debtor‟s interest in liability insurance proceeds is
property of the estate, then the standard rules applicable to non-debtor releases
also govern insurance releases. The sole statutory bases for insurance third-party
releases would be §§ 105(a) and 1123(b)(6), the provisions granting bankruptcy
courts their general equitable powers. And many courts have ruled that these
laws do not provide sufficient authority for non-debtor releases. If all of the
liability insurance proceeds are estate property, however, then bankruptcy courts
have other statutes at their disposal—§§ 363(f), 1123(a)(5)(D) and
1129(b)(2)(A)(ii). Extinguishing the claims of co-insureds and tort plaintiffs
against an insurer is arguably more justifiable under these statutes than under the
two equitable provisions.344 Moreover, the limits that pro-release authorities
impose on general non-debtor releases are largely inapplicable to insurance
releases, to the extent the latter may be granted under § 363(f). And thus,
insurance non-debtor releases would be distinguishable from general releases in
critical ways.345
such relief. Of course, there is an argument that the tort claimants‟ interests are essentially the
equivalent of liens, see supra notes 290-91, 297, and accompanying text, but it is virtually
impossible to reach the same conclusion with respect to the interests of additional insureds.
Two final points relating to the scope of § 363(f) deserve brief attention. First, suppose
that a co-insured is not merely an additional insured, but rather jointly purchases the insurance with
the debtor and is also a primary, named insured. In that situation, the debtor and the co-insured
would best be conceptualized as co-owners of the policy. Any attempt to extinguish the coinsured‟s rights in such a case via an insurance non-debtor release would probably be governed by
§ 363(h), rather than § 363(f). Section 363(h) permits the sale of property free and clear of the
rights of certain joint owners if a series of stringent requirements is met. See 11 U.S.C. §
363(h)(1)-(4); 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 363.08[1] (15th ed. rev. 2005) (“Because [§ 363(h)]
authorizes a trustee to sell and thereby deprive a nondebtor of its property, there are significant
conditions to the exercise of the power.”). It might be very difficult to show that an insurance nondebtor release satisfies § 363(h). (Since additional insureds are third-party beneficiaries under an
insurance policy, not co-owners, In re Adelphia Commc‟ns Corp., 364 B.R. at 525, § 363(h) is not
relevant where the non-debtor insured is merely an additional insured.) Second, suppose that the
debtor was the additional insured on a policy procured by a parent or other related company. In
that case, I suspect that neither § 363(f) nor § 363(h) would be available. See In re Forty-Eight
Insulations, Inc., 133 B.R. at 978 n.5 (stating that § 363(h) had “no application” in a case mirroring
these facts).
344
See Zaretsky, supra note 141, at 410-11 (“Of course, any determination based on the court‟s
„channeling‟ power is dependent on a finding that the policy proceeds are property of the estate. If
the insurance proceeds were viewed as an asset that does not become property of the estate, they
would not be subject to the „channeling‟ power and section 363(f) would not apply.”); see also In
re Elsinore Shore Assoc., 91 B.R. 238, 253-54 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1988) (distinguishing JohnsManville because the claims at issue there were against property of the estate—i.e., the insurance
policies, whereas Elsinore Shore Associates requested the enjoining of claims against independent
third parties).
345
There are plausible middle grounds between these two extremes. For example, perhaps an
additional insured‟s right to policy proceeds is not an interest in estate property, but a tort
claimant‟s right to such proceeds does constitute such an interest. Under this legal conclusion, the
standard non-debtor release rules would apply to the release of claims held by additional insureds,
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V. SECTION 524(g) OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
A. The Purpose and General Structure of Section 524(g)
As Part IV illustrates, the law with respect to non-debtor releases is
unsettled. In the aftermath of the Manville case, Congress believed that similar
uncertainty plagued the usage of a litigation trust and channeling injunction to
address future claims, and that the ambiguous legal environment inhibited
Manville‟s attempts to raise money for its on-going operations.346 This
“undermined the „fresh start‟ objectives of bankruptcy and the goals of the trust
arrangement.”347 Section 524(g),348 and its companion provision § 524(h),349
were intended to remove the cloud hanging over the “trust/injunction
mechanism” used in Manville, and subsequently in the bankruptcy of UNR,350
and legitimize those procedures for other companies seeking to reorganize
because of asbestos liabilities.351
while §§ 363(f), 1123(a)(5)(D) and 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) would potentially govern the release of
claims against the carrier held by tort claimants.
346
See H.R. REP. No. 103-835, at 40 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340, 3349
(“Nevertheless, lingering uncertainty in the financial community as to whether the injunction can
withstand all challenges has apparently made it more difficult for [Manville] to meet its needs for
capital and has depressed the value of its stock.”).
347
Id.; see also 140 CONG. REC. S4523 (daily ed. Apr. 20, 1994) (remarks of Sen. Brown)
(“Without a clear statement in the code of a court‟s authority to issue such injunctions, the financial
markets tend to discount the securities of the reorganized debtor. This in turn diminishes the trust‟s
assets and its resources to pay victims.”).
348
11 U.S.C. § 524(g) (2006).
349
Id. § 524(h).
350
See Unarco Bloomington Factory Workers v. UNR Indus., Inc., 124 B.R. 268, 271-72 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1990) (summarizing a Chapter 11 plan that substantially mirrored Manville‟s in its
treatment of asbestos tort claims); H.R. REP. No. 103-835, at 40, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3340, 3349 (explaining that UNR “has resolved its chapter 11 reorganization with a similar
trust/injunction arrangement”).
351
H.R. REP. No. 103-835, at 41, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340, 3349 (“The Committee has
approved section 111 of the bill in order to strengthen the Manville and UNR trust/injunction
mechanisms and to offer similar certitude to other asbestos/trust injunction mechanisms that meet
the same kind of high standards with respect to regard for the rights of claimants, present and
future, as displayed in the two pioneering cases.”).
As indicated in the main text, Congress wished to legitimize the trust/injunction structure
in both future actions and in asbestos bankruptcies that utilized the structure prior to the enactment
of § 524(g)—namely the Manville and UNR cases. The retroactive effect was accomplished
through § 524(h), which essentially created a post hoc statutory basis for the previously issued
Manville and UNR channeling injunctions. Subsection (h) provides that injunctions issued in
asbestos bankruptcies before the enactment of § 524(g), and having substantially the same impact
as a § 524(g) injunction, shall be deemed to satisfy virtually all of the requirements of subsection
(g), if three additional standards are met. 11 U.S.C. § 524(h)(1). First, when the plan was initially
confirmed, the court determined that the plan was “fair and equitable in accordance with the
requirements of section 1129(b).” Id. § 524(h)(1)(A). Second, the court appointed a future claims
representative as part of the confirmation process. Id. § 524(h)(1)(B). And third, the future claims
representative “did not object to confirmation of the plan or issuance of” the injunction. Id. §
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In designing § 524(g), Congress had the same aim as the drafters of the
reorganization plan in Johns-Manville—finding a way to “preserve the going
concern value” of the debtor in order to provide “a source of payment for . . .
future claims.”352 Congress was also impressed by the protections afforded
present and future claimants in the Manville and UNR bankruptcies.353 It felt that
such protections were a required feature of any trust/injunction mechanism
enacted into law.354 As a result, Congress modeled the statute on the specific
structure established in the Manville case.355
When crafting § 524(g), Congress was primarily focused on the features of
the litigation trust and the rights of future claimants.356 Extending injunctive
protection to third parties received comparatively little attention. It was noted in
passing during the Senate debate,357 but was not mentioned once in the House
debate358 or in the House Report on the statute.359 Nonetheless, provisions
allowing the bankruptcy court to shield non-debtors via the trust/injunction
mechanism were included in the statute.360
524(h)(1)(C); see also id. § 524(h)(2) (containing some additional provisions regarding how §
524(g) applies to pre-enactment litigation trusts that, as of the effective date of the statute, were
under a stay of operations).
352
140 CONG. REC. S4523 (daily ed. Apr. 20, 1994) (remarks of Sen. Graham); see also Part
III.B.2. (discussing the purposes of the Manville trust and injunction).
353
140 CONG. REC. S4523 (remarks of Sen. Graham).
354
See H.R. REP. No. 103-835, at 41, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340, 3349 (“The Committee
has concluded, therefore, that creating greater certitude regarding the validity of the trust/injunction
mechanism must be accompanied by explicit requirements simulating those met in the Manville
case.”).
355
Id. at 40, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340, 3348.
356
On the protection of future claimants, see id. (describing § 524(g) as involving “the
establishment of a trust to pay the future claims, coupled with an injunction to prevent future
claimants from suing the debtor”); id. at 40, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340, 3349 (“The
Committee remains concerned that full consideration be accorded to the interests of future
claimants who, by definition, do not have their own voice.”); 140 CONG. REC. S4523 (remarks of
Sen. Graham) (“It is the uncertainty of the number and amount of these future claims, and the need
to implement a procedure that recognizes these future claimants as creditors under the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code, that necessitates this amendment . . . .”); see also Brown, supra note 32, at 902
n.164 (noting that the legislative history “clearly establishes the focus of Section 524(g) is to
protect future claimants”); Plevin et al., Future Claims Representative, supra note 32, at 271-72
(“The central innovation of § 524(g) is that it provides a means by which a debtor can limit the
rights of persons—the future claimants—who are not present in court to defend those rights.”);
Alan N. Resnick, Bankruptcy As a Vehicle for Resolving Enterprise Threatening Mass Tort
Liability, 148 U. P A. L. R EV. 2045, 2073 (2000) (stating that the purpose of the “asbestos
amendments” was to protect debtor manufacturers from future liability).
357
See 140 CONG. REC. S4523-24 (daily ed. Apr. 20, 1994) (remarks of Sens. Graham, Helfin,
Cambell & Brown).
358
See 140 CONG. REC. H10765-66 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1994) (remarks of Rep. Brooks); id. at
H10772 (remarks of Rep. Fish).
359
See H.R. REP. No. 103-835, at 40-41, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340, 3348-50.
360
11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4) (2006).
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Section 524(g) allows bankruptcy courts to issue an injunction that
“supplement[s] the injunctive effect of a discharge”361 by shielding the debtor
and certain third parties from current and future asbestos-related claims.362 The
injunction may enjoin entities from taking legal action to recover “on any claim
or demand that, under a plan of reorganization, is to be paid in whole or in part
by” a qualifying litigation trust363 established to address the debtor‟s asbestos
liabilities.364 This relief, which is referred to as a “supplemental injunction” or a
“channeling injunction,” is designed to immunize the reorganized debtor from
litigation so that it can generate the funds necessary to satisfy its tort
obligations,365 and provide an incentive for related non-debtors to contribute
assets to the litigation trust for the payment of tort claims. 366
B. The Requirements for a Supplemental Injunction Protecting the Debtor
Section 524(g) contains an exacting series of requirements that must be
satisfied before the court may issue a supplemental injunction protecting the
debtor. And the statute adds further conditions on top of the general
requirements if the injunction also shields non-debtors. This subpart sets forth
the general requirements, those that must be met before any § 524(g) injunction
is permissible.
First, and most importantly, the injunction must be issued “in connection
with” an order “confirming a plan of reorganization under chapter 11.”367 This
entails that the debtor be reorganizing pursuant to Chapter 11, not liquidating
under Chapter 7.368 Thus, in addition to the requirements specified by § 524(g),
the supplemental injunction and the related provisions of the debtor‟s plan of
reorganization have to comply with Chapter 11‟s mandates.369

361

Id. § 524(g)(1)(A).
Id. § 524(g)(3)-(5).
363
Id. § 524(g)(1)(B). A “demand” is essentially a future claim that was not asserted during the
bankruptcy. See id. § 524(g)(5).
364
See id. § 524(g)(2)(B)(i), (i)(I).
365
140 CONG. REC. S4523 (daily ed. Apr. 20, 1994) (remarks of Sen. Brown) (“The underlying
company funds the trust with securities and the company remains viable. Thus, the company
continues to generate assets to pay claims today and into the future.”).
366
Id. (remarks of Sen. Graham) (“By providing a trust to pay claims and an injunction channeling
the present and future asbestos claims to that trust, the debtor and third parties who are alleged to
be liable for the asbestos claims against the debtor will be encouraged to participate in a system that
will maximize the assets available to asbestos claims, present and future, and provide for an
equitable distribution and method of payment.” (emphasis added)); Porter, supra note 30, at 229
(“The inclusive protection of parents, affiliates, and subsidiaries that is contemplated by § 524(g)
rests on the premise that these parties will make appropriate contributions to the trust in order to
justify the benefit of the channeling injunction.”); see also id. at 229 (contending that the statute has
succeeded in inducing third parties to make contributions in exchange for injunctive relief).
367
11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(1)(A).
368
NAT‟L BANKR. REVIEW COMM‟N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS 321 (1997).
369
In re Combustion Eng‟g, Inc. 391 F.3d 190, 234 (3d Cir. 2004) (“To achieve this [supplemental
injunctive] relief, a debtor must satisfy the prerequisites set forth in § 524(g), in addition to the
362
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Second, the debtor must be “subject to substantial future demands for
payment” arising from its asbestos-related activities.370 Third, the “amounts,
numbers, and timing of such future demands” need to be impossible to
determine.371 Fourth, if future claimants pursue these demands “outside the
procedures prescribed by” the reorganization plan, such action is “likely to
threaten the plan‟s purpose to deal equitably with claims and future demands.”372
For example, in the bankruptcy of The Babcock & Wilcox Company, the court
found this requirement to be met because, without the plan mechanisms, “claims
would be paid on a first come first serve basis . . . leaving little or nothing to pay
later filed claims.”373
standard plan confirmation requirements.” (citing 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(1)(A))); see, e.g., In re Porter
Hayden Co., No. 02-54152-SD, 2006 WL 4667137, at *1-*4 (Bankr. D. Md. Jun. 30, 2006)
(separately addressing the requirements of Chapter 11 generally and of § 524(g) specifically), aff‟d,
No. 06-201, 2006 WL 4672671 (Bankr. D. Md. Jul. 7, 2006); In re Kaiser Aluminum Corp., No.
02-10429(JKF), 7312, 2006 WL 616243, at *5-*17 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 6, 2006) (same), aff‟d, 343
B.R. 88 (D. Del. 2006); In re J T Thorpe Co., 308 B.R. 782, 784-93 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2003), order
entered by, No. 02-41487-H5-11, 2003 WL 23573844 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Jan. 17, 2003) (same),
aff‟d, No. 02-41487-H5-11, 2004 WL 720263 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2004).
370
Section 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(I) states that “the debtor is likely to be subject to substantial future
demands for payment arising out of the same or similar conduct or events that gave rise to the
claims that are addressed by the injunction.” 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(I) (emphasis added).
And § 524(g)(2)(B)(i)(I) makes it clear that the “claims that are addressed by the injunction” must
be the debtor‟s asbestos-related liabilities. See id. § 524(g)(2)(B)(i)(I) (stating that a § 524(g)
litigation trust, which is prerequisite to a supplemental injunction, may only assume the liabilities
of a debtor who “has been named as a defendant in personal injury, wrongful death, or property
damage actions seeking recovery for damages allegedly caused by the presence of, or exposure to,
asbestos or asbestos-containing products.”); see also In re Combustion Eng‟g, Inc., 391 F.3d at 234
n.45 (explaining that the debtor must be subject to “substantial demands for payment in the future
arising out of” its asbestos-related activities). For good examples of cases where the debtor
satisfied the requirement of § 524(g)(2)(B)(i)(I), see In re Celotex Corp., 204 B.R. 586, 604 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 1996) (primary debtor faced nearly 100,000 personal injury asbestos claims upon filing
for bankruptcy in 1990 and 737,033 by the claim-filing deadline), and In re Federal-Mogul Global
Inc., No. 01-10578, 2007 WL 4180545, at *29 (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 16 2007) (debtor projected to
face 200,000 to 500,000 claims over the next 40 years).
371
11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(II); see also Sander L. Esserman & David J. Parsons, The Case for
Broad Access to 11 U.S.C. § 524(g) in Light of the Third Circuit‟s Ongoing Business Requirement
Dicta in Combustion Engineering, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 187, 193 n.30 (2006) (contending
this is an “easy” requirement to satisfy because, “[g]iven the history of asbestos litigation, the
lengthy latency periods . . . , and evolving medical technology, it is difficult to predict with even a
modicum of certainty the timing or extent of future demands that may be asserted against the
Debtor”).
372
11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(III).
373
In re The Babcock & Wilcox Co., No. 00-10992, 2004 WL 4945985, at *22 (Bankr. E.D. La.
Nov. 9, 2004), vacated on other grounds, No. Civ.A. 05-232, 2005 WL 4982364 (E.D. La. Dec. 28,
2005); see also 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 524.07[2], at 524-50 (15th ed. rev. 2008) (“[I]f the
court finds that the viability of the debtor or a successor, after reorganization, would not be
seriously threatened by the assertion” of present and future claims, then § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)III) is not
satisfied.).
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Fifth, as noted above, the supplemental injunction must be “implemented in
connection with” a litigation trust, established by the debtor‟s plan of
reorganization.374 Sixth, the trust has to assume the asbestos liabilities of the
debtor375 and use “its assets or income to pay claims and demands.”376 Seventh,
the trust must be funded “in whole or in part” by the debtor‟s securities and by an
obligation of the debtor “to make future payments, including dividends,” to the
trust.377 Eighth, the trust must either own, “or by the exercise of rights granted
under such plan . . . be entitled to own if specified contingencies occur, a
majority of the voting shares of” the debtor, the debtor‟s parent corporation, or
each subsidiary of the debtor that is also a debtor in the bankruptcy.378 This
requirement ensures that the trust may obtain control of the reorganized debtor if
the trust otherwise turns out to have insufficient funds to fulfill its obligations
under the plan of reorganization.379 Ninth, the trust‟s operating procedures must
“provide reasonable assurance” that the trust will have the financial resources to
pay in “substantially the same manner” comparable present claims and future
demands.380 Significant discrimination between present claims and future

374

11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(i).
Id. § 524(g)(2)(B)(i)(I); Findley v. Falise (In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig.), 878 F. Supp.
473, 571 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (explaining that the trust “must . . . assume the debtor‟s wrongful death,
personal injury and property damage liabilities for exposure to asbestos products”), aff‟d in part,
vacated in part, 78 F.3d 764 (2d Cir. 1996). Some courts have held that the trust may assume nonasbestos liabilities as well. See In re Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., 203 B.R. 256, 267 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio 1996) (holding that debtor‟s § 524(g) trust could assume debtor‟s lead liabilities as well as its
asbestos liabilities).
376
11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(i)(IV).
377
Id. § 524(g)(2)(B)(i)(II); see, e.g., In re Celotex Corp., 204 B.R. 586, 602-04 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1996) (outlining the funding of the trust—which included (1) hundreds of millions in common
stock of the reorganized debtor, and (2) promissory notes valued at $200 million issued by the
reorganized debtor to the trust—and noting that the total funding exceeded $1.2 billion). Some
courts have interpreted this provision to require that the reorganized debtor constitute a “going
concern”—that it have some continuing business operations after exiting bankruptcy. See, e.g., In
re Combustion Eng‟g, Inc., 391 F.3d 190, 238 (3d Cir. 2004) (“The implication of this requirement
is that the reorganized debtor must be a going concern, such that it is able to make future payments
into the trust to provide an „evergreen‟ funding source for future asbestos claimants.”). Contra
Esserman & Parsons, supra note 371, at 187 (“This paper argues that there has not been and should
not be an ongoing business requirement. . . .”).
378
11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(i)(III).
379
4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 524.07[2], at 524-50 (15th ed. rev. 2008). The “contingency” that
grants a trust control of the debtor must be an event that would occur prior to the point in time
when obtaining control of the debtor would be worthless. In re Congoleum Corp., 362 B.R. 167,
175-79 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2007) (holding that debtor‟s plan did not satisfy § 524(g)(2)(B)(i)(III)
because there was “no plausible scenario” in which the trust would be able to obtain a controlling
interest in debtor‟s stock “when [the shares] were still valuable”).
380
11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(V) (2006). The statute explains that the trust “will operate through
mechanisms such as structured, periodic, or supplemental payments, pro rata distributions,
matrices, or periodic review of estimates of the numbers and values of present claims and future
demands, or other comparable mechanisms.” Id.
375
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demands, or between substantively similar present claims, is prohibited by this
requirement.381
Tenth, as part of the confirmation process, the persons with claims to be
addressed by the trust must be placed in a separate class (or classes).382 Eleventh,
at least seventy-five percent of the members of the separate class voting on the
plan have to vote in the plan‟s favor.383 Twelfth, the court must appoint a legal
representative for future claimants “for the purpose of protecting” their rights.384
Nothing in the statute states that the representative must approve of the plan as a
prerequisite to confirmation,385 but “future claimants‟ representatives have
asserted that no channeling injunction may be issued without their
endorsement.”386 Thirteenth, the court must determine that granting the
protections of a supplemental injunction to the debtor is “fair and equitable” to
future claimants “in light of the benefits provided” to the trust “on behalf of such
debtor.”387
Fourteenth, the terms of the supplemental injunction need to be set forth in
both the plan of reorganization and the disclosure statement.388 Fifteenth, after
adequate notice, the court must conduct a hearing on the injunction.389 Sixteenth,
the supplemental injunction does not become effective until “the order
confirming the plan of reorganization” is “issued or affirmed by the district
court” and the time for appeal from the district court‟s action has expired.390

381

See In re Congoleum Corp., 362 B.R. at 183-84 (holding that the plan violated §
524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(V) because the plan classified and treated differently asbestos claims based solely
upon the time at which the claims were filed); In re ACandS, Inc., 311 B.R. 36, 42 (Bankr. D. Del.
2004) (finding that plan violated § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(V) because of excessive discrimination between
claims).
382
11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(IV)(bb). The statute‟s reference to multiple “classes” is relevant in
several contexts. First, when a bankruptcy involves multiple debtors, each with their own asbestos
claimants, it may be appropriate to place the plaintiffs for each debtor in a distinct class. Second,
most courts put personal injury claimants and property damage claimants in separate classes. See,
e.g., In re Celotex Corp., 204 B.R. at 605 (finding § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(IV)(bb) satisfied where the
primary debtor‟s asbestos personal injury claimants and asbestos property damage claimants were
placed in two separate classes (Classes six and eight respectively)). For a third context, see infra
note 456.
383
11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(IV)(bb).
384
Id. § 524(g)(4)(B)(i). See generally Fed. Ins. Co. v. W.R. Grace, Civ. Ac. No. 04-844, 2004 WL
55 5517843, *4-*10 (D. Del. Nov. 22, 2004) (addressing various issues regarding the appointment
of a § 524(g) future claims representative, including the proper statutory authority for the
appointment, the correct conflict-of-interest standard, and the appropriate appointment procedure).
385
See Barliant, supra note 32, at 457 n.84 (“The Bankruptcy Code does not require that the future
claims‟ representative approve the section 524(g) trust or the overall plan.”).
386
Plevin et al., Pre-Packaged Asbestos Bankruptcies, supra note 32, at 909 n.121.
387
11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(B)(ii).
388
Id. § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(IV)(aa).
389
Id. § 524(g)(1)(A).
390
Id. § 524(g)(3)(A)-(A)(i) (emphasis added). The statute further provides that, once the
injunction becomes “valid and enforceable,” it “may not be revoked or modified by any court
except through appeal in accordance with paragraph (6).” Id. at 524(g)(3)(A)(i) (emphasis added);

2009]

OVERLOOKING TORT CLAIMANTS‟ BEST INTERESTS

61

These sixteen requirements are all expressly set forth in the statute. But
some authorities have interpreted various portions of § 524(g) to imply additional
mandates. For example, the statute provides that a channeling injunction may be
entered to “supplement the injunctive effect of a discharge.”391 In construing this
language, one court ruled that, since the injunction is supposed to “supplement”
the “discharge,” at least one debtor in the bankruptcy must be entitled to a
discharge under § 1141(d);392 otherwise, a supplemental injunction is
impermissible.393
C. Section 524(g)’s Additional Requirements When The Injunction Protects
Non-Debtors
Section 524(g)(4) allows some non-debtors to receive the protection of the
supplemental injunction—i.e., it permits the issuance of non-debtor releases.394
see also id. § 524(g)(6) (preserving the power of an “appellate court” to act on an appeal either of
an injunction issued under the statute or of “the order of confirmation that relates to the
injunction.”). However, the statute also states that “after entry of such injunction, any proceeding
that involves the validity, application, construction, or modification of such injunction . . . may be
commenced only in the district court in which such injunction was entered.” Id. § 524(g)(2)(A)
(emphasis added). While paragraphs (3)(A)(i) and (2)(A) appear to be in conflict, they can be
reconciled as follows: Subparagraph (3)(A)(i) bars attempts to change the terms of the injunction,
whereas subparagraph (2)(A) addresses modifications expressly contemplated by the initial terms
of the confirmation order.
391
Id. § 524(g)(1)(A).
392
Id. § 1141(d).
393
See In re W. Asbestos Co., 313 B.R. 832, 854 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2003); see also Esserman &
Parsons, supra note 371, at 200-01, 204 (summarizing and rejecting this argument). For another
example, see also supra note 377 (discussing the implied “going-concern” requirement).
394
Extending the supplemental injunction to non-debtors under § 524(g)(4) should be distinguished
from the legal impact of another part of the statute. Under § 524(g)(3), some third parties are
automatically entitled to a measure of protection, apart from the supplemental injunction, when the
requirements regarding the litigation trust are satisfied. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(3)(A). That
paragraph provides that entities who become direct or indirect transferees of the debtor or the trust,
pursuant to the reorganization plan or afterwards, shall not be liable on any asbestos-related claims
by reason of the transfer. Id. § 524(g)(3)(A)(ii) (providing that “no entity that pursuant to such plan
or thereafter becomes a direct or indirect transferee of, or successor to any assets of, a debtor or
trust that is the subject of the injunction shall be liable with respect to any claim or demand made
against such entity by reason of its becoming such a transferee or successor”). This provision is
designed to cut off any successor liability such transferees might otherwise face. 4 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY ¶ 524.07[4] (15th ed. rev. 2008). Similarly, persons that loan money to the debtor,
the trust, or a transferee of either, pursuant to the reorganization plan or afterwards, are not liable to
any asbestos claimants simply in virtue of the loan. 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(3)(A)(iii) (stating that “no
entity that pursuant to such plan or thereafter makes a loan to such a debtor or trust or to such a
successor or transferee shall, by reason of making the loan, be liable with respect to any claim or
demand made against such entity, nor shall any pledge of assets made in connection with such a
loan be upset or impaired for that reason”); see also id. § 524(g)(3)(B)(ii) (providing that the
protection for transferees and lenders does not shield them from liability under fraudulent transfer
law). Extinguishing a third party‟s successor liability, arising because of its transactions with the
debtor taking place after the bankruptcy filing, involves a different set of issues from releasing or
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However, the statute lists additional conditions that must be met when the
injunction shields third parties. First, any non-debtor who will be receiving the
benefits of the injunction must be identified “by name or as part of an identifiable
group” in the terms of the injunction.395 Second, as with the debtor, protecting a
third party via the injunction must be fair and equitable to future claimants “in
light of the benefits provided” to the trust “on behalf of such . . . third party.” 396
Notably, this language does not mandate that every third party contribute funds
to the trust; it merely requires that someone provide funding on the non-debtor‟s
“behalf.”397
Third, § 524(g) only permits certain third parties to receive the protection of
the injunction—and they may be shielded from only particular types of asbestos
claims.398 Section 524(g)(4)(A)(ii) provides that the supplemental injunction
may bar actions against non-debtors “alleged to be directly or indirectly liable for
the conduct of, claims against, or demands on the debtor,” but only “to the extent
such alleged liability arises by reason of” one of the following four relationships
with the debtor:
(I) the third party‟s ownership of a financial interest in the debtor, a past or
present affiliate of the debtor, or a predecessor in interest of the debtor;
enjoining claims against the third party flowing from pre-bankruptcy activity. See Brubaker, supra
note 173, at 962 n.3. And discharging post-filing lenders is similarly distinguishable. Accordingly,
§ 524(g)(3) is generally beyond the scope of this article. It should be noted, however, that some
courts conflate the provisions granting third parties the protection of the supplemental injunction
with the provisions granting immunity to successors and lenders. See, e.g., In re Celotex Corp.,
204 B.R. 586, 605-06 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1996).
395
11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(A)(ii)(2006).
396
Id. § 524(g)(4)(B)(ii) (providing that “the court determines, before entering the order confirming
such plan, that identifying such debtor or debtors, or such third party (by name or as part of an
identifiable group), in such injunction with respect to such demands for purposes of this
subparagraph is fair and equitable with respect to the persons that might subsequently assert such
demands, in light of the benefits provided, or to be provided, to such trust on behalf of such debtor
or debtors or such third party”).
397
Id.; see, e.g., In re Kaiser Aluminum Corp., No. 02-10429(JKF), 7312, 2006 WL 616243, at *17
(Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 6, 2006) (confirming plan where it appears the protected third parties
contributed nothing; all contributions were made on their behalf by the reorganized debtors), aff‟d,
343 B.R. 88 (D. Del. 2006); In re J T Thorpe Co., 308 B.R. 782, 790-91 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2003)
(confirming plan with supplemental injunction that shielded various non-debtor parties related to
the debtor because the debtor‟s parent company made contributions on behalf of the related parties,
satisfying § 524(g)(4)(B)(ii)), order entered by, No. 02-41487-H5-11, 2003 WL 23573844 (Bankr.
S.D. Tex. Jan. 17, 2003), aff‟d, No. 02-41487-H5-11, 2004 WL 720263 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2004).
398
It should be noted that § 524(g)(4) does not expressly limit the third-party claims that may be
enjoined to asbestos claims. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(A) (2006). However, the overall structure
of the statute, the purpose of the act, and the legislative history, plainly establish such a limitation.
See, e.g., 140 CONG. REC. S4523 (daily ed. Apr. 20, 1994) (remarks of Sen. Graham) (“Mr.
President, upon the establishment of a trust to pay asbestos claims, the bankruptcy court may enjoin
claims against the debtor and certain third parties alleged to be liable for the asbestos claims
against the debtor, channeling such claims to the trust for payment.” (emphasis added)). And no
court or commentator has suggested otherwise.
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(II) the third party‟s involvement in the management of the debtor or a
predecessor in interest of the debtor, or service as an officer, director or
employee of the debtor or a related party;
(III) the third party‟s provision of insurance to the debtor or a related party;
or
(IV) the third party‟s involvement in a transaction changing the corporate
structure, or in a loan or other financial transaction affecting the financial
condition, of the debtor or a related party, including but not limited to—
(aa) involvement in providing financing (debt or equity), or advice to an
entity involved in such a transaction; or
(bb) acquiring or selling a financial interest in an entity as part of such a
399
transaction.

A number of courts and commentators have concluded that the language of
§ 524(g) leaves many ambiguities.400 Paragraph (4)(A)(ii) is no exception.
However, this provision does offer rather clear guidance with respect to the
enjoining of some types of claims.
First, § 524(g)(4)(A)(ii) only allows for the restraining of claims alleging
that a non-debtor is “directly or indirectly liable for the conduct of, claims
against, or demands on the debtor.”401 This language suggests that supplemental
injunctions may not extinguish rights against a third party arising from the third
party‟s independent conduct.
And several courts have adopted this
understanding. For example, in Combustion Engineering,402 the initial plan of
reorganization channeled to the litigation trust the asbestos liabilities of two
affiliates of the debtor, Basic and Lummus.403 Some of the claims against these
two entities flowed from products that they distributed on their own. 404 In other
words, the claims were “wholly separate from any liability involving Combustion
Engineering.”405 The Third Circuit held that the “plain language” of § 524(g)
prohibited the extension of the supplemental injunction to “these non-derivative
third-party actions.”406 The court explained that “§ 524(g)[(4)(A)(ii)] limits the
situations where a channeling injunction may enjoin actions against third parties

399

11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(A)(ii). The statute defines a related party to mean (1) past and present
affiliates of the debtor, (2) the debtor‟s predecessors in interest, and (3) “any entity that owned a
financial interest” in the debtor or the parties identified in (1) and (2). Id. § 524(g)(4)(a)(iii).
400
See, e.g., Brown, supra note 32, at 902 (“Unfortunately, Section 524(g) is not always a model of
clarity, and its legislative history is sparse.”); Kenneth Pasquale & Arlene G. Krieger, Combustion
Engineering and the Interpretation of Section 524(g), 2007 ANN. SURV. OF BANKR. LAW Part I § 4,
at 149 (explaining that § 524(g) “is a convoluted series of requirements” and that recent litigation
“has exposed a number of significant ambiguities in the application” of the statute).
401
11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(A)(ii).
402
In re Combustion Eng‟g, Inc., 391 F.3d 190 (3d Cir. 2004).
403
Id. at 201.
404
Id. at 231 (“By contrast, the asbestos-related personal injury claims asserted against Combustion
Engineering, Basic, and Lummus arise from different products, involved different asbestoscontaining material, and were sold to different markets.”).
405
Id. at 235.
406
Id. (emphasis added).
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to those where a third party has derivative liability for the claims against the
debtor.”407
Similarly, it appears clear that the supplemental injunction is allowed to bar
claims seeking to hold a parent company or manager of the debtor responsible for
the debtor‟s asbestos liabilities by piercing the corporate veil.408 Courts and
commentators frequently describe veil piercing as creating a type of “indirect
liability.”409 And section 524(g) permits the enjoining of actions asserting that a
third party is “directly or indirectly liable” by reason of “the third party‟s
ownership of a financial interest in the debtor” or “the third party‟s involvement
in the management of the debtor.”410
There is also little question that the channeling injunction may prohibit
actions against insurance companies in which plaintiffs seek to recover under
liability insurance policies the carriers sold to the debtor. The statute states that
the injunction may bar lawsuits alleging that a third party is directly or indirectly
liable by reason of its “provision of insurance to the debtor or a related party.” 411
Moreover, this was the precise type of claim released in Johns-Manville,412 the
bankruptcy upon which § 524(g) is based.
A more difficult case than these three examples concerns the liability of
joint tortfeasors. Suppose asbestos claimants seek to hold a senior manager of
the debtor liable because he was involved in the debtor‟s tortious activity. It is
well established that directors and officers are personally liable for corporate
torts if they participate in the wrongful conduct.413 The claimants would, in

407

Id. at 234 (emphasis added); accord In re Federal-Mogul Global, Inc., No. 01-10578, 2008 WL
4493519, *8-*9 (Bankr. D. Del. Sept. 30, 2008) (holding that § 524(g) supplemental injunction
could not be extended to two entities whose asbestos liabilities arose from their own conduct and
did “not derive in any way from liability of the Debtors”; the two entities were “not alleged to be
liable for the „conduct of‟, claims against‟, or „demands on‟ the Debtors”); In re Quigley Co., No.
04-15739(SMB), 2008 WL 2097016, at *6, *8 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 15, 2008) (holding that
claims against the debtor‟s parent could be enjoined under § 524(g) because the claims sought to
hold the parent vicariously liable for the debtor‟s conduct and “vicarious liability is a form of
derivative liability”); see also 140 CONG. REC. S4523 (daily ed. Apr. 20, 1994) (remarks of Sen.
Graham) (“Mr. President, upon the establishment of a trust to pay asbestos claims, the bankruptcy
court may enjoin claims against the debtor and certain third parties alleged to be liable for the
asbestos claims against the debtor, channeling such claims to the trust for payment.” (emphasis
added)).
408
See In re Quigley, 2008 WL 2097016 at *6 (offering several examples of the types of derivative
claims that can be enjoined pursuant to § 524(g), including “alter ego, piercing the corporate veil,
domination and control, and respondeat superior” (emphasis in original)).
409
See, e.g., U.S. v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 70 (1998) (referring to veil piercing as establishing
“indirect, derivative liability”); Douglas G. Smith, Piercing the Corporate Veil in Regulated
Industries, 2008 BYU L. REV. 1165, 1186 (contrasting direct liability with “the indirect liability
that occurs where the corporate veil has been pierced”).
410
11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(A)(ii), (ii)(I), (ii)(II) (2006) (emphasis added).
411
Id. § 524(g)(4)(A)(ii)(III).
412
See supra notes 148-53 and accompanying text.
413
3A WILLIAM M. FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS § 1135 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 2002).
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essence, be asserting that the manager is a joint tortfeasor with the debtor. 414
There is language in § 524(g) that suggests that enjoining such an action is
permissible. The statute provides that a supplemental injunction may bar claims
against a third-party alleging that the third-party is “directly or indirectly liable
for the conduct of . . . the debtor” by reason of “the third party‟s involvement in
the management of the debtor . . . or service as an officer, director or employee of
the debtor.”415 First, the hypothetical plaintiffs are charging the manager with
direct tort liability. Second, while the liability flows from the manager‟s own
conduct, as was the case with Basic and Lummus in Combustion Engineering,
that conduct is inseparable from the debtor‟s because the manager‟s actions were
the debtor‟s actions. Thus, the claims allege that the manager is liable for the
debtor‟s conduct. This distinguishes the manager from Basic and Lummus,
whose conduct was completely independent. Third, and last, the manager‟s
liability “arises by reason of” his service as an officer of the debtor; it was only
through such service that the manager was involved with the debtor‟s torts.
I am not necessarily convinced by this reading.416 But it does illustrate that
the language of § 524(g) provides considerable basis for expanding the protection
of the supplemental injunction beyond mere “derivative” liability of third parties.
Because the statute permits the enjoining of claims that assert “direct” liability,
the language may be construed to allow for the release of joint tortfeasor claims
against directors and officers, corporate affiliates, and even insurance
companies.417
Section 524(g)(4) contains additional ambiguities.418 But my purpose here
is not to definitively resolve all issues regarding the language of that provision.

414

See id. (noting that a plaintiff may hold liable as joint tortfeasors the corporation and a manager
that participated in the act that caused the plaintiff‟s injury).
415
11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(A)(ii), (ii)(II) (emphasis added).
416
It is also worth noting that there are probably very few individuals left comparable to my
hypothetical manager given how long ago most asbestos torts took place.
417
See 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(A)(ii)(I)-(III). In Johns-Mansville Corp. v. Chubb Indem. Ins. Co. (In
re Johns-Manville Corp.), 517 F.3d 52 (2d Cir. 2008), rev‟d on other grounds, Travelers Indem.
Co. v. Bailey, 129 S. Ct. 2195 (2009), the Second Circuit implicitly rejected my joint-tortfeasor
argument. The court concluded that a § 524(g) supplemental injunction could not enjoin claims
against insurers alleging that the carriers (1) influenced Manville‟s failure to disclose the dangers of
asbestos, and (2) violated a duty to disclose information about asbestos that they learned through
their dealings with Manville. Id. at 58, 67-68. The court repeatedly described these claims as
based on the insurers‟ “independent” conduct or duties. See id. at 55, 64-65, 67. But the precise
allegations, such as influencing Manville to not divulge material, suggest that the insurers were
being prosecuted, at least in part, as joint tortfeasors. See United States v. Union Corp., 277 F.
Supp. 2d 478, 489 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (“Joint tortfeasors are parties who either act together in
committing a wrong or whose acts, if independent of each other, unite to form a single injury.”).
418
For example, some authorities suggest that § 524(g)(4)(A)(ii)(III) allows for extension of the
supplemental injunction to parties that shared insurance with the debtor, in addition to those that
sold insurance to the debtor. See, e.g., In re Combustion Eng‟g, Inc., 295 B.R. 459, 481 (Bankr. D.
Del. 2003), subseq. vacated on other grounds, 391 F.3d 190 (3d Cir. 2005). At least one
commentator has criticized this understanding. See Brubaker, BANKR. LAW LETTER, supra note
196, at 11 (asserting that, even if sharing insurance constitutes the “provision of insurance” for
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Rather, I believe that the bulk of non-debtor releases granted in asbestos cases
raise more pressing concerns than strict compliance with the terms of §
524(g)(4).
VI. LIMITATIONS ON ASBESTOS NON-DEBTOR RELEASES
A. The Varying Scope of Asbestos Non-Debtor Releases
Virtually all, if not all, plans of reorganization in asbestos bankruptcies
contain third-party releases.419 Many of these provisions enjoin claims that are
firmly within the scope of § 524(g). For example, most of the plans shield
insurers from claims arising from insurance policies that the carriers issued to the
debtor,420 consistent with § 524(g)(4)(A)(ii)(III). Most also prohibit the assertion
purposes of paragraph (4)(A)(ii)(III), the non-debtors‟ liability in Combustion did not arise “by
reason of” the shared-insurance relationship, as required by § 524(g)(4)(A)(ii) if the non-debtors
are to be protected by the supplemental injunction). I think Professor Brubaker has the superior
understanding. Another issue is whether the supplemental injunction may shield carriers, who have
settled their coverage disputes with the debtor, from state-law contribution actions brought by nonsettling insurers. Mark D. Plevin et al., Where Are They Now, Part Five: An Update on
Developments in Asbestos-Related Bankruptcy Cases, 8-8 MEALEY‟S ASB. BANKR. REP. 24, 10-11
(2009) [hereinafter Plevin et al., Where Are They Now]. In some cases, these contribution claims
are channeled to the trust for payment. Id. Protecting the settling carrier is probably permissible in
this circumstance because the non-settling insurer is essentially seeking to hold the settling carrier
“indirectly liable for the conduct of . . . the debtor” by reason of its “provision of insurance to the
debtor.” 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(A)(ii), (ii)(III); see In re W. Asbestos Co., 313 B.R. 832, 856
(Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2003) (adopting this understanding of (4)(A)(ii) & (ii)(III)). In other
bankruptcies, the contribution claims are enjoined even though the non-settling carrier will not be
paid anything by the trust. See, e.g., In re W. Asbestos Co., 313 B.R. at 856. Section 524(g)(1)(B)
provides that the supplemental injunction may bar claims “to be paid in whole or in part by a trust
described in paragraph (2)(B)(i).” 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(1)(B) (emphasis added). Some non-settling
insurers have thus objected in cases where they will receive no payment from the trust. See, e.g., In
re W. Asbestos Co., 313 B.R. at 856; see also Plevin et al., Where Are They Now, supra, at 22 n.143
(collecting other examples). Despite the language in paragraph (g)(1)(B), which seems to give the
non-settling carriers a compelling argument, at least one court has held that a supplemental
injunction may enjoin their rights despite the lack of payment. See In re W. Asbestos Co., 313 B.R.
at 856.
For an excellent discussion of some of the ambiguities that plague § 524(g)(4)(A)(ii), see
In re Quigley Co., No. 04-15739(SMB), 2008 WL 2097016 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 15, 2008). See,
e.g., id. at *5 (explaining that the phrase “arises by reason of” in § 524(g)(4)(A)(ii) is ambiguous).
419
Every plan that I reviewed in preparing this article contained at least one such release.
420
See, e.g., Third Amended Plan of Reorganization of A.P.I. Inc. (Nov. 21, 2005) as Modified at
Confirmation at 30-31, In re A.P.I. Inc., No. 05-30073 (Bankr. D. Minn. Dec. 6, 2006) [hereinafter
A.P.I. Third Amended Plan]; In re Kaiser Aluminum Corp., No. 02-10429(JKF), 7312, 2006 WL
616243, at *15-*16 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 6, 2006), aff‟d, 343 B.R. 88 (D. Del. 2006); In re J T
Thorpe Co., No. 02-41487-H5-11, 2003 WL 23573844, at *10-*11 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Jan. 17,
2003), aff‟d, No. 02-41487-H5-11, 2004 WL 720263 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2004); see also Plevin et
al., Where Are They Now, supra note 418, at 11. (“Policyholder-debtors typically extend that relief
in their Chapter 11 plans to insurers who have entered into settlement agreements with the debtor
pre-confirmation. In some instances, plans allow insurers who settle post-confirmation to also be
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of claims against (i) non-debtor parent and affiliate companies,421 and (ii)
directors and officers,422 where the claimants seek to hold such parties liable for
the debtor‟s conduct solely by reason of their status as corporate affiliates or
managers of the debtor. These types of supplemental injunctions are consistent
with §§ 524(g)(4)(A)(ii)(I) and (II), respectively.
However, a significant number of asbestos releases contain expansive
language that arguably extinguishes claims that are beyond the scope of §
524(g).423 For example, in the bankruptcy of A.P.I. Inc., the non-debtor release
in the reorganization plan extinguished all “Third Party Claims,”424 a term
defined to include every claim “based upon, relating to, arising out of, or in any
way connected with” asbestos claims against the debtor.425 Such language is
likely broad enough to encompass joint-tortfeasor liability, rather than just the
types of derivative liability that are well within the scope of the statute. To
illustrate, a cause of action seeking to hold a parent company liable for asbestos
harm as a joint-tortfeasor with the debtor clearly “relates” and is “connected” to
asbestos claims against the debtor. Yet, despite the release‟s broad language,
A.P.I.‟s plan of reorganization was confirmed.426 Likewise, in the J T Thorpe
bankruptcy, the court released various third parties from claims against them that
“were either directly or derivatively through the [d]ebtor . . . on the same subject
matter as any Claims” against the debtor.427 Language such as “directly” and “on
protected by the court‟s § 524(g) injunction.”); Esserman & Parsons, supra note 371, at 204
(“[I]nsurance companies are often protected by an § 524(g) injunction[.]”). Sometimes, the plan
cites both § 524(g) and § 105(a) as the basis for the insurance releases. See infra notes 438-39 and
accompanying text for a discussion of this point.
421
See, e.g., In re Porter Hayden Co., No. 02-54152-SD, 2006 WL 4667137, at *4, *6-*7 (Bankr.
D. Md. Jun. 30, 2006), aff‟d, No. 06-201, 2006 WL 4672671 (D. Md. Jul. 7, 2006); In re Kaiser
Aluminum Corp., 2006 WL 616243, at *15-*16; In re J T Thorpe Co., 308 B.R. 782, 790-91
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2003) (noting that the debtor‟s parent, Thorpe Corporation, and various affiliates
were receiving protection under the supplemental injunction), order entered by, 2003 WL
23573844, at *10-*13 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Jan. 17, 2003) (setting forth the terms of the supplemental
and “third-party” injunctions), aff‟d, No. 02-41487-H5-11, 2004 WL 720263 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 3,
2004); see also Esserman & Parsons, supra note 371, at 204 (“Indeed, parent and affiliate
companies . . . are often protected by an § 524(g) injunction[.]”).
422
See, e.g., In re Porter Hayden Co., 2006 WL 4667137 at *4, *6-*7; In re Kaiser Aluminum
Corp., 2006 WL 616243, at *15-*16; A.P.I. Third Amended Plan, supra note 420, at 14-15, 26-30.
423
The precise scope of many of asbestos third-party releases is difficult to determine, a perhaps
intentional feature of such provisions. See Brubaker, supra note 173, at 993 (“The driving force
behind non-debtor releases seems to be a relentless desire to steadfastly avoid articulating and
valuing what and whose claims are being released.”).
424
A.P.I. Third Amended Plan, supra note 420, at 28-29.
425
Id. at 15 (emphasis added); see also id. at 3 (defining “Asbestos Claim” in sufficiently broad
language to arguably encompass joint-tortfeasor claims; the definition of “Third-Party Claim” is
potentially unnecessary).
426
Order Confirming Third Amended Plan of Reorganization of A.P.I. Inc. (Nov. 21, 2005) as
Modified at Confirmation, In re A.P.I. Inc., No. 05-30073 (Bankr. D. Minn. Dec. 5, 2006).
427
See In re J T Thorpe Co., No. 02-41487-H5-11, 2003 WL 23573844, at *9 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.
Jan. 17, 2003), aff‟d, No. 02-41487-H5-11, 2004 WL 720263 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2004); id. at *10*13 (setting forth the terms of the injunctions barring prosecution of any released claims; the terms
offer additional detail on the parties actually protected). In comparison, the Porter Hayden plan of
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the same subject matter” also probably includes joint-tortfeasor liability. But the
J T Thorpe plan was confirmed as well.428 And there are other examples.429
B. Asbestos Non-Debtor Releases Issued Under §§ 105(a) and 1123(b)(6)
Given the ambiguities in § 524(g) and the breadth of many asbestos nondebtor releases, it is not surprising that courts and parties frequently cite § 105(a)
as an alternative ground for granting an asbestos release. In numerous cases, the
plan or confirmation order indicates that the supplemental injunction or other
non-debtor release was issued pursuant to § 524(g) and § 105(a),430 and there are
even cases that cite to just § 105(a).431
If a third-party release in an asbestos case is conferred under § 105(a) (or §
1123(b)(6)) rather than § 524(g), it is subject to all of the legal principles
discussed in Part IV above. First consider general non-debtor releases—i.e.
releases that do not involve insurance. In anti-release jurisdictions, general
releases are beyond the power of the court.432 And judges abiding by local
precedent should strike such releases, as occurred in the Western Asbestos
Company bankruptcy,433 a case from the Northern District of California
Bankruptcy Court, which falls within the anti-release Ninth Circuit.434 Yet, this
reorganization is much narrower, and the claims released fall well within the statute. The plan only
shields the non-debtors from “Asbestos Bodily Injury Claim[s].” In re Porter Hayden Co., 2006
WL 4667137, at *4, *6. There is no additional, general language, such as “relating to,” “connected
with,” or “same subject matter.” See id. at *6; accord In re Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 348 B.R.
136, 153-54 (D. Del. 2006).
428
In re J T Thorpe Co., 2003 WL 23573844.
429
See, e.g., In re Federal-Mogul Global Inc., No. 01-10578, 2007 WL 4180545, *33 (Bankr. D.
Del. Nov. 16 2007) (“[T]he supplemental injunction enjoins all Entities that hold or assert claims,
demands or causes of action against any of the Released Parties relating in any way to any Claim
against or Equity Interest in any of the Debtors” (emphasis added)); In re Celotex Corp., 204 B.R.
586, 606 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1996) (noting that the parties protected by the supplemental injunction
include “any other Entity that is alleged to be co-liable with the Debtors and provides value to the
Debtors or the Trust or any of the respective successors or assigns thereof”). Of course, sometimes
the proponents of the plan realized that the contemplated non-debtor release goes beyond § 524(g),
and thus they asked the court to grant the release solely pursuant to § 105(a). See, e.g., In re
Congoleum Corp., 362 B.R. 167, 189-91 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2007) (refusing to confirm the Chapter 11
plan and holding that the “sweeping” § 105(a) release contained therein was legally barred).
430
See, e.g., A.P.I. Third Amended Plan, supra note 420, at 26-30; In re U.S. Mineral Prods., No.
01-2471 (JKF), 2005 WL 5887219, *6 (Bankr. D. Del. Dec. 29, 2005); In re J T Thorpe Co., 2003
WL 23573844, at *10-*13.
431
See, e.g., Order Confirming the Joint Plan of Reorganization, as of September 28, 2005, as
Amended Through January 17, 2006, at 13-15, In re The Babcock & Wilcox Co., No. 00-10992
(Bankr. E.D. La. Jan. 18, 2006).
432
See supra notes 194-97 and accompanying text.
433
See In re W. Asbestos Co., 313 B.R. 832, 846-47 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2003) (pursuant to Ninth
Circuit precedent, finding invalid a § 1123(b)(6) non-debtor release; the release purported to
extinguish claims (1) based upon the non-debtors‟ pre-petition operation or management of the
debtor, but (2) unrelated to the bankruptcy case).
434
See Resorts Int‟l, Inc. v. Lowenschuss (In re Lowenschuss), 67 F.3d 1394, 1401-02 (9th Cir.
1995) (§ 524(e) prohibits non-debtor releases).
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does not always happen. Some courts bound by anti-release authority have
upheld § 105(a) releases.435 In my view, the pro-release authorities have the
better position. Thus, I believe that general asbestos releases are, indeed,
permissible under § 105(a) (and § 1123(b)(6)).436 But such releases are valid
only if they satisfy the Master Mortgage test, or (I would contend) my modified
version of it. And virtually every decision I reviewed that upheld a § 105(a)
release—including decisions from pro-release, anti-release, and open
jurisdictions—made no such finding.437

435

For example, the Fifth Circuit is an anti-release jurisdiction. Feld v. Zale Corp. (In re Zale), 62
F.3d 746, 760 (5th Cir. 1995) (“Section 524[(e)] prohibits the discharge of debts of non-debtors,”
and thus § 105(a) may not be used to grant non-debtor releases). But in the J T Thorpe
reorganization, a bankruptcy court located in the Southern District of Texas entered third-party
releases pursuant to § 524(g) and § 105(a). See In re J T Thorpe Co., 308 B.R. 782, 791 (Bankr.
S.D. Tex. 2003), order entered by, No. 02-41487-H5-11, 2003 WL 23573844, at *10-*13 (Bankr.
S.D. Tex. Jan. 17, 2003), aff‟d, No. 02-41487-H5-11, 2004 WL 720263 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2004);
see also In re The Babcock & Wilcox Co., No. 00-10992, 2004 WL 4945985, at *24-*28 (Bankr.
E.D. La. Nov. 9, 2004) (another case from within the Fifth Circuit approving of non-debtor releases
entered under § 524(g) and § 105(a)), vacated on other grounds, No. Civ.A. 05-232, 2005 WL
4982364 (E.D. La. 2005); In re Asbestos Claims Mgmt. Corp., 294 B.R. 663, 683-86 (N.D. Tex.
2003) (same).
436
See Silverstein, supra note 6, at 19-20, 106-36.
437
As indicated in the text, there are decisions relying upon § 105(a) as authority for a general,
asbestos non-debtor release from (1) pro-release jurisdictions, (2) anti-release jurisdictions, and (3)
jurisdictions where the circuit court has not yet made a definitive ruling on the subject of nondebtor releases (i.e., “open jurisdictions”). In only two of these cases did the court apply the
Master Mortgage test.
Pro-Release Jurisdictions. My research uncovered just one opinion from a pro-release
circuit that cited § 105(a) as a basis for a general asbestos release. See In re Eagle-Picher Indus.,
Inc., 203 B.R. 256, 281 (S.D. Ohio 1996) (citing both § 524(g) and § 105(a)). The Eagle-Picher
court did not apply the Master Mortgage test. Id. at 279-81. However, the test was first articulated
only two years earlier, see In re Master Mortgage Inv. Fund, Inc., 168 B.R. 930, 934-35 (Bankr.
W.D. Mo. 1994), and the Sixth Circuit had not yet adopted either the pro-release position or the
Master Mortgage test, see Class Five Nev. Claimants v. Dow Corning Corp. (In re Dow Corning
Corp.), 280 F.3d 648, 656-58 (6th Cir. 2002) (stating that non-debtor releases are permissible
pursuant to §§ 105(a) and 1123(b)(6) and adopting the Master Mortgage test). Therefore, this is
not too surprising.
Anti-Release Jurisdictions. As noted in the immediately preceding footnote, three courts
from the Fifth Circuit have ignored governing anti-release precedent and upheld asbestos releases
issued in part under § 105(a). Two did not apply the Master Mortgage test. See In re J T Thorpe
Co., 308 B.R. at 788-91; In re Asbestos Claims Mgmt. Corp., 294 B.R. at 683-86. The third did,
and found the test satisfied. See In re The Babcock & Wilcox Co., 2004 WL 4945985, at *24-*28.
The opinion in In re The Babcock & Wilcox Co., was vacated on appeal because the parties reached
a settlement. That settlement lead to a revised Chapter 11 plan that was ultimately confirmed and
that also cited § 105(a) as the entire or partial basis for two asbestos non-debtor releases. Order
Confirming the Joint Plan of Reorganization, as of September 28, 2005, as Amended Through
January 17, 2006, at 11-15, In re The Babcock & Wilcox Co., No. 00-10992 (Bankr. E.D. La. Jan.
18, 2006).
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Next consider insurance non-debtor releases in asbestos cases. Some courts
and reorganization plans have cited § 105(a)—either in conjunction with §
524(g)438 or by itself439—as authority for such releases. If § 105(a) is genuinely
the basis for an insurance release, then courts contemplating such relief must
address all of the complexities regarding insurance releases discussed in Part
IV.B. However, if there is any type of non-debtor release that § 524(g) almost
certainly authorizes, it is an insurance release. Accordingly, despite frequent
references to § 105(a), insurance third-party releases in asbestos cases are best
understood as flowing from § 524(g).
In sum, non-debtor releases issued pursuant to § 105(a) or § 1123(b)(6) in
asbestos bankruptcies—i.e., general releases only, not insurance releases—are
either invalid or, in my view, must satisfy the Master Mortgage test, including
the requirement that all dissenting claimants receive payment in full on the
released causes of action. Few plans of reorganization in asbestos cases have
promised payment in full on claims extinguished by third-party releases.440 This
may flow from the fact that courts frequently rely upon both § 524(g) and §
105(a), or just § 524(g), as authority for the release. But as will be shown in the
next part, the requirement of payment in full applies to § 524(g) releases as well.
C. Asbestos Non-Debtor Releases Issued Under § 524(g)
Under the case law in both pro and anti-release jurisdictions, asbestos nondebtor releases that extend beyond the powers conferred by § 524(g) must, at the
very least, provide payment in full on the extinguished claims. I firmly support
Open Jurisdictions. The Third and Eighth Circuits have not yet taken a side in the debate
over non-debtor releases. But there are lower court opinions from both circuits approving of §
105(a) asbestos releases without considering the Master Mortgage elements. See, e.g., In re U. S.
Mineral Prods., No. 01-2471 (JKF), 2005 WL 5887219, at *6 (Bankr. D. Del. Dec. 29, 2005)
(granting a § 105(a) injunction, but failing address to the Master Mortgage test); In re U.S. Mineral
Prods., No. 01-2471 (JKF), 2005 WL 5898300 (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 29, 2005) (also failing to
address the Master Mortgage elements); A.P.I. Third Amended Plan, supra note 420, at 30-31
(providing for non-debtor releases to be granted under § 524(g) and § 105(a)); Order Confirming
Third Amended Plan of Reorganization of A.P.I. Inc. (Nov. 21, 2005) as Modified at Confirmation
at 11-16, In re A.P.I. Inc., No. 05-30073 (Bankr. D. Minn. Dec. 5, 2006) (issuing two injunctions
under §§ 524(g) and 105(a) that constitute non-debtor releases, but nowhere addressing the Master
Mortgage elements). But see also In re Combustion Eng‟g, Inc., 295 B.R. 459, 480-85 (Bankr. D.
Del. 2003) (after finding that two non-debtors could not be protected by a § 524(g) channeling
injunction from claims that were “independent” of the debtor because such claims were outside the
scope of the § 524(g), the court concluded that a § 105(a) non-debtor release was impermissible as
well because the Master Mortgage/“Dow” factors were not satisfied), subseq. vacated, 391 F.3d
190, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2004) (explaining that the bankruptcy court subsequently found that the
Master Mortgage/“Dow” factors were met).
438
See, e.g., A.P.I. Third Amended Plan, supra note 420, at 30-31; In re W. Asbestos Co., 313 B.R.
456, 462, 465-66 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2004), aff‟d, No. 3:03-CV-00989 MJJ, 2004 WL 1944792
(N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2004); In re J T Thorpe Co., 2003 WL 23573844, at *10-*11.
439
See, e.g., In re Federal-Mogul Global Inc., No. 01-10578, 2007 WL 4180545, *33-*34 (Bankr.
D. Del. Nov. 16, 2007); In re Porter Hayden Co., No. 02-54152-SD, 2006 WL 4667137, at *7-*8
(Bankr. D. Md. Jun. 30, 2006), aff‟d, No. 06-201, 2006 WL 4672671 (D. Md. Jul. 7, 2006).
440
See infra notes 469-72 and accompanying text.
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this conclusion. In this part, I argue, among other things, that a similar
requirement applies to releases that fall within the scope of the statute. Section
524(g) displaced many of the legal requirements applicable to non-debtor
releases issued outside the asbestos context. But it did not moot all of them. And
one of the principles that is still applicable is the final element of both the Master
Mortgage test and my modified version of the test—the mandate that the plan of
reorganization promise full payment to dissenting creditors.
1. The Relationship of § 524(g) to General Non-Debtor Release Law
Section 524(g) significantly altered the law governing non-debtor releases
in asbestos insolvencies. To begin with, the specific authorization to issue thirdparty releases contained in the statute makes the circuit split over the legality of
non-debtor releases irrelevant to any release validly granted pursuant to § 524(g).
Recall that the judicial debate over third-party releases in non-asbestos cases
centers on §§ 105(a), 1123(b)(6), and 524(e).441 The explicit sanctioning of
third-party releases in § 524(g) eliminates any need to rely on the two equitable
statutes as a basis for such relief.442 And § 524(g) expressly states that courts
may grant supplemental injunctions shielding non-debtors “[n]otwithstanding the
provisions of section 524(e).”443
Section 524(g) also moots or displaces (1) most of the Master Mortgage
test that pro-release courts use to assess the validity of releases, and (2) at least
one piece of my Modified Master Mortgage test.444 Under element two of both
tests, the release must be “essential” to the reorganization. And under element
three of the courts‟ version, the benefitting releasee has to contribute substantial
assets to the reorganization plan. These two standards flow from §§ 105(a) and
1123(b)(6), which, again, are not implicated by channeling injunctions in
asbestos cases. Moreover, § 524(g) contains substitute requirements for both
components. The element that requires essentiality is replaced by the mandate
that without the injunction, the plan cannot “deal equitably with claims and
future demands.”445 And the “substantial contribution” element is replaced by
the requirement that the injunction be fair and equitable “in light of the benefits
provided” on behalf of the protected third party.446 Similarly, the fifth piece of
the Master Mortgage test, that “all or substantially all” parties impacted by the
release receive payment in full, is likely also derived from the two equitable
statutes, and thus no longer relevant to asbestos releases. Finally, the § 524(g)
condition that seventy-five percent of the voting asbestos claimants cast their

441

See supra notes 190-97 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of why § 524(g) clearly does not displace any authority bankruptcy courts
possess to issue non-debtor releases under §§ 105(a) and 1123(b)(6) outside the asbestos context,
see supra note 196.
443
11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(A)(ii) (2006).
444
The elements of the Master Mortgage test and my Modified Master Mortgage test that I discuss
in the next several paragraphs are explained at supra notes 200-31 and accompanying text.
445
11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(III).
446
Id. § 524(g)(4)(B)(ii).
442
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ballot in favor of the plan447 displaces element four of the Master Mortgage test,
which provides that the parties impacted by a release must “overwhelmingly
consent” to the plan of reorganization.
Between the original Master Mortgage test and my modified version, there
are three elements left to consider vis-à-vis § 524(g): (1) the third party has an
“identity of interest” with the debtor such that prosecuting the claims otherwise
scheduled for release could impact the estate (the first element of both tests); (2)
the class of creditors impacted by the non-debtor release accepts the plan
pursuant to § 1126(c)448 (the third element of my test); and (3) the plan promises
payment in full to dissenting creditors on any claims extinguished by the release
(the final element of both tests).
The Identity-of-Interest Element. The identity-of-interest requirement
concerns subject matter jurisdiction. If the debtor and the released third party do
not have an identity of interest, any lawsuit against the third party will have no
impact on the estate, placing the underlying claim beyond the jurisdiction of the
bankruptcy court. Subject matter jurisdiction is an absolute prerequisite to any
judicial order.449 A bankruptcy court may thus not enjoin a claim outside its
jurisdiction. Accordingly, the identity-of-interest element still applies to asbestos
non-debtor releases even when they are granted pursuant to § 524(g).450 Yet very

447

Id. § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(IV)(bb).
Id. § 1126(c).
449
Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 701 (1982)
(“The validity of an order of a federal court depends upon that court‟s having jurisdiction over both
the subject matter and the parties.”); Comm. v. Dennis Reimer Co., L.P.A., 150 F.R.D. 495, 498
(D. Vt. 1993) (observing that subject matter jurisdiction “is a statutory and constitutional
prerequisite to a court‟s ability to entertain a legal action”).
450
See In re The Babcock & Wilcox Co., No. 00-10992, 2004 WL 4945985, at *24 (Bankr. E.D.
La. Nov. 9, 2004) (assessing the identity-of-interest element with respect to a non-debtor release
issued under both § 524(g) and § 105(a)), vac. on other grounds, No. Civ.A. 05-232, 2005 WL
4982364 (E.D. La. 2005); see also In re Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 348 B.R. 136, 156 (D. Del.
2006) (in one sentence, finding that the court had subject matter jurisdiction to issue the § 524(g)
channeling injunction).
Another jurisdictional issue deserves note. While the language of § 524(g) suggests that
a supplemental injunction becomes valid either upon issuance or affirmance by the district court,
11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(3)(A) (2006), when the injunction protects third parties, the jurisdictional
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code will often require more than traditional appellate review by the
district court. To the extent bankruptcy courts possess subject matter jurisdiction over actions
between non-debtors, they do so pursuant to their “related to” jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b)
(2006) (providing that federal district courts have jurisdiction “of all civil proceedings arising under
title 11, or arising in or related to cases under title 11” (emphasis added)); 28 U.S.C. § 157(a)
(permitting “any or all” bankruptcy matters to be referred to bankruptcy courts); Celotex Corp. v.
Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 308 n. 5 (1995) (“Proceedings „related to‟ the bankruptcy include . . . suits
between third parties which have an effect on the bankruptcy estate.”). However, absent consent of
the parties, 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2), bankruptcy courts may not issue final judgments in related
proceedings, id. at § 157(c)(1). Rather, “[i]n such proceeding[s] the bankruptcy judge shall submit
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court, and any final order or
judgment shall be entered by the district judge after considering the bankruptcy judge‟s proposed
448
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few courts have addressed this requirement.451 This is particularly problematic
given a court‟s independent duty to assess whether it has subject matter
jurisdiction.452
The § 1126 Creditor Consent Element. Acceptance of the plan under §
1126(c) by the class of creditors impacted by a third-party release was included
in my Modified Master Mortgage test because it is clear that a non-debtor release
granted pursuant to § 105(a) or § 1123(b)(6) can not survive cramdown. The
same is true with respect to § 524(g) releases.
findings and conclusions and after reviewing de novo those matters to which any party has timely
and specifically objected.” Id. A non-debtor release is effectively a final judgment. In re Digital
Impact, Inc., 223 B.R. 1, 12 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1998) (holding that a non-debtor release “is
equivalent to issuing a final adjudication of the merits” of the released claims); Brubaker, supra
note 173, at 1070 (“A non-debtor release is not a mere status quo injunction; a non-debtor release
effectively adjudicates the released non-debtor action. The release operates as an adjudication on
the merits, fully binding for res judicata/preclusion purposes.”). Accordingly, any such release
granted by the bankruptcy court—including a supplemental injunction issued under 11 U.S.C. §
524(g)—is subject to de novo review by the district court if a party impacted by the release objects
on appeal. See Brubaker, supra note 173, at 1070 (“The non-debtor actions that are „adjudicated‟
through non-debtor releases are, at best, non-core, „related to‟ actions, beyond the power of a
bankruptcy judge to determine by final order without consent of the litigants.”). But see In re
Celotex Corp., 204 B.R. 586, 608 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1996) (concluding that confirmation of plan
with supplemental injunction barring claims against third parties is a core proceeding).
Alternatively, to avoid the waste of judicial resources resulting from duplicative
assessment of a channeling injunction, the district court can withdraw the reference under 28
U.S.C. § 157(d) and grant the release itself, in the first instance, as contemplated by § 524(g)(3)(A).
See Brubaker, supra note 173, at 1070 n.432 (“Limitations on a bankruptcy court‟s core jurisdiction
are not implicated where the district court enters the final order approving non-debtor release and
injunction provisions.”); e.g., In re Burns & Roe Enter., Inc., No. 08-4191 (GEB), 2008 WL
4280099, at *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 15, 2008) (withdrawing the reference for the confirmation hearing “in
the interest of judicial economy” so that the district court judge, sitting jointly with the bankruptcy
judge, could consider the debtor‟s proposed § 524(g) channeling injunction).
451
See, e.g., In re Porter Hayden Co., No. 02-54152-SD, 2006 WL 4667137 (Bankr. D. Md. Jun.
30, 2006), aff‟d, No. 06-201, 2006 WL 4672671 (D. Md. Jul. 7, 2006) (neither opinion discusses
the identity-of-interest requirement); In re Kaiser Aluminum Corp., No. 02-10429(JKF), 7312,
2006 WL 616243, at *13-*18 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 6, 2006) (addressing the identity-of-interest
requirement with respect to a § 105(a) non-debtor release, but not with respect to the § 524(g)
channeling injunction), aff‟d, 343 B.R. 88 (D. Del. 2006); In re J T Thorpe Co., 308 B.R. 782
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2003), order entered by, No. 02-41487-H5-11, 2003 WL 23573844 (Bankr. S.D.
Tex. Jan. 17, 2003), aff‟d, No. 02-41487-H5-11, 2004 WL 720263 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2004). There
are also courts that applied the identity-of-interest requirement but apparently thought it was not a
prerequisite to jurisdiction, just one possible jurisdictional ground. See In re U.S. Mineral Prods.
Co., No. 01-2471 (JKF), 2005 WL 5898300, at *14 (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 29, 2005) (finding that
each beneficiary of the releases and injunctions “shares an identity of interest with the Debtor . . . ,
or was instrumental to the successful prosecution and conclusion of the Chapter 11 Case, provided
necessary funding to the Debtor, and/or has contributed substantial assets or other benefits to the
Debtor‟s reorganization” (emphasis added)); In re ABB Lummus Global, Inc., No. 06-10401-JKF,
2006 WL 2052409, at *20 (Bankr. D. Del. Jun. 29, 2006) (same).
452
Royal Ins. Co. of Am. v. Caleb V. Smith & Sons, Inc., 929 F. Supp. 606, 606 (D. Conn. 1996)
(“A federal district court has a duty to independently determine whether it has jurisdiction to
consider a case before it.”) (citing Ins. Corp. of Ireland, 456 U.S. at 720).
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As noted previously, the general requirements for confirmation apply to any
Chapter 11 plan that contains a § 524(g) channeling injunction.453 Thus, in
asbestos cases involving § 524(g), as in other bankruptcies, it is necessary to
satisfy the requirement that either (1) every impaired class consent under §
1126(c), or (2) the plan be confirmable via a cramdown over the objection of any
impaired, dissenting class.454 There is no reason to believe that a § 524(g) nondebtor release is more amenable to cramdown than a § 105(a) release. Indeed,
the Third Circuit has ruled that no § 524(g) channeling injunction may be
crammed down, whether it protects third parties or not.455 Therefore, as with
non-asbestos third-party releases, the class of asbestos claimants impacted by any
§ 524(g) release must accept the plan under § 1126(c).456
Section 1126(c) is satisfied when, among voting members of the class, at
least two-thirds in dollar amount and more than one-half in number approve of
the plan.457 The second part of this standard is substantially mooted by the
requirement in § 524(g) that at least seventy-five percent of voting asbestos
claimants approve of the plan.458 But the first part of § 1126(c) is a distinct
requirement that must still be satisfied. A plan is thus unconfirmable unless at

453

See supra notes 367-69 and accompanying text.
See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(a)(8)(A), 1129(b)(1); see also 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1124.01, at
1124-3 (15th ed. rev. 2003) (“A class of claims is impaired under § 1124 if the plan alters the legal,
equitable or contractual rights to which holders of such claims are otherwise entitled.”); id. ¶
1124.02, at 1124-5 (“Any alternation of these rights constitutes impairment, even if the value of the
rights is enhanced.” (emphasis added)) (collecting authorities).
455
See Century Indem. Co. v. Congoleum Corp. (In re Congoleum Corp.), 426 F.3d 675, 680 n.4
(3d Cir. 2005) (“Pre-packaged bankruptcies employing a [§ 524(g)] channeling injunction are not
eligible for the „cram down‟ provision contained in 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) which allows the
bankruptcy court to confirm a plan of reorganization over creditors‟ objections in certain
circumstances.”).
456
In addition, when a supplemental injunction extinguishes claims against third parties, there is a
compelling argument that asbestos claimants with rights against both the debtor and the released
third parties must be placed in a distinct class (or subclass). Including them in a class with tort
claimants who possess rights against only the debtor is inconsistent with the classification and
treatment principles set forth in 11 U.S.C. §§ 1122(a), 1123(a)(4). See Brubaker, supra note 173, at
983 (making this point in the context of non-asbestos third-party releases); see also id. at 976-77
n.61 (arguing that subclassification of future claims, separating those with rights against the debtor
and third parties from those with rights against only the debtor, is necessary under §
524(g)(2)(b)(ii)(bb) to avoid “irreconcilable conflicts” of interest); id. at 981-86 (arguing that nonasbestos third-party releases frequently corrupt the integrity of class formation and treatment
because courts do not take the extinguished non-debtor claims into account in analyzing whether
the plan of reorganization satisfies §§ 1122(a) and 1123(a)(4)). Such separate classification is
consistent with the language of § 524(g) which mandates that “a separate class or classes of
[asbestos] claimants . . . [be] established.” 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(b)(ii)(BB) (emphasis added). But
cf. In re Congoleum Corp., 362 B.R. 167, 182 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2007) (placing the asbestos claimants
in four distinct classes rendered “the Plan unconfirmable on its face”). Thus, the class that must
consent under § 1126(c) to any § 524(g) non-debtor release is the distinct class of asbestos
claimants with rights extinguished by the release.
457
11 U.S.C. § 1126(c).
458
11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(IV)(bb).
454
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least two-thirds in value of the voting asbestos claimants impacted by any thirdparty release vote in favor of the plan.459 In theory, this should prevent the votes
of large numbers of parties with smaller tort claims from overwhelming the votes
of those with more serious personal injuries.460 However, some commentators
have observed that it does not always work out this way in practice.461
The Payment-in-Full Element. The requirement that the reorganization plan
promise all dissenting creditors payment in full on any claims extinguished by a
§ 105(a) or § 1123(b)(6) non-debtor release was included in my Modified Master

459

An excellent is example is the Quigley bankruptcy. See In re Quigley Co., 346 B.R. 647, 65359 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006) (holding that the class of personal injury asbestos claimants did not
accept the plan; eighty-five percent in number of those voting did so in favor of the plan, well more
than the fifty-percent requirement of § 1126(c) and the seventy-five percent requirement of §
524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(IV)(bb); but only either sixty-five percent or fifty-two percent in dollar amount
(the court used two different measures) of those voting did so in favor of the plan, both of which
were less than the two-thirds requirement of § 1126(c)); In re Quigley Co., 377 B.R. 110, 114-15
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007) (explaining that the debtor‟s plan could not be confirmed because the
asbestos claimants failed to accept the plan under § 1126(c), as outlined in the previous
parenthentical); see also In re Kaiser Aluminum Corp., No. 02-10429(JKF), 7312, 2006 WL
616243, at *2, *10, *15 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 6, 2006) (separately addressing the requirement of §
1129(a)(8), which incorporates § 1126(c), and § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(IV)(bb)), aff‟d, 343 B.R. 88 (D.
Del. 2006); In re J T Thorpe Co., 308 B.R. 782, 785, 787-89 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2003) (separately
addressing the requirements of §§ 1126(c) and § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(IV)(bb)), order entered by, No.
02-41487-H5-11, 2003 WL 23573844 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Jan. 17, 2003), aff‟d, No. 02-41487-H511, 2004 WL 720263 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2004); Plevin et al., Future Claims Representative, supra
note 32, at 285 n.72 (noting that the seventy-five percent requirement is “in addition to” the twothirds mandate of § 1126(c)).
460
See the discussion of the Quigley bankruptcy supra note 459. See also Brown, supra note 32, at
859-60 (“[G]iven the wide disparity among the potential values of asbestos claims, it is possible
that a large block of low-value claimants will vote in favor of a plan (thereby satisfying the supermajority “number of claimants” requirement of Section 524(g)) while a much smaller number of
high-value claimants will vote against the plan (thereby preventing the plan from satisfying the
two-thirds “value of claims” requirement of Section 1126(c)).”).
461
See Mark D. Taylor, As the Wave of Asbestos Bankruptcies Recedes: What Have We Learned?,
6-12 MEALEY‟S ASB. BANKR. REP. 22, 1 (2007) (discussing how large number of unimpaired claims
controlled the vote in many asbestos bankruptcies); Plevin et al., Future Claims Representative,
supra note 32, at 285 n.73 (explaining that, because courts generally weight all asbestos claims at
one dollar per claim for voting purposes, the large numbers of unimpaired claimants “can veto any
plan that they . . . believe will not adequately provide for their interests,” to the detriment of the
smaller numbers of impaired claimants). Former Bankruptcy Judge Barliant and his co-authors
have identified additional, related problems with the voting process in asbestos bankruptcies. In
some reorganizations, tort plaintiffs who settled with the debtor pre-petition are permitted to vote
on the plan. This enables the plan proponents to essentially buy some of the votes necessary to
reach the seventy-five percent threshold of § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(IV)(bb). Barliant, supra note 32, at
462-64; see, e.g., In re Quigley Co., 377 B.R. at 113. In other cases, claims arising after a specified
cut-off date, but prior to the filing of the Chapter 11 petition, have been denied the right to vote on
the plan. Barliant, supra note 32, at 458-62.
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Mortgage test because of the best interests of creditors test.462 Pursuant to the
best interests test, which is contained in § 1129(a)(7), a Chapter 11
reorganization plan is confirmable only if it provides each dissenting, impaired
creditor at least as much as the claimant would be paid if the debtor liquidated
under Chapter 7.463 Third-party releases are impermissible in Chapter 7 cases.464

462

See Silverstein, supra note 6, at 76-77. The pro-release courts have never articulated their basis
for adding this element to the original Master Mortgage test.
463
11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(A) (2006); 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1129.03[7], at 1129-45 (15th
ed. rev. 2004) (explaining that the test “is an individual guaranty to each creditor or interest holder
that it will receive at least as much in reorganization as it would in liquidation”). Unlike the cramdown provisions in § 1129(b), which protect classes of creditors, see In re Sentry Operating Co.,
264 B.R. 850, 865 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2001), the best interests test protects individual creditors (and
individual holders of equity interests), see In re Cajun Elec. Power Coop., Inc., 230 B.R. 715, 741
(Bankr. M.D. La. 1999) (the best interests test “is designed to protect those individual creditors
who voted against a particular plan, but who, nonetheless, are being bound to such plan.”); 7
COLLIER ¶ 1129.03[7][b], at 1129-46 (“Section 1129(a)(7) operates on an individual creditor or
interest holder level.”). This means that each creditor (and each holder of an equity interest) has “a
limited veto power over the terms of a chapter 11 plan.” CHARLES J. TABB & RALPH BRUBAKER,
BANKRUPTCY LAW: PRINCIPLES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICE 775 (2d ed. 2006) [hereinafter TABB];
accord 7 COLLIER ¶ 1129.03[7][b], at 1129-46 (The best interests test “renders irrelevant class votes
if but one [dissenting] member of that class would get less than their liquidation preference under
the plan.”).
The best interests test reflects one of the foundational precepts of Chapter 11: The
debtor‟s various constituencies are free to negotiate and formulate a plan of reorganization via the
structures of Chapter 11; however, the final product of this process may not deprive any objecting
creditor or interest-holder of its direct financial stake in the debtor—i.e., its rights upon liquidation
of the debtor—without that person‟s consent. See TABB, supra, at 775. Put another way, “the Code
assumes that any value over and above liquidation value is subject to negotiation and debate, and
its allocation subject to group vote rather than individual demand.” 7 COLLIER ¶ 1129.03[7][b], at
1129-45 to 1129-46. But each creditor‟s entitlement to liquidation value is “inviolable.” Brubaker,
supra note 173, at 992. See generally 7 COLLIER ¶ 1129.03[7] (providing an extensive overview of
the best interests test); Natalic Regoli, Confirmation of Chapter 11 Bankruptcy: A Practical Guide
to the Best Interest of Creditors Test, 41 TEX. J. BUS. LAW 7 (2005) (same); FERRIEL & JANGER,
supra note 174, at 764-67 (providing a brief overview of the best interests test).
In deciding whether the best interests of creditors test is satisfied in a given case, the
court must “conjure up a hypothetical chapter 7 liquidation that would be conducted on the
effective date of the plan. The court then makes an independent finding, based on the evidence and
arguments presented, whether creditors will receive as much under the plan as they would in the
hypothetical Chapter 7 liquidation.” In re Affiliated Foods, Inc., 249 B.R. 770, 787 (Bankr. W.D.
Mo. 2000) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); accord In re Sierra-Cal, 210 B.R. 168,
172 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1997). In assessing what would occur in the hypothetical liquidation, “it is
generally agreed that all provisions applicable in a chapter 7 liquidation are to be taken into
account.” In re Sierra-Cal, 210 B.R. at 174. Thus, the bankruptcy court must, inter alia, apply the
Chapter 7 distribution scheme, id. at 172, as set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 726(a) (2006) (stating the order
of priority in a Chapter 7 case). And the court must take “into account such matters as
subordinations (11 U.S.C. § 510) and recoveries from general partners (11 U.S.C. § 723) that
would be applied in a chapter 7 liquidation.” In re Sierra-Cal, 210 B.R. at 172; accord H.R. REP.
No. 95-595, at 412-13 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6368-69; see, e.g., In re
Sierra-Cal, 210 B.R. at 174 (holding that the disallowance of claims under 11 U.S.C. § 502(d)
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A creditor may thus recover any deficiency from a solvent co-obligor if the
debtor‟s Chapter 7 distribution does not completely satisfy the creditor‟s claim.465
Therefore, because the dissenting creditor would receive payment in full on its
claim in a Chapter 7 liquidation from either the debtor, the co-obligor, or a
“must be taken into account in the [best interests] test‟s hypothetical liquidation”). See generally 7
COLLIER ¶ 1129.03[7][c], at 1129-50 to 1129-55 (addressing various issues that arise in applying
the best interests test as a result of the Chapter 7 distribution scheme and related provisions of
Chapters 5 and 7 of the Code).
As part of the best interests analysis, the court typically reviews a “liquidation analysis”
that summarizes how much creditors would receive if the debtor liquidated under Chapter 7, and
compares the analysis to the payments contemplated by the debtor‟s Chapter 11 plan. See, e.g.,
Kane v. Johns-Manville (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 843 F.2d 636, 643 (1988) (explaining that at
the confirmation hearing “Manville presented an extensive liquidation analysis based on
documentary evidence and expert testimony,” and that the bankruptcy judge “found that Class-4
present asbestos health claimants would receive 100% on their claims under the plan but would
receive only 56%-81% in a liquidation”). Many authorities indicate that the plan proponents must
present a liquidation analysis. See, e.g., In re Adelphia Commc‟ns, Corp., 361 B.R. 337, 366
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“In order to show that a payment under a plan is equal to the value that the
creditor would receive if the debtor were liquidated, there must be a liquidation analysis of some
type[.]”) (internal quotation marks omitted); 7 COLLIER ¶ 1129.03[7][b][iii], at 1129-47 (concluding
that § 1129(a)(7)‟s statutory language “essentially requires every plan proponent to perform a
liquidation analysis of the estate”); see also Regoli, supra, at 24 n.58 (collecting authorities holding
that a liquidation analysis is mandatory). Others indicate, however, that the court may dispense
with a liquidation analysis in some circumstances. See, e.g., In re AG Consultants Grain Div., Inc.,
77 B.R. 665, 670 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1987) (holding that no liquidation analysis was necessary
where it was “patently obvious” from the petition schedules and financial statements that unsecured
creditors would receive less in a liquidation than under the debtor‟s plan); see also Regoli, supra, at
24 n.58 (collecting authorities finding that a liquidation analysis was unnecessary). When a
liquidation analysis is conducted, it has to be “based on evidence and not mere assumptions or
assertions,” In re Adelphia Commc‟ns, Corp., 361 B.R. at 366, but it need not establish with high
levels of certainty the value creditors would receive if the debtor proceeded with a Chapter 7
bankruptcy, id. at 366-67 (“However, the valuation of a hypothetical chapter 7 liquidation is, by
nature, inherently speculative and is often replete with assumptions and judgments.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)); In re Affiliated Foods, Inc., 249 B.R. at 788 (“The valuation of a
hypothetical Chapter 7 for purposes of § 1129(a)(7) is not an exact science. The hypothetical
liquidation entails a considerable degree of speculation about a situation that will not occur unless
the case is actually converted to chapter 7.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). For a summary of
liquidation analyses, see 7 COLLIER ¶ 1129.03[7][b][iii], at 1129-47 to 1129-49; for a
comprehensive overview, see Regoli, supra, at 23-39.
464
Silverstein, supra note 6, at 73-74, 76 n.350 (collecting judicial and secondary authorities). But
cf. id. at 74 n.338 (collecting judicial authorities granting releases in Chapter 11 liquidations).
465
Id. at 76 & n.350; accord Brubaker, supra note 173, at 992 (“In a Chapter 7 liquidation
proceeding, creditors retain their rights to pursue non-debtors for full payment, because there is no
reorganization to protect by providing non-debtor releases.”); see also Hydee R. Feldstein,
Reinterpreting Bankruptcy Code § 524(e): The Validity of Third-Party Releases in a Plan, 22 CAL.
BANKR. J. 25, 43 (1994) (“Where a creditor holds, or creditors generally hold, claims against a
nondebtor, § 524(e) . . . would preserve those claims and they would survive a chapter 7 discharge
of the debtor pursuant to § 524(a).”).
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combination of the two, the debtor‟s Chapter 11 plan must promise full payment
to the dissenting creditor if the plan releases the co-liable third party.466
This reasoning is equally applicable to non-debtor releases granted under §
524(g). That statute only permits the issuance of a supplemental injunction “in
connection with” an order “confirming a plan of reorganization under [C]hapter
11.”467 Section 524(g) channeling injunctions, protecting third parties or
otherwise, are prohibited in Chapter 7 bankruptcies. Accordingly, as with other
types of debtors, when an asbestos debtor liquidates through Chapter 7, its tort
claimants are entitled to payment of any deficiency from solvent co-obligors.
And thus, once again, because any dissenting asbestos claimant would receive
full payment on its claim in a Chapter 7 proceeding from the debtor, the coobligor, or a mix of each, the debtor‟s Chapter 11 plan must promise payment in
full to the dissenting asbestos claimant if the plan releases the co-obligor.468

466

Silverstein, supra note 6, at 77 & n.351; accord Brubaker, supra note 173, at 991-94 (arguing
that non-debtor releases violate the best interests of creditors test); id. at 992 (“[G]iving at least
liquidation value to each creditor requires protection of the Chapter 7 right to pursue non-debtor
actions.”); Kenneth M. Lewis, When are Nondebtors Really Entitled to a Discharge: Setting the
Record Straight on Johns-Manville and A.H. Robins, 3 J. BANKR. LAW AND PRAC. 163, 174-75
(1994) (arguing that a plan containing a non-debtor release does not satisfy the best interests test if
co-obligors have sufficient assets to satisfy any deficiencies on the discharged claims); see also
Feldstein, supra note 465, at 43 (“Accordingly, if the claims released . . . have any real value, then
the best interest test requires realization of that value for the plan to be confirmed.”); cf. Class Five
Nev. Claimants v. Dow Corning Corp. (In re Dow Corning Corp.), 280 F.3d 648, 658 (6th Cir.
2002) (holding that non-debtor releases are permissible only when all dissenting creditors whose
claims are extinguished by the release are paid in full under the debtor‟s plan); In re Boyer, 90 B.R.
200, 201 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1988) (“Because unsecured creditors would receive full payment if this
were a chapter 7 case, they are entitled to full payment and interest if full payment in the chapter 11
case is not made as of the effective date of the plan.”). As previously discussed, the same analysis
applies to the release of independent claims against a third party. See supra note 223 and
accompanying text. But this analysis is not pertinent to § 524(g) because, as explained supra at
notes 401-07 and accompanying text, § 524(g) may not be used to extinguish independent claims
against non-debtors. The statute my only be used to extinguish third-party claims when the third
party and the debtor are co-obligors of some type.
467
11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(1)(A) (2006) (emphasis added).
468
A crucial assumption of this argument, in either the non-asbestos or the asbestos context, is that,
under the best interests test, it is mandatory to consider what a creditor would receive from both the
debtor and the co-obligor if the debtor liquidated through Chapter 7. Professor Brubaker, the first
commentator to fully develop how the best interests standard impacts non-debtor releases briefly
addressed this point. See Brubaker, supra note 173, at 991-994. He argued that the language of §
1129(a)(7)(A)(ii) is not restricted to claims against the debtor: “It requires a comparison of what a
holder would receive under the plan on account of an abstract „claim‟ with the amount the holder
would receive if the debtor were liquidated under Chapter 7.” Brubaker, supra note 173, at 992
n.118. Thus, he concluded, “the best interests equation also properly mandates consideration of
creditors‟ comparative recoveries on non-debtor claims, to the extent the plan is treating those nondebtor claims by release.” Id. at 992. Obviously, I concur with Professor Brubaker‟s analysis.
And there is general language in the case law that supports our understanding of the best interests
test. See, e.g., In re Zaruba, 384 B.R. 254, 262 (Bankr. D. Alaska 2008) (“The best interests of
creditors test requires that the debtor demonstrate that creditors will fare at least as well in Chapter
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11 as they would in Chapter 7.” (emphasis added)). However, there is also general language to the
contrary. See, e.g., In re Smith, 357 B.R. 60, 67 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2006) (“Under section
1129(a)(7), absent consent, each creditor or interest holder in an impaired class must receive (i)
property (ii) that has a present value equal to (iii) that participant's hypothetical chapter 7
distribution (iv) if the debtor were liquidated instead of reorganized on the effective date of the
plan.” (emphasis added)); In re Lisanti Foods, Inc., 329 B.R. 491, 500 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2005) (“In
making such a showing, the liquidation value of the debtor‟s assets is controlling.” (emphasis
added)); see also 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1129.03[7], at 1129-46 (15th ed. rev. 2004) (“This
means that, absent consent, a creditor . . . must receive property that has a present value equal to
that participants hypothetical chapter 7 distribution if the debtor were liquidated instead of
reorganized on the plan‟s effective date.” (emphasis added)). None of the authorities containing
these broad statements considered the application of the best interests test when the plan of
reorganization contains a non-debtor release, and so their pertinence is questionable. Moreover, the
only cases to address the relationship of the best interests test to non-debtor releases have implicitly
sided with Professor Brubaker and me. See Mercury Capital Corp. v. Milford Conn. Assocs., 354
B.R. 1, 9 (D. Conn. 2006) (reversing confirmation of debtor‟s Chapter 11 plan and remanding with
instructions to the bankruptcy court to consider whether the plan satisfied the best interest test; the
district court‟s concern was that the plan released a creditor‟s claim against non-debtor guarantors,
and thus the creditor “may be significantly less secured under the debtor‟s plan than under a
Chapter 7 liquidation”); In re Conseco, Inc., 301 B.R. 525, 527-28 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2003)
(explaining that the debtor‟s prior plan of reorganization was not confirmable because it violated
the best interests test by providing that creditors who were entitled to a Chapter 7 liquidation
distribution had to release non-debtors in order to receive any payment under the Chapter 11 plan).
Both Mercury Capital Corp. and In re Conseco, Inc., support the proposition that, when a plan
contains a third-party release, the best interest analysis must take account of distributions the
releasing creditors would receive in Chapter 7 from the debtor and the protected third parties. See
also In re Boston Harbor Marina Co., 157 B.R. 726, 732 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1993) (“Indeed, because
a chapter 7 trustee of [a] partnership may proceed against the partners individually, 11 U.S.C. § 723
(1988), the best-interest-of-creditors test . . . requires the court to find that creditors will receive at
least as much from the partners‟ contributions to the [partnership‟s] plan as they would from the
assertion of a chapter 7 trustee‟s rights against the partners,” if the plan releases the partners.) (For
reasons set forth later in this footnote, Boston Harbor is only indirect support for my position.).
Professor Brubaker does acknowledge in his article that many of the earlier pro-release
authorities ignored “the creditors‟ Chapter 7 right to seek full satisfaction from non-debtors in
gauging satisfaction of the best interests test—comparing a creditor‟s Chapter 11 distribution with a
hypothetical Chapter 7 distribution, from the debtor only.” Brubaker, supra note 173, at 992; see
also id. at 994 n.124 (offering as an example In re A.H. Robins Co., 88 B.R. 742, 748 (E.D. Va.
1988), aff‟d, 880 F.2d 694 (4th Cir. 1989)); TABB, supra note 463, at 776 (“In determining what the
creditors and interest holders would receive in a chapter 7 liquidation, the courts generally limit
their inquiry to what those parties would receive in the bankruptcy case itself. In other words, a
court does not ask whether the creditor or interest holder would be better off overall if the debtors
were to liquidate, but only compares the bankruptcy distributions in chapter 7 versus chapter 11.”).
But, by generally adopting the Sixth Circuit‟s addition to the Master Mortgage test—the
requirement that all dissenting creditors impacted by a non-debtor release receive payment in full
on the released claims—the pro-release authorities now implicitly accept the position held by
Professor Brubaker and myself: When a plan contains a third-party release, the best interests test
requires considering what the creditor would receive from the released party in the Chapter 7 case.
I must point out one decision that, while not addressing non-debtor releases, contradicts
my position more directly than the authorities discussed in the first paragraph of this footnote. In In
re Dow Corning Corp., 237 B.R. 380, 411 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1999), the court stated that, when

80

UMKC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78:1

applying the best interests test, the judge must consider what “the creditor would receive from the
chapter 7 trustee—and only that amount—for comparison with the dividend available under the
plan.” Id. at 411 (emphasis added). The Dow bankruptcy court justified this assertion by pointing
to case law construing the Chapter 13 best interest of creditors test, id., which is substantially
similar to Chapter 11‟s, compare 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (2006), with id. § 1129(a)(7). The court
explained that judicial authorities interpreting the Chapter 13 test “uniformly hold that amounts
obtainable from other sources, such as guarantors, are irrelevant when performing that section‟s
best-interest-of-creditors test.” In re Dow Corning Corp., 237 B.R. at 411 (emphasis added).
The Chapter 13 case law is not nearly as broad as the Dow court suggested. None of the
authorities it cited involved guarantors or other non-debtors. All of the decisions concerned the
impact of nondischargeable claims against the debtor on the application of the Chapter 13 best
interests test. Each of the dissenting creditors in these actions essentially argued that, because their
claims were nondischargeable in a Chapter 7 proceeding, they could pursue collection against the
debtor post-liquidation for any deficiency; thus, since they would ultimately receive full payment if
the debtor went through Chapter 7, the best interest test mandated that the debtor‟s Chapter 13 plan
pay them in full. See Ravenot v. Rimgale (In re Rimgale), 669 F.2d 426, 430-31 (7th Cir. 1982); In
re Syrus, 12 B.R. 605, 607 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1981); In re Hurd, 4 B.R. 551, 553 (Bankr. W.D. Mich.
1980). The contention was rejected in all of these opinions. In Rimgale, the Seventh Circuit
explained that, if the argument were valid, Chapter 13‟s more generous discharge provisions would
be nullified. In re Rimgale, 669 F.2d at 431; accord In re Hurd, 4 B.R. at 553 (explaining that,
under the argument, the Chapter 13 discharge statute “would be . . . meaningless”). (A Chapter 13
discharge is broader than a Chapter 7 discharge. 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1328.02[2], at 13289 (15th ed. rev. 2005); compare 11 U.S.C. § 1328 (2006) with id. § 727.) The Syrus court relied
upon the language of the Chapter 13 statute containing the best interest test, 12 B.R. at 607, which
directs the court to compare a claim‟s plan distribution to “the amount that would be paid on such
claim if the estate of the debtor liquidated under chapter 7,” 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4)) (emphasis
added). The court explained that most authorities construe the italicized language to refer to “the
amount that would actually be distributed out of the assets that were in the estate.” In re Syrus, 12
B.R. at 607; see also In re Hurd, 4 B.R. at 553 (“Section 1325(a)(4) speaks only to recovery from
assets of the debtor‟s estate.”). Finally, “nondischargeability does not insure 100% payment . . . [,]
only the right to pursue collection of the debt.” In re Syrus, 12 B.R. at 607; see also 8 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1325.05[2][d] (15th ed. rev. 2008) (“Many such claims are never paid despite the
lack of a discharge because debtors remain unable to satisfy them after bankruptcy.”).
Even if the Chapter 13 case law relied upon by the Dow bankruptcy court is correct (and
there is authority to the contrary, though it is a decided minority), the relationship of
nondischargeability to the Chapter 13 best interest test has little bearing here. First, as the Dow
court concedes, see In re Dow Corning Corp., 237 B.R. at 411, the language of the Chapter 11 best
interest test is different from Chapter 13‟s. It does not refer to “the amount that would be paid . . .
under chapter 7,” 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(b) (emphasis added), but rather to “the amount that such
holder [of a claim or interest] would receive or retain if the debtor were liquidated,” id. §
1129(a)(7) (emphasis added). This is a small, but crucial difference. In a Chapter 7 case, a creditor
would “retain” its right to sue co-liable non-debtors for any shortage. Thus, the Chapter 11 best
interest test mandates recognition of that right in a plan of reorganization containing a third-party
release of the creditor‟s claim.
Second, as the Rimgale court explained, § 1328 (the Chapter 13 discharge statute) would
be nullified if, when performing the Chapter 13 best interests analysis, judges had to consider what
a creditor would recover from the debtor post-liquidation on a nondischargeable claim. In re
Rimgale, 669 F.2d at 431. However, no such problem is created if, while conducting the Chapter
11 best interests analysis, the judge considers what a creditor would obtain from a non-debtor
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Few Chapter 11 plans in asbestos cases have complied with the payment-infull requirement dictated by the best interests test. Rather, in numerous asbestos
bankruptcies, the court approved a § 524(g) non-debtor release without
mandating that the plan promise complete satisfaction of the extinguished claims.
Virtually all § 524(g) litigation trusts operate under a “fixed percentage payout.”469 Under such an arrangement, asbestos claimants only receive a
percentage of the full liquidated value of their tort claims. 470 The precise fraction
is typically set in the reorganization plan, but “is subject to change over time
outside a hypothetical Chapter 7 bankruptcy. No piece of Chapter 11 would be rendered
meaningless by following such a procedure.
Third, there is a much better analogy to the Chapter 11 best-interests-test/non-debtorrelease relationship than the interconnection of the Chapter 13 best interests test and
nondischargeable claims: Partnership reorganizations. 11 U.S.C. § 723(a) provides that if the estate
of a bankrupt partnership cannot pay all claims in full, the trustee may pursue general partners for
any deficiency to the extent permitted under non-bankruptcy law. This statute has lead the courts
to conclude that the assets that a trustee would recover from non-debtor general partners in a
Chapter 7 liquidation must be considered when conducting a Chapter 11 best interests analysis.
See, e.g., In re Union Meeting Partners, 165 B.R. 553, 575 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1994) (“Because a
bankruptcy court should consider the value of a § 723(a) recovery when calculating the liquidation
value needed for the § 1129(a)(7) comparison, . . . a plan proponent should also provide evidence
of the net worth of a partnership debtor's general partners.”) (citation omitted); see also 7 COLLIER
ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1129.03[7][c][iv] (15th ed. rev. 2004) (“Under chapter 7 practice, the trustee of
a debtor has recourse to the personal assets of the partners of the debtor in order to satisfy
partnership debts. Thus, if the chapter 11 debtor is a partnership, the liquidation analysis will also
have to estimate the probable collections from general partners of assets which could be paid to
creditors.”); FED. R. BANKR. P. 1007(g) (“The court may order any general partner to file a
statement of personal assets and liabilities within such time as the court may fix.”). Considering
what the trustee would recover from non-debtor general partners is quite similar to considering
what creditors would recover from third parties that are co-liable with the debtor. Moreover, if the
partners of a debtor-partnership are solvent, the Chapter 11 plan must provide creditors with
payment in full. See In re Grandfather Mountain Ltd. P‟ship, 207 B.R. 475, 484 (Bankr. M.D.N.C.
1996) (explaining that, in light of § 723(a), the best interests test mandated that two unsecured
creditors receive payment in full under the partnership-debtor‟s Chapter 11 plan of reorganization
because it was “undisupted” that the general partners were solvent); MARK S. SCARBERRY ET AL.,
BUSINESS REORGANIZATION IN BANKRUPTCY: CASES AND MATERIALS 814 (3d ed. 2006) (because
the Chapter 7 trustee of a debtor-partnership with solvent partners may recover sufficient funds
from the partners to pay creditors in full under 11 U.S.C. § 723(a) (2006), the best interests test
mandates that any such partnership pay creditors in full if it is reorganizing under Chapter 11)
(collecting authorities). This supports the proposition that, when a plan releases solvent nondebtors, full payment on the released claims is necessary.
In sum, the crucial assumption of my argument—that the best interests test mandates
considering what a creditor would receive from both the debtor and the non debtor if a Chapter 11
plan releases claims against the non-debtor—is firmly supported. The Dow bankruptcy court is
probably correct that non-bankruptcy collections from third parties are usually irrelevant in
performing the best-interests analysis. But the story changes completely when a plan of
reorganization releases claims against such third parties.
469
Francis E. McGovern, The Evolution of Asbestos Bankruptcy Trust Distribution Plans, 62
N.Y.U. ANN. S URV. AM . L. 163, 174 (2006).
470
Id.
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under specified circumstances.”471 By design, these types of plans do not
promise payment in full.472 Yet neither courts nor litigants press best-interests
objections against such plans.
Part of the problem may be that it is common for virtually all asbestos
claimants to vote in favor of the plan.473 Consenting claimants do not receive the
protection of the best interests test. But in many asbestos insolvencies, even the
dissenting claimants do not object to confirmation (on any ground at all, let alone
under the best interests test).474 There are many possible explanations for why

471

Id. at 175.
See, e.g., Joint Plan of Reorganization as of September 25, 2005, as Amended Through January
17, 2006, at Exhibit B at 2, 11, In re The Babcock & Wilcox Co., No. 00-10992, 2004 WL
4945985 at *24-*28 (Bankr. E.D. La. Nov. 9, 2004) (indicating that the intention of the plan was to
pay as close to the full liquidated value as possible, but adopting an initial payment percentage of
only thirty-four percent given “the inherent uncertainty” concerning the debtor‟s total asbestos
liabilities); Fifth Amended Plan of Reorganization, at Exhibit 2 at 3, In re United States Mineral
Prod., No. 01-2471 (JKF) (Bankr. D. Del. Sep. 27, 2005) (“Because there is uncertainty in the
prediction of both the number and severity of future claims, and the amount of the trust‟s assets, no
guarantee can be made of any Payment Percentage of a Trust‟s Claim‟s liquidated value.”
(emphasis added)); In re W. Asbestos Co., 313 B.R. 832, 836-37 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2003)
(explaining that the litigation trust “will process and pay the Class 4 claims to the extent possible,”
and that the trust will begin by paying 11.5% of the liquidated value of such asbestos claims); Third
Amended Plan of Reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code for Asbestos Claims
Management Corporation (With Technical Modifications), at Appendix A at 5, No. 02-37124-SAF11 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Apr. 21, 2003) (“The NGC Bodily Injury Trust will only be able to pay
Asbestos Claimants a percentage . . . of the Allowed Liquidated Value . . . of their claims.”); Plan
of Reorganization Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code for J T Thorpe Company, Exhibit A
at 2, In re J T Thorpe Co., No. 02-41487-H5-11 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Oct. 1, 2002) (stating that parties
would only be paid a “percentage of the Liquidated Value of each Asbestos Claim . . . to provide
reasonable assurance than the Successor Trust will be in a financial position to continue to pay
similar Asbestos Claims in substantially the same manner”); see also RAND, supra note 2, at 102
(“These plans establish the amount due a claimant—termed the “full liquidated value” of a claim—
for each type of claim. However, over time, trusts typically pay lower than liquidated value on
current claims in order to preserve funds for paying future claims.”); Plevin et al., Pre-Packaged
Asbestos Bankruptcies, supra note 32, at 912 (noting that asbestos prepacks are often expressly
designed not to pay future claims and certain present claims in full).
473
See, e.g., In re Kaiser Aluminum Corp., No. 02-10429(JKF), 7312, 2006 WL 616243, at *15
(Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 6, 2006) (of the asbestos claimants voting, 99.84% voted in favor of the plan);
In re J T Thorpe Co., 308 B.R. 782, 787-89 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2003) (noting that over ninety-nine
percent of the voting members of each class of asbestos claimants voted in favor of the plan), order
entered by, No. 02-41487-H5-11, 2003 WL 23573844 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Jan. 17, 2003), aff‟d, No.
02-41487-H5-11, 2004 WL 720263 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2004); see also Esserman & Parsons, supra
note 371, at 194 n.33 (“It is common for virtually all claimants voting upon a plan to vote in
favor.”).
474
See Plevin et al., Where Are They Now, supra note 418, at 9 (“In many § 524(g) cases, a debtor's
insurers are the only objecting parties. As a result, if the debtor can persuade the court that the
insurers lack standing, the debtor will be able to proceed with an uncontested confirmation
hearing.”); e.g., In re W. Asbestos Co., 313 B.R. at 836 (noting that “the only parties objecting to
confirmation are four insurance companies”).
472
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virtually no one (if not no one) has objected to § 524(g) third-party releases on
best interests grounds. Perhaps litigants are unaware of their legal rights.475 Or
perhaps my argument is not quite as strong as it appears.
2. Counterarguments Regarding the Payment-In-Full Requirement
Although few bankruptcy courts have addressed the identity-of-interest
element, I suspect subject-matter jurisdiction will often be satisfied with respect
to non-debtor claims appropriately enjoined by a § 524(g) supplemental
injunction.476 In addition, most courts carefully apply § 1126(c) in asbestos
bankruptcies.477 My contention that the best interests test mandates full payment
on any non-debtor claims barred by a § 524(g) channeling injunction is more
controversial.
The Best Interests Test and the Language of § 524(g). The most obvious
response to my best interests argument is that § 524(g) contains language
indicating that partial payment of enjoined asbestos claims is permissible. The
statute provides that a supplemental injunction may enjoin a claim or demand
that, “under a plan of reorganization, is to be paid in whole or in part by” a
qualifying litigation trust.478 Similarly, in setting forth the requirements that need
to be satisfied if the injunction bars future claimants from suing the debtor or
third parties, the act refers to future demands “to be paid in whole or in part by
a” litigation trust.479 Section 524(g) also appears to contemplate less than full
payment for asbestos plaintiffs in its requirement that the trust‟s operating
procedures “provide reasonable assurance that the trust will value, and be in a
financial position to pay, present claims and future demands that involve similar
claims in substantially the same manner.” 480 If payment in full were necessary,

475

This may flow in part from the fact that courts assessing the best interests in asbestos cases
appear to never consider what the tort claimants would receive from the released third parties in the
event the debtor liquidated. See, e.g., In re Porter Hayden Co., No. 02-54152-SD, 2006 WL
4667137, at *2 (Bankr. D. Md. Jun. 30, 2006) (best-interests finding consists of a single sentence
and does not mention the released third parties), aff‟d, No. 06-201, 2006 WL 4672671 (D. Md. Jul.
7, 2006); In re Kaiser Aluminum Corp., 2006 WL 616243, at *10 (same); In re J T Thorpe Co., 308
B.R. at 787 (same). In fairness to these courts, and others, the third parties may have been
discussed in the liquidation analysis, even though they were not mentioned in the opinions.
476
Most enjoinable non-debtor claims falling within the scope of § 524(g) would probably give rise
to the type of indemnity and contribution claims that could “conceivably” impact the estate. See
Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding that bankruptcy courts have
jurisdiction over claims that “could conceivably have any effect on the estate being administered in
bankruptcy”). Since subject-matter jurisdiction is generally beyond the scope of this article, I do
not wish to say more on the topic.
477
See supra note 459 (collecting authorities).
478
11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(1)(B) (2006) (emphasis added).
479
Id. § 524(g)(4)(B) (emphasis added).
480
11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(V) (2006).
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there would be no need to prescribe comparable treatment for present claims and
future demands.481
Clearly, if this response is valid, my argument is defeated. But the response
fails for three reasons. First, a key aspect of § 524(g) is the enhancement of
traditional Code protections. For example, as noted previously, in the standard
Chapter 11 case, a plan may be confirmed if either (1) each class of creditors
“has accepted” the plan,482 or (2) the plan complies with the cramdown
provisions.483 A class “accepts” the plan where at least two-thirds in amount and
more than one-half in number of the voting claimants cast their ballots in favor of
the plan.484 But § 524(g) demands more: A plan with a supplemental injunction
cannot be confirmed under any circumstances unless at least seventy-five percent
of the voting members of each class of asbestos claimants vote for the plan.485
Likewise, in other Chapter 11 reorganizations, the requirement that a plan be
“fair and equitable” with respect to a given class of creditors only applies when
the debtor seeks to confirm the plan via cramdown.486 Section 524(g), however,
mandates that any plan enjoining future claims be “fair and equitable” to the
persons that hold such rights in light of the benefits provided to the litigation trust
by the debtor or any third party protected by the injunction.487 If § 524(g) nondebtor releases are permissible when the extinguished claims are not paid in full,
then the claimants impacted by such a release are entitled to less protection than
creditors whose third-party rights are discharged under § 105(a) or § 1123(b)(6).
This is contrary to § 524(g)‟s focus on augmenting Code requirements.
Second, Congress expressly identified the one provision in the Code that §
524(g) supplemental injunctions need not comply with when non-debtors are
protected by the injunction. According to the statute, third-party releases are
authorized “[n]otwithstanding the provisions of section 524(e).”488 If Congress
had wanted to exempt § 524(g) non-debtor releases from any other Code
requirements, it could easily have listed statutes in addition to § 524(e). It did
not do so. To the contrary, Congress indicated that the rest of the Code governs
supplemental injunctions when it provided that such injunctions are permissible
only “in connection with” an order “confirming a plan of reorganization under
[C]hapter 11.”489 And, of course, pursuant to § 1129(a)(7), reorganization plans
need to satisfy the best interests test. Consistent with § 524(g)‟s straightforward

481

Cf. Findlay v. Falise (In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Lit.), 878 F. Supp. 473, 572 (S.D.N.Y.
1995) (concluding that, because the original Manville plan was supposed to pay all claims in full,
there was no need for any “special mechanism of the type described” in § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(V)),
aff‟d in part, vacated in part, 78 F.3d 764 (2d Cir. 1996).
482
11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(a)(8)(A).
483
Id. § 1129(b)(1).
484
Id. § 1126(c).
485
Id. § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(IV)(bb).
486
Id. § 1129(b)(1).
487
Id. § 524(g)(4)(B)(ii).
488
Id. § 524(g)(4)(A)(ii) (emphasis added).
489
Id. § 524(g)(1)(A).
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terms, the courts have universally subjected reorganization plans containing
channeling injunctions and litigation trusts to all of Chapter 11‟s provisions.490
Third, the language in § 524(g) that arguably permits non-debtor releases
without payment in full on the enjoined claims is amenable to alternative and
preferable understandings. A supplemental injunction need not shield third
parties. The text of the statute plainly authorizes injunctions that protect only the
debtor.491 If the debtor is the sole beneficiary of a channeling injunction, it is
quite possible that there will be insufficient funds to pay all asbestos claimants in
full since third parties will have no incentive to contribute resources to the
trust.492 The language allowing payment “in part” should be read to permit
debtors who are insolvent on a going-concern basis—even with the protection of
a channeling injunction—to utilize the trust/injunction mechanism. Indeed, such
debtors may be the ones for whom the mechanism will be most beneficial,
maximizing the available resources for tort and commercial creditors.
Additionally, asbestos plaintiffs frequently sue sixty to seventy defendants for
their injuries.493 Such plaintiffs may receive compensation from multiple alleged
tortfeasors. The “in part” language in § 524(g) should thus also be interpreted to
allow litigation trusts to make partial payments to plaintiffs who obtain damages
from other defendants. Given these alternative constructions, it is completely
unnecessary to read the phrase “in part” as undermining claimant protections
contained elsewhere in the Code. This is especially true with respect to the
protection guaranteed by the best interests test, which is “one of the cornerstones
of [C]hapter 11 practice.”494

490

See supra note 369 (collecting authorities). Of course, I contend that they have not applied the
best interests test correctly.
491
Compare 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(A)(ii) (stating that a supplemental “injunction may bar any
action directed against a third party” (emphasis added)), with id. § 524(g)(3)(A)(ii) (providing that
no successor who receives property from the debtor or the litigation trust pursuant to the plan or
thereafter “shall be liable with respect to any claim” (emphasis added)).
492
See supra notes 469-72 and accompanying text (noting that few plans of reorganization in
asbestos bankruptcies promise payment in full to the tort claimants); infra notes 545-51 and
accompanying text (noting that many asbestos debtors defaulted on the plans of reorganization,
paying less than was promised under the plan).
493
Brickman, supra note 24, at 992.
494
7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1129.03[7], at 1129-45 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. rev.
2004); accord In re Sierra-Cal, 210 B.R. 168, 172 (Bankr. E.D. Ca. 1997).
Another textual provision someone objecting to my argument could raise is §
524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(II), which provides that a debtor may not utilize § 524(g) unless the amount of its
future asbestos obligations cannot be determined. If such amounts cannot be determined, one
might ask, how can a plan of reorganization assure payment in full to asbestos claimants? This is a
pretty thin basis for any contention that the best interests test no longer requires payment in full on
claims barred by a non-debtor release in asbestos cases. And it is clearly subject to my first two
replies in the text. I think it is also subject to a version of the third reply: The language is amenable
to an alternative interpretation. Just because the debtor‟s future liabilities “cannot be determined,”
does not mean that the debtor and other parties are entirely in the dark. If they were, the court
would be unable to assess the feasibility of the plan under 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) (2006); it would
be impossible to determine whether the debtor could satisfy its plan obligations (even with the
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Does the Best Interests Test Always Require Payment in Full? Another
response to my argument is that the best interests test does not always require
payment in full on claims extinguished by a third-party release, whether the
release is issued under § 105(a) or § 524(g). Suppose a group of asbestos
plaintiffs holds claims of questionable validity against the third parties shielded
by a supplemental injunction. In a Chapter 7 liquidation, the plaintiffs would
receive only pro rata payments from the insolvent debtor and likely nothing from
the third parties.495 Or suppose that the debtor‟s Chapter 7 filing, combined with
the crush of tort claims, would put pressure on the third parties to file for
bankruptcy themselves. Perhaps both the debtor and the non-debtors scheduled
for protection under the injunction are insolvent when the debtor‟s asbestos
liabilities are taken into account. Under either the “weak-third-party-claims”
scenario or the “insolvent-non-debtor” scenario, the bankruptcy court may
conclude that the tort claimants would not receive payment in full if the debtor
proceeded with a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, and thus the Chapter 11 plan need not
completely satisfy the released claims despite the best interests test.
It is first necessary to point out the limited nature of this counterargument.
The two hypothetical scenarios raise an issue about the applicability of the fullpayment requirement only when the debtor‟s liquidation analysis demonstrates
(1) that the non-debtor claims are genuinely questionable, or (2) that the released
third parties are truly insolvent.496 Either point will be established in merely a
subset of asbestos (or other) bankruptcies involving non-debtor releases. The
claims against the third parties will often be meritorious. And those persons will
frequently be solvent.497
Nonetheless, this response has merit. In assessing whether a plan meets the
best interests test, courts consider the solvency of non-debtors in certain
circumstances—most importantly, in the partnership context, where they must
assess the financial status of general partners of a debtor-partnership.498 If the
flexibility written into many asbestos-related plans of reorganization). If non-debtors are going to
be shielded by a § 524(g) third-party release, they should not be able to hide behind any uncertainty
regarding the debtor‟s liabilities in order to avoid the full application of the best interests test. And
§ 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(II) ultimately does not contain any language that suggests otherwise.
495
See Feldstein, supra note 465, at 43 (“Accordingly, if the claims released under the plan have
any real value, then the best interest test requires realization of that value for the plan to be
confirmed.” (emphasis added)); cf. Esserman & Parsons, supra note 371, at 208 (suggesting that
asbestos claimants will frequently be better off if the debtor reorganizes because third parties
shielded by a § 524(g) supplemental injunction are certain to make financial contributions; if the
debtor liquidates the asbestos claimants will have to conduct “speculative and costly litigation” in
order to recover from the third parties).
496
For a short discussion of liquidation analysis, see supra note 463.
497
See, e.g., In re Combustion Eng‟g, Inc., 391 F.3d 190, 237, 238 n. 51 (3d Cir. 2004) (stating that
there was no evidence that two affiliates of the debtor, who were seeking the protection of a nondebtor release, needed to reorganize; noting, in particular, that one of non-debtors was clearly
solvent).
498
See 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1129.03[7][c][iv] (15th ed. rev. 2004) (“Under [C]hapter 7
practice, the trustee of a debtor has recourse to the personal assets of the partners of the debtor in
order to satisfy partnership debts. Thus, if the [C]hapter 11 debtor is a partnership, the liquidation
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partners are solvent, a Chapter 7 trustee is entitled to pursue the partners for any
deficiency,499 and the Chapter 11 plan must therefore pay the partnership‟s
creditors in full.500 Where the partners are insolvent, however, the best interests
test arguably no longer requires complete satisfaction of creditor claims.
Likewise, courts sometimes assess the validity of claims in performing best
interests analysis.501 For example, one court held that, although the best interests
analysis requires taking into account that the trustee would seek disallowance of
certain claims under § 502(d),502 it is not necessary to adjudicate a § 502(d)
objection503 or reach a definitive conclusion as to whether the trustee would be
successful. Rather, because the court considers only a hypothetical Chapter 7
liquidation in performing best interests analysis, it is entitled to “speculate” about
the likely outcome of the adjudication.504
On the validity question, there is authority to the contrary. Some courts
have ruled that it is inappropriate to consider the legitimacy of claims in the best
interests context because it is impractical to estimate the prospects of
collectability.505 But all this indicates is that the issue is an open one.
My intention here is not to resolve what courts should consider when
conducting the best interests analysis in bankruptcies generally. I am willing to
assume that, if the circumstances so warrant, it is often appropriate to consider
the solvency of non-debtors (e.g., of general partners) and the legitimacy of
claims and objections (e.g., § 502(d) disallowance) when applying the best
analysis will also have to estimate the probable collections from general partners of assets which
could be paid to creditors.”). For a thorough discussion of this point, see supra note 468.
499
11 U.S.C. § 723(a) (2006).
500
SCARBERRY ET AL., supra note 468, at 814 (noting that because the Chapter 7 trustee of a debtorpartnership with solvent partners may recover sufficient funds from the partners to pay creditors in
full under 11 U.S.C. § 723(a) (2006), the best interests test mandates that any such partnership pay
creditors in full if it is reorganizing under Chapter 11) (collecting authorities). For more on this
topic, see supra note 468.
501
See In re Sierra-Cal, 210 B.R. 168, 172 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1997) (stating that the best interests
test “requires estimation of disputed and contingent claims and of [C]hapter 7 administrative
expenses.”).
502
Id. at 174; see also 11 U.S.C. § 502(d) (2006) (providing for the mandatory disallowance of
claims filed by creditors holding property recoverable under various avoidance statutes).
503
In re Sierra-Cal, 210 B.R. at 174 (“The „best interests‟ analysis in plan confirmation being
hypothetical, it is not necessary (as would be required in an actual liquidation) to adjudicate the
creditor‟s § 502(d) status before imposing the § 502(d) disability.”).
504
Id. at 174 (“In computing the hypothetical [C]hapter 7 liquidation, the court is entitled to view
the entire record of the case and to engage in rational speculation about what would occur in a
[C]hapter 7 liquidation. Among other things, the court can hypothesize that certain claims would
evoke the objection of a [C]hapter 7 trustee and can speculate about the likely fate of such
objections, bearing in mind the protective purpose of the „best interests‟ test.”).
505
See, e.g., In re Syrus, 12 B.R. 605, 607 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1981) (“The extent of collectability and
the offsetting costs of collection cannot be estimated by the courts.”); In re Hurd, 4 B.R. 551, 553
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1980) (“It would also be impractical for the court to place a value on a
creditor‟s right of action against a debtor not discharged; factors such as the speed with which
judgment could be obtained, and collectability of the judgment, would have to be considered. Yet,
how could the Court fairly and accurately consider these factors?”).
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interests test. I want to proffer a more narrow argument, applicable only to a
limited number of cases: Assessing non-debtor solvency or the legitimacy of
claims against the non-debtor for best interests purposes is inappropriate when
such assessment is a prelude to a non-debtor release.
If a co-obligor of the debtor is genuinely insolvent, it should commence its
own bankruptcy (or perhaps jointly file with the debtor). A release of liability is
one of the signature benefits offered by the Code. To achieve this coveted relief,
a party almost always has to submit to the full jurisdiction of the bankruptcy
court. As explained by judges and commentators alike, it is such submission,
combined with the party‟s insolvency, that justifies the bankruptcy court‟s
extraordinary power to compel creditors to accept partial recovery.506 Sections
105(a) and 524(g) create narrow exceptions to these principles, permitting the
court to extinguish the liabilities of non-debtors who have not directly invoked
the bankruptcy system. Where the non-debtor proffers sufficient assets to enable
the plan to promise payment in full to asbestos claimants, there is no great danger
in protecting the non-debtor via a release. But when the non-debtor contributes
insufficient funding for complete resolution of the debtor‟s asbestos obligations
because the non-debtor is purportedly insolvent—yet still receives the benefit of
a release—the absolved third party escapes its tort liability without ever having to
accede to the bankruptcy process. If the non-debtor desires the type of relief
generally reserved for debtors—if the non-debtor is seeking an actual release, a
release of claims that will not be paid in full—it should submit fully to the
bankruptcy court‟s jurisdiction. Only then can a proper assessment of the third
party‟s financial status take place. Review of a liquidation analysis is too narrow
a proceeding.
Admittedly, my argument does not find support in the explicit language of §
1129(a)(7) or elsewhere of the Code. And we must be mindful of the Supreme
Court‟s admonishment to employ a plain meaning approach to the interpretation
of federal statutes,507 an approach the court has regularly followed with respect to
the Bankruptcy Code.508 But third-party releases issued outside the asbestos
context, and a significant number of releases in asbestos cases, are granted
pursuant to § 105(a) and § 1123(b)(6). Those statutes, as the primary sources of
the bankruptcy court‟s general equitable powers,509 are obviously concerned with

506

See In re Arrowmill Dev. Corp., 211 B.R. 497, 506 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1997) (quoting Judith R.
Starr, Bankruptcy Court Jurisdiction to Release Insiders from Creditor Claims in Corporate
Reorganizations, 9 BANKR. DEV. J. 485, 498 (1993)).
507
See Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000)
(“[W]hen the statute‟s language is plain, the sole function of the courts—at least where the
disposition required by the text is not absurd—is to enforce it according to its terms.” (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc. 489 U.S. 235,
241(1989))).
508
See, e.g., Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004) (“It is well established that „when the
statute‟s language is plain, the sole function of the courts—at least where the disposition required
by the text is not absurd—is to enforce it according to its terms.‟” (quoting Hartford Underwriters,
530 U.S. at 6; construing various provisions of the Bankruptcy Code)).
509
See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
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equity. And thus, it is appropriate for courts to give weight to broader
bankruptcy policies and structural considerations, like those articulated in the
previous paragraph, in deciding whether to grant a non-debtor release. In fact, in
my prior article, I expressly argued that, even when the Master Mortgage test (or
my modified version) is satisfied, a court is not required to confer a release; it
merely has the authority to do so. After finding that the Master Mortgage
elements are met, the court must still exercise its discretion and consider the
equities in determining whether such a dramatic remedy is truly warranted in the
case before it.510 Note that I am not asserting that courts are statutorily prohibited
from considering a non-debtor‟s insolvency in deciding whether an actual
release—as opposed to a channeling release—satisfies the best interests test.511
Rather, I am contending that the court should, in the exercise of its discretion,
always (or almost always) refuse to grant actual releases on equitable grounds
where the purported justification for ignoring the last element of the Master
Mortgage test is that the proposed beneficiaries of the release are insolvent. If
they are indeed insolvent, the prospective releasees should be denied relief unless
they declare bankruptcy themselves.512

510

Silverstein, supra note 6, at 79-80 & n.358 (collecting authorities).
For readers familiar with my past article, this is what distinguishes my point here from one of
the anti-release arguments I rejected with respect to § 524(e) in the prior piece. To recap, perhaps
because § 524(e) does not expressly forbid releases, some anti-release authorities have relied upon
the policies underlying that provision, and underlying the Bankruptcy Code generally, in arguing
that § 524(e) bars third-party releases. Silverstein, supra note 6, at 49-50, 122, 125. I criticized
such reasoning in light of the Supreme Court‟s plain-meaning approach to statutory interpretation
as exemplified in United States v. Energy Resource Co., 495 U.S. 545 (1990). Silverstein, supra
note 6, at 123-28. The anti-release authorities used broad structural reasoning and underlyingpolicy arguments to assert that § 524(e) is a statutory bar on all non-debtor releases, an
interpretation that goes beyond the statute‟s plain terms. This is exactly the type of statutory
construction the Supreme Court has disavowed. Id. at 123-26. And thus, I still believe the antirelease authorities are incorrect for the reasons I articulated in my last article. In the current piece, I
am relying on the same structural and policy arguments proffered by the anti-release authorities.
But I am doing so in a very different context: I am using the anti-release arguments as a basis for
recommending, on wholly equitable grounds, that courts refuse to grant § 105(a) and § 1123(b)(6)
actual releases (as opposed to channeling releases) where the asserted justification for not paying
the creditors in full is the alleged insolvency of the shielded non-debtor. I am not using structural
and policy reasoning to twist a statute like § 524(e) in a direction it will not go. And the High
Court‟s jurisprudence on statutory interpretation contains nothing that conflicts with my contention
that, when exercising equitable powers, courts should consider broader arguments based on
structure and underlying policies.
512
Cf. In re Combustion Eng‟g, Inc. 391 F.3d 190, 237 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting that “the practical
effect” of two proposed § 105(a) non-debtor releases “is to extend bankruptcy relief to two nondebtor companies outside of bankruptcy”) (further observing that the releases allow the non-debtors
“to cleanse themselves of non-derivative asbestos liability without enduring the rigors of
bankruptcy”); Brubaker, supra note 173, at 994 (observing that “non-debtor releases interject
discharge of creditors‟ non-debtor rights into a bankruptcy process designed to restructure only
creditor claims against the debtor”).
511
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The same reasoning applies with respect to the validity of non-debtor
claims that a plan proposes to extinguish. In exercising its equitable discretion, a
court should be very hesitant to permanently enjoin the prosecution of such a
claim because it believes the cause of action is baseless, and thus would not be
paid if the debtor liquidated under Chapter 7. Creditors holding claims against
non-debtors are generally entitled, on equitable grounds, to either a promise of
payment in full in the plan of reorganization, or a full adjudication on the merits.
Moreover, if the claims against the third-party really are so weak, the third-party
ought to be able to settle with the creditors for a modest amount,513 converting
the requested relief from an equitably problematic involuntary release into a
wholly legitimate voluntary one.
Of course, this analysis is pertinent only to releases granted under §§ 105(a)
and 1123(b)(6). Section 524(g) is not a general equitable statute like the other
two provisions. Thus, there is substantially less basis to argue for equitable
limits on supplemental injunctions in asbestos cases—such as my proposed
restrictions on the scope of liquidation analyses conducted pursuant to the best
interests test when a non-debtor release is involved. Accordingly, for § 524(g)
third-party releases, the validity of the claims against the non-debtor and that
party‟s solvency are likely appropriate questions to consider in addressing
whether the best interests test mandates payment in full on the released claims.
And if the court ultimately concludes that either the non-debtor is insolvent or the
claims against it lack merit, the court may uphold the § 524(g) non-debtor release
even though the plan of reorganization does not promise the asbestos claimants
full payment on the extinguished rights.514
There is one more context in which the best interests test might not mandate
payment in full for claims enjoined by a § 524(g) third-party release. Recall the
discussion in Part IV.B regarding insurance non-debtor releases issued outside
the asbestos context. There, I presented the following argument. Assume a
debtor and its insurer settle a coverage dispute for less than the policy limits.
Assume further that, in conjunction with the settlement, the court issues a thirdparty release extinguishing all claims against the carrier relating to the
compromised policy, including claims held by additional insureds and tort
claimants with property interests in the policy. An insurance release of this type
might be permissible under § 363(f) in Chapter 7 bankruptcies. If such releases
are authorized in Chapter 7 cases, then additional insureds and tort claimants will
not necessarily receive payment in full if the debtor liquidates. And, if these

513

Cf. Brubaker, supra note 173, at 993 n.122 (“The risk averse non-debtor would be willing to
trade a greater certain contribution in exchange for release from a lower projected, but uncertain,
liability outside bankruptcy.”).
514
In an essay on § 524(g), Katherine Porter offered the following: “The controversy that courts
must resolve is whether [asbestos] claimants would receive more if solvent nondebtors either had to
pay claimants out of their own (often sizeable) profits or had to file separate bankruptcy cases that
put all of the nondebtor company‟s value at issue in negotiating the terms of a trust.” Porter, supra
note 30, at 229-30. I am uncertain as to the precise point Ms. Porter is pressing in this quotation,
but it seemed sufficiently related to my discussion of the best interests test and non-debtor solvency
that I wanted to present it.
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creditors will not receive full payment in a hypothetical Chapter 7 proceeding,
the best interests test does not require full payment on the released claims in the
debtor‟s Chapter 11 action. Accordingly, outside the asbestos context, when an
insurance non-debtor release is included in a plan of reorganization that does not
promise the additional insureds and tort claimants payment in full on the
extinguished claims, the best interests test does not invalidate the release.
If this argument is valid, then insurance third-party releases issued under §
524(g) in asbestos cases would also not be subject to the payment-in-full
requirement. My contention—that the best interests test mandates full payment
on the non-debtor claims enjoined by a supplemental injunction—is premised on
the inability of courts to issue such an injunction (or any other type of third-party
release) in Chapter 7 cases. After all, § 524(g) applies solely in Chapter 11
proceedings. And non-debtor releases granted under § 105(a) or § 1123(b)(6) are
legal, at most, only when necessary to a debtor‟s reorganization. But if § 363(f)
authorizes insurance third-party releases in Chapter 7 liquidations, then the
premise of my position is false with respect to insurance releases. This would
mean that there is one type of § 524(g) non-debtor release that is conferrable
without any promise of payment in full on the barred claims: a supplemental
injunction shielding an insurance company under § 524(g)(4)(A)(ii)(III).
According to this argument, since insurance releases are allowed in Chapter 7
under § 363(f), asbestos claimants will not always recover in full from the
carriers if the debtor liquidates. And thus, a § 524(g) insurance release may
sometimes be included in Chapter 11 plans that do not promise the tort plaintiffs
full payment on the enjoined claims.
As I have implied at various points throughout this Article, I am undecided
on the question of whether § 363(f) permits courts to grant insurance releases in
Chapter 7 bankruptcies. To answer this question, I would need to resolve the
complex issues discussed in Part IV.B, including the four-way split in the courts
concerning whether (and to what extent) liability insurance proceeds are property
of the estate. That task is beyond the scope of this Article. But I felt it essential
to bring to the reader‟s attention the legal morass related to insurance non-debtor
releases; in my experience, § 524(g) insurance releases are sought by plan
proponents (and granted by the courts) in all asbestos bankruptcies. Judges and
lawyers thus need to be aware of the complexities inherent in this type of release.
And since the authorities are split on a number of the issues that impact the
propriety of Chapter 7 insurance releases, those same judges and lawyers must
also be mindful of the local governing precedents. For example, in jurisdictions
where none of the proceeds of the debtor‟s liability insurance are part of the
debtor‟s estate, § 363(f) almost certainly may not be used to grant an insurance
release, in Chapter 7 or otherwise. And thus any § 524(g) insurance release must
be contained in a plan that provides payment in full on the enjoined claims. In
territories where the debtor‟s share of the proceeds is part of the estate, § 363(f)
probably may not be used to confer an insurance release—leading to the same
result under § 524(g) as in the first group of jurisdictions. Finally, in circuits
where all of the proceeds are estate property, there is a strong case that § 363(f)
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does justify at least some Chapter 7 insurance non-debtor releases.515 And
therefore § 524(g) insurance releases need not be contained in reorganization
plans that provide full payment on the barred claims.
The Best Interests Test and Future Claimants. A final response to my best
interests argument proceeds as follows. Even if the best interests test does
require payment in full on any claims extinguished by a § 524(g) release, this
protection does not accrue to future claimants. Section 1129(a)(7)(A) only
applies to persons who hold “a claim or interest.”516 And future claimants do not
hold bankruptcy “claims.” They merely possess what § 524(g) describes as a
“demand.”517
This argument, even if valid, is of little import. Section 524(g) requires that
the holders of present and future claims receive substantially equivalent treatment
under the plan of reorganization. The statute mandates that the trust‟s operating
procedures “provide reasonable assurance that the trust will value, and be in a
financial position to pay, present claims and future demands that involve similar
claims in substantially the same manner.” 518 This language prohibits significant
discrimination between present and future asbestos claimants.519 If present tort
plaintiffs are entitled to payment in full, future tort plaintiffs must receive
“substantially the same” protection. We can thus leave aside the issue of whether
future claimants hold bankruptcy “claims” or not.520 Because these creditors are
entitled to treatment comparable to present claimants, they must effectively
receive the protections guaranteed by the best interests test.
To summarize my position so far, if an asbestos non-debtor release is issued
pursuant to § 105(a) or § 1123(b)(6), then general release law applies, including
the requirement of payment in full on the extinguished claims.521 If an asbestos
release is validly issued under § 524(g), then full payment is necessary, except in
three circumstances: (1) where the released non-debtor is insolvent; (2) where the
claims against the non-debtor are speculative; and (3) perhaps where the nondebtor is an insurance company and the supplemental injunction bars claims
against it related to insurance policies that have since been compromised. As the
case law currently stands, it is unclear whether payment in full is required in the
third circumstance; the answer to the question likely varies with the circuit, and I
am taking no firm position here.

515

I used the locution “strong case” because there are also issues specific to § 363(f), rather than to
the property-of-the-estate question, that must be resolved. See supra note 343.
516
11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(A) (2006).
517
See id. § 524(g)(5). Moreover, if the debtor liquidated, it is likely that future claimants would
receive no money at all, at least from the debtor. Plevin et al., Future Claims Representative, supra
note 32, at 276 (arguing that liquidation provides “some recourse for current claimants,” but “it
would leave future claimants entirely without recourse”).
518
11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(V) (2006) (emphasis added).
519
See In re ACandS, Inc., 311 B.R. 36, 42 (Bankr. D. Del. 2004) (finding that plan violated §
524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(V) because of excessive discrimination between claims).
520
For a brief discussion of this issue, see supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
521
Of course, in anti-release jurisdictions, courts and litigants must take account of governing
precedents that are contrary to my view.
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3. Asbestos Non-Debtor Releases and the Fair-and-Equitable Standard
There is one issue left to discuss regarding third-party releases issued
pursuant to § 524(g). The statute provides that enjoining future claimants from
suing the debtor and/or third parties must be “fair and equitable” to such
claimants “in light of the benefits provided” to the trust “on behalf of” the debtor
and any protected third parties.522 What does the phrase “fair and equitable”
mean? I have saved this issue for last because, in my view, the “fair and
equitable” language of § 524(g) should be construed in light of the payment-infull requirement mandated by the best interests test.
When applying the “fair and equitable” requirement, most courts perform a
generalized “fairness” analysis.523 This analysis is typically cursory in nature,
comprising just a few sentences in the opinion confirming the plan of
reorganization. The court notes simply that the contributions provided by the
protected debtor and third parties make the channeling injunction “fair and
equitable.”524
Beyond § 524(g), the only other Bankruptcy Code provisions that use the
phrase “fair and equitable” are the cramdown provisions. Under § 1129(b)(1), a
reorganization plan may be confirmed over the objection of a dissenting class
only if the plan “is fair and equitable” with respect to the class.525 In the
cramdown context, the concept of “fair and equitable” has multiple
components,526 including both codified and uncodified elements.527 One of the

522

11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(B)(ii).
In re Congoleum Corp., 362 B.R. 167, 179 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2007) (“Most courts that have looked
at the fair and equitable requirement for the injunction in 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(B)(ii) have looked
at all the elements of a plan and then made a generalized determination of what is fair and
equitable.”).
524
See, e.g., In re Kaiser Aluminum Corp., No. 02-10429(JKF), 7312, 2006 WL 616243, at *16*17 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 6, 2006) (noting the various contributions, and summarily concluding in
one sentence that the plan was fair and equitable to future claimants), aff‟d, 343 B.R. 88 (D. Del.
2006); In re J T Thorpe Co., 308 B.R. 782, 790-91 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2003) (listing the parent
company‟s contributions on behalf of itself and certain other released third parties, and then
concluding with a one-sentence finding that extending the injunction to cover the parent and the
other third parties was fair and equitable with respect to future claimants), order entered by, No.
02-41487-H5-11, 2003 WL 23573844 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Jan. 17, 2003), aff‟d, No. 02-41487-H511, 2004 WL 720263 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2004). But see In re ABB Lummus Global, Inc., No. 0610401-JKF, 2006 WL 2052409, at *18-*20 (Bankr. D. Del. Jun. 29, 2006) (finding the non-debtor
release to be fair and equitable to future claimants because the contributions by the non-debtors
were sufficient to enable all asbestos claimants to receive payment in full).
525
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (2006); see also id. § 1129(b)(2) (indentifying several requirements
included under the concept of “fair and equitable”); id. § 943 (providing that a municipality
reorganization plan must comply with the sections identified in § 901); id. § 901 (identifying §§
1129(b)(1), 1129(b)(2)(A) & 1129(b)(2)(B)). It should be noted that two other sections of the Code
use the similar locution “fairly and equitably.” See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1113(b)(1)(A), 1114(f)(1)(A),
1114(g)(3).
526
See generally 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶¶ 1129.04[4], 1129.05 (15th ed. rev. 2004 & 2005).
523

94

UMKC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78:1

most crucial is the absolute priority rule,528 which is codified in § 1129(b)(2).529
Another, uncodified piece adopted by many courts is a prohibition on the “unfair
and unreasonable shifting of [the] risk” of plan failure from junior to senior
classes.530
At least one court has expressly concluded that the phrase “fair and
equitable” has a different meaning in § 524(g) than it does in § 1129(b).531 And
the analysis of the § 524(g) requirement performed by other courts implies the
same understanding.532 But there is a strong argument that the phrase has
substantially the same meaning in both statutes.
When Congress drafted the cramdown provisions, it chose the phrase “fair
and equitable” with care.533 These words “reflect and stand proxy for almost a
century of judicial decision-making, and over a century of legislative
guidance.”534 And when Congress decided to use the term “fair and equitable” a
second time, in § 524(g), it is reasonable to presume that the legislative body
acted with the same circumspection.535
If the traditional understanding of “fair and equitable” applies to channeling
injunctions that bar future claimants from prosecuting their rights against the
debtor or third parties, the impact would be significant. For example, the
absolute priority component would mandate that, where the channeling
injunction shields the debtor from future claims, the plan must promise the future
claimants payment in full, or the debtor‟s shareholders have to lose their
equity.536 True, other provisions of § 524(g) only require that the litigation trust
527

Id. ¶ 1129.05 (identifying and discussing the codified pieces); id. ¶ 1129.04[4][b] (15th ed. rev.
2004) (identifying and discussing the uncodified pieces); id. ¶ 1129.04[4][c] (discussing one
particular uncodified piece—the new value component). Some of the uncodified “fair and
equitable” components are more well established than others. Id. ¶ 1129.04[4], at 1129-90.
528
Id. ¶ 1129.04[4][a], at 1129-90.
529
See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2).
530
7 COLLIER ¶ 1129.04[4][b][ii], at 1129-107.
531
See In re W. Asbestos Co., 313 B.R. 832, 850 n. 25 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2003).
532
See supra notes 523-24 and accompanying text.
533
7 COLLIER ¶ 1129.04[4], at 1129-89.
534
Id. ¶ 1129.04[4], at 1129-90.
535
Moreover, in the cramdown context, the fair-and-equitable standard, including the absolute
priority rule, only applies to dissenting classes of creditors. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (2006).
But future claimants are incapable of accepting or rejecting the plan because they are not direct
participants in the reorganization process. See id. § 524(g)(5)(A). They are involved only through
the future claims representative, see id. § 524(g)(4)(B)(i), who arguably does not get to vote on the
plan, see supra notes 385-86 and accompanying text. Since future claimants are not in a position to
dissent from a plan that sacrifices their interests to other plan constituencies, alternative forms of
protection are necessary. Congress may reasonably have concluded that requiring that the plan
always treat future claimants in a fair and equitable manner is one such protection. (Another is the
provision mandating that present and future asbestos claimants receive substantially similar
treatment contained in § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(V).) In short, there are good reasons to believe that §
524(g) uses the phrase “fair and equitable” in the traditional sense. However, as will be made clear
in the text shortly, I ultimately find this conclusion unpersuasive.
536
7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1129.04[4][a], at 1129-92 (15th ed. rev. 2004) (explaining the
absolute priority rule).
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(1) “be funded . . . by the securities of [one] or more debtors”537 and (2) receive
immediate or contingent ownership of “a majority of the voting shares” of the
debtor.538 But these obligations (and the other provisions of § 524(g)) are best
understood, I contend, as setting merely the minimum requirements for the
architecture of the litigation trust. They do not negate requirements implicit in
other Code sections that mandate higher standards in terms of the trust‟s
structure. On this interpretation of § 524(g), if a supplemental injunction enjoins
future claims that the trust will not be paying in full, the original equity holders
must lose their ownership interests.539
There is an important response to this argument. The phrase “fair and
equitable” is used differently in §§ 524(g) and 1129(b)(1). In the latter provision,
the phrase is unqualified: A plan must be “fair and equitable . . . with respect to
each class of claims or interests that is impaired under, and has not accepted, the
plan.”540 In the former, the term is used in conjunction with other language: The
court must determine that shielding the debtor or third parties “is fair and
equitable . . . in light of the benefits provided” to the trust on behalf of the debtor
or third parties.541 This contrast suggests that the words have a different meaning
in § 524(g), a meaning that centers on the contributions being made by the
shielded parties, rather than absolute priority or other traditional fair-andequitable principles.542 Given the alternative context, I find this second
interpretation to be more persuasive. “Fair and equitable” has a distinct meaning
in § 524(g), one that is not rigidly tied to the understanding applicable to those
same words as set forth in the cramdown statute.
However, even though the words “fair and equitable” connote something
different in § 524(g), this does not entail that their meaning is wholly variant
from the identical language in § 1129(b)(1). One piece of the cramdown
understanding of “fair and equitable” is that the plan must not unreasonably shift
the risk of plan failure from junior to senior creditors.543 A similar notion of risk
shifting should be read into § 524(g)‟s usage of the phrase, particularly as applied
to non-debtors protected by the supplemental injunction.
Section 524(g)‟s “fair and equitable” requirement commands the court to
determine whether it is appropriate to protect the debtor and non-debtors from

537

11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(i)(II) (2006).
Id. § 524(g)(2)(B)(i)(III) (also stating that this requirement can be satisfied through ownership
of the debtor‟s parent or subsidiaries).
539
My argument here does not entail that the trust own 100% of the reorganized debtor
immediately upon the latter‟s emergence from Chapter 11. The trust might share ownership with
other creditors, such as commercial claimants.
540
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1).
541
Id. § 524(g)(4)(B)(ii) (emphasis added).
542
Cf. 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶¶ 943.03[1][f] & 943.03[1][f][i][A], at 943-14 to 943-15 (15th
ed. rev. 2000) (explaining that, while the Chapter 11 cramdown provisions govern in Chapter 9
municipality reorganizations, “the strict fair and equitable rule of corporation reorganizations
cannot be applied without some adjustments,” and identifying some of the adjustments that are
necessary).
543
See supra note 530 and accompanying text.
538
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future claims—restricting future claimants to recovery from the litigation trust—
given the level of funding the protected parties are contributing to the trust.544
The primary concern with respect to future claimants is that the trust will run out
of money years after confirmation, either because more future claimants appear
than anticipated or because the debtor runs into business difficulties and is unable
to fulfill its obligations to the trust.545 This is not an insignificant concern.
In a recent article, James Stengel compiled a chart detailing the payments
being made by nineteen asbestos litigation trusts as of 2006.546 The data present
a bleak picture, to say the least. Of the nineteen trusts, eleven were not making
any payments at all to claimants at that time, though a few were scheduled to
start doing so. Four others were paying a de minimis amount—for example, one
was paying twenty-five dollars and another was paying 0.6% of a claim‟s value.
One trust was making payments only to plaintiffs suffering malignant injuries.
And the other three were paying at 5%, 11.25%, and 15% of a tort claim‟s
value.547 Not one of these trusts was paying even twenty-five cents on the dollar,
let alone full compensation. Stengel added that “all trusts pay only a fraction of
claim value, most have reduced payments (often dramatically), and several have
failed.”548 Other commentators have similarly documented the litigation trusts‟
payment problems.549 For example, Asbestos Litigation, a report by the RAND
Corporation, notes that many trusts “pay only pennies on the dollar,”550 and
offers the following conclusion: “It is certain that many of the asbestos personal
injury trusts established as a result of Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganizations pay
only a small fraction of the agreed-upon value of plaintiffs‟ claims; there is no
reason to believe that the reorganizations currently in process will yield vastly
different outcomes.”551
Some commentators contend that the fair-and-equitable requirement has
induced third parties to make substantial contributions to litigation trusts.552 And

544

11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(B)(ii).
See RAND, supra note 2, at 105 (“The history of asbestos litigation has been characterized by
failures to forecast its magnitude, scope, and evolution with any accuracy.”); see also id. at 102
(“The trusts are required to provide for future claimants and, consequently, the trusts are generally
concerned about being sure there will be money for future claimants.”) (further explaining that to
preserve funds for future claimants, trusts “typically pay lower than liquidated value on current
claims”).
546
Stengel, supra note 29, at 262. Some of the trusts on the list, such as the Manville trust, predate
§ 524(g).
547
Id.
548
Id. at 263 (emphasis added); id. at 262 (concluding that the asbestos litigation trusts “have been
a dismal failure”).
549
See, e.g., id., at 261 (“According to David Austern, the general counsel of the Manville Trust:
„No existing asbestos trust, except for Manville, has ever paid full liquidated value to any
claimant.‟”) (quoting David T. Austern, Presentation at the American Bankruptcy Institute Winter
Conference, Dec. 4, 2003, at 6).
550
RAND, supra note 2, at 102.
551
Id. at xxix.
552
See Porter, supra note 30, at 229.
545
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there are cases that lend some support to this conclusion.553 But the payment
history of the trusts indicates that non-debtor contributions have not been nearly
large enough. And because it is likely that every one of the Chapter 11 plans that
established the struggling trusts also released the contributing non-debtor, the
asbestos claimants have lost the opportunity to seek compensation for their
injuries from potentially liable parties.554
It is true that other § 524(g) provisions (1) indirectly address the prospect of
the debtor encountering new financial problems,555 and (2) require that the trust
be in a financial position to pay present and future claims “in substantially the
same manner.”556 Moreover, § 1129(a)(10) mandates that the plan be feasible.557
But despite these protections, the “fair and equitable” language is best understood
as heightening the necessary certainty that the trust will have sufficient assets
when a channeling injunction applies to future claimants. After all, such
claimants are incapable of participating directly in the formulation of the plan of
reorganization; rather, they are represented by a future claims representative,558
who arguably does not get to vote on the plan.559 By mandating greater certainty
that the plan will be successful, the “fair and equitable” requirement assures that
other constituencies will not formulate a plan that forces future claimants to bear
undue risk.
This reading of § 524(g) is even more compelling when the supplemental
injunction protects non-debtors. The best interests test already requires that
present and future claimants be promised payment in full on any claims barred by
the injunction (at least in most circumstances). The most logical additional

553

See, e.g., In re Quigley Co., 377 B.R. 110, 114-15 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007) (noting that the
debtor and Pfizer, its parent, would be funding the litigation trust with $645 million dollars, enough
to permit asbestos claimants to recover in full); In re J T Thorpe Co., 308 B.R. 782, 790 (Bankr.
S.D. Tex. 2003) (Thorpe Corporation, the parent of the debtor and one of the released parties, (1)
pledged its equity in the debtor to secure a loan to the debtor, (2) promised to loan up to 3.5 million
to the debtor, (4) released their claims to shared insurance with the debtor, and (4) contributed
various other miscellaneous funds and assets), order entered by, No. 02-41487-H5-11, 2003 WL
23573844 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Jan. 17, 2003), aff‟d, No. 02-41487-H5-11, 2004 WL 720263 (S.D.
Tex. Mar. 3, 2004).
554
But cf. Shelley, supra note 32, at 258-59 (contending that many personal injury plaintiffs have
improperly recovered from multiple litigation trusts, thus receiving more than full payment on their
claims).
555
See 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(i)(III) (2006) (requiring that the trust be given at least the
contingent right to own a majority of the voting shares of the debtor or related affiliates). The
“contingency” that grants a trust control of the debtor must be an event that would occur prior to
the point in time when obtaining control of the debtor would be worthless. In re Congoleum Corp.,
362 B.R. 167, 176 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2007).
556
See 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(V).
557
Id. § 1129(a)(10).
558
See id. § 524(g)(5)(A) (providing that “the term „demand‟ means a demand for payment, present
or future, that . . . was not a claim during the proceedings leading to the confirmation of a plan of
reorganization” (emphasis added)); id. § 524(g)(4)(B)(i) (providing for the appointment of a future
claims representative).
559
See supra notes 385-86 and accompanying text.
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function that the “fair and equitable” standard could serve is greater assurance
that future claimants will in fact receive full compensation if their right to pursue
non-debtors is extinguished by a channeling injunction.
In essence, I would read the § 524(g) “fair and equitable” requirement to
mandate greater certainty than mere “feasibility”560 that the plan will be able to
pay future claims, whether the supplemental injunction protects both the debtor
and third-parties, or just the debtor.
When assessing the assurance required by the “fair and equitable” standard,
courts should take careful note of the fact that large numbers of § 524(g) trusts
have failed to fulfill their plan obligations. Given this state of affairs, the “fair
and equitable” principle suggests that when courts issue supplemental injunctions
that protect third-parties they should consider specifying that the relief granted is
only a provisional injunction, not a full-blown non-debtor release. Recall how
provisional injunctions operate:561 Unlike third-party releases, a provisional
injunction does not permanently enjoin or otherwise extinguish the creditor‟s
claim against the third party the day the plan is confirmed. Instead, it merely
stays the creditor‟s right to pursue the third party. If the plan‟s promise of
payment in full is satisfied, the injunction becomes permanent. But if the debtor
defaults, the injunction is lifted and the creditor can pursue the non-debtor.
Hence the name provisional injunction; permanent relief for the protected nondebtor is contingent upon the creditor receiving total satisfaction of its debt.562
The distinguishing feature of a provisional injunction is that, contrary to a nondebtor release, it places the risk of plan failure on the benefitting non-debtor
rather than the creditor.
Nothing in § 524(g) suggests that the supplemental injunction must be
permanent.563 The injunction need merely “supplement the injunctive effect of a
discharge.”564 True, § 524(g)(3)(A)(i) states that, upon issuance or affirmance by
the district court “the injunction . . . may not be revoked or modified by any court
except through appeal in accordance with paragraph (6).”565 But this language
does not rule out an injunction that expires by its own terms, as opposed to
revocation or modification by a court. Moreover, § 524(g)(2)(A) states that
“after entry of such injunction, any proceeding that involves the validity,

560

See supra note 228 and accompanying text (discussing the “feasibility” requirement of 11
U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) (2006)).
561
See also supra notes 237-41 and accompanying text.
562
For a pre § 524(g) asbestos bankruptcy in which the plan contained a provisional injunction
rather than a non-debtor release, see The New National Gypsum Co. v. The National Gypsum Co.
Settlement Trust (In re National Gypsum, Co.), 219 F.3d 478, 486 (5th Cir. 2000) (channeling
injunction protecting third parties did not bar asbestos claimants from suing the third parties “after
exhausting the remedy or remedies provided by the [Trust]”).
563
In In re Combustion Engineering, Inc., the future claims representative proposed, during the
negotiations, that the “§ 524(g) injunction would be reevaluated if ABB Limited [the debtor‟s
ultimate parent] defaulted on its obligations under the Plan.” 391 F.3d 190, 206 n.10 (3d Cir.
2004). In other words, he proposed a provisional injunction.
564
11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(1)(A) (2006).
565
Id. § 524(g)(3)(A)(i).
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application, construction, or modification of such injunction . . . may be
commenced only in the district court in which such injunction was issued.”566
One subparagraph says no modification is permissible; another says an action to
modify must be brought before the issuing court. The best way to reconcile these
two provisions is as follows: Subparagraph (2)(A) permits modifications
expressly contemplated by the initial terms of the plan of reorganization or
confirmation order, and subparagraph (3)(A)(i) bars all other changes.567
Of course, provisional injunctions do not provide third parties the finality
they crave. Only non-debtor releases do that.568 But if a third party desires
certainty, it should have to contribute sufficient assets to make the success of the
plan more than merely “feasible.” The contributions should convince the court
that plan success, and thus full payment of any third-party claims, is highly
likely.569
In short, given the payment history of most asbestos litigation trusts, while
the protection provided by the best interests test seems broad, any promise to
future claimants of payment in full on claims extinguished by a § 524(g) release
may turn out to be hollow. If such promises are to have value, a heightened
feasibility requirement is essential. And if that stricter standard is not satisfied in
the eyes of the court, a § 524(g) provisional injunction should be the maximum
relief granted to non-debtors.
VII. CONCLUSION
The asbestos crisis has inspired courts and legislatures to develop some of
the most radical remedies in the American legal system. Non-debtor releases are
a signature example. But like other powerful remedies, non-debtor releases are
subject to abuse, as this Article demonstrates. Courts have consistently granted
third-party releases that violate established legal principles.

566

See also id. § 524(g)(2)(A) (emphasis added).
But see In re W. Asbestos Co., 313 B.R. 832, 855 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2003) (“While an
injunction is an equitable remedy, in this instance, the equities are built into 11 U.S.C. § 524(g). If
those equities are satisfied, the Court does not believe that it has the discretion to limit the effect of
the supplemental injunction to something less than permitted by statute.” (emphasis added)).
568
And thus non-debtors seeking a release are likely to vigorously challenge any proposal that a
court issue only a provisional injunction under § 524(g). After all, supplemental injunctions and
their related litigation “trusts have thus far successfully contained liability and prevented the
continued pursuit of parent companies, subsidiaries, and buyers for mass tort liability.” Johnston &
Porter, supra note 31, at 514. Indeed, “[e]ven when the asbestos trusts turn out to be underfunded,
there has been no suggestion that asbestos plaintiffs have recourse against the reorganized debtors
or their parents or affiliates.” Id. But that is only because the injunctions included in the plans
have been permanent rather than provisional.
569
Cf. 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1129.04[4][b][ii], at 1129-109 to 1129-110 (15th ed. rev.
2004) (explaining that the courts are essentially construing the cramdown “fair and equitable”
standard to require a heightened showing of feasibility when they find invalid reorganization plans
that “unfairly or unreasonably” shift the risk of plan failure from junior to senior creditors).
567
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Asbestos reorganizations are generally enormous cases of staggering
complexity. In the quest for a speedy resolution to such cases, courts and
litigants have understandably looked for legal shortcuts. The extraordinary
circumstances in asbestos insolvencies do not, however, justify disregarding
fundamental protections set forth in the Bankruptcy Code. Nonetheless, that is
precisely what has happened in these cases. Most crucially, asbestos tort
claimants have been deprived of their rights guaranteed by the best interests of
creditors test. I hope that this Article will prompt courts and parties to adopt a
new approach in asbestos bankruptcies, one that assures that § 524(g)
supplemental injunctions and other non-debtor releases are granted only after a
full consideration of the statutory limits on this form of relief.

